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1. Executive Summary 
1.1 Background
In 2012, a series of media exposés broadcast evidence implicating European 
and Russian telecommunications companies in a bribery scandal centring on 
Gulnara Karimova, daughter of Uzbekistan’s former President Islam Karimov 
(1991-2016). Subsequently, the United States Department of Justice launched 
civil forfeiture actions to recover $850 million in financial assets alleged to 
be the result of bribery in Uzbekistan’s telecommunications sector.1 The 
latter’s passage through a series of Latvian, British and Swiss bank accounts, 
linked these assets to shell companies incorporated in the British Overseas 
Territories, which Karimova is alleged to have controlled through proxies.
Tabloid accounts of the scandal portray Gulnara 
Karimova as the Uzbek princess, an indulged 
daughter of a Central Asian despot, who exploited 
her father’s position to live an ostentatious, jet-
setting life. This has kept the spotlight on Karimova’s 
celebrity status.  As a result, the extensive 
supporting cast of offshore banks, foreign advisers, 
and secrecy jurisdictions, implicated in her activities 
have not been given the same exposure. Neither 
has the systematic forms of state violence and 
institutionalised racketeering, that underwrite grand 
corruption in Uzbekistan. 
Uzbek authorities have played on Karimova’s 
tarnished public image, arguing that the state is a 
victim of her corrupt activities. The government 
maintains that Karimova, and her conspirators have 
been arrested, tried and imprisoned. 
If the US Department of Justice convince the New 
York Southern District Court that the $850 million is 
linked to criminal activities, difficult policy questions 
will emerge. Can the funds be returned directly to 
the Government of Uzbekistan? Or, instead, should 
they be employed to compensate the victims of 
the corruption? In which case is there a reliable 
basis for identifying victim groups given that grand 
corruption is by its nature supposedly discrete, 
hidden and of a financial character?
These questions emerge in an international context 
where there is growing resolve to confront grand 
corruption, and kleptocracies. Indeed, a significant 
contingent of jurists, scholars, civil society 
organisations and states, frame grand corruption 
as one of the most egregious international crimes 
today, owing to its impact on security, development, 
democracy, and human rights. 
A growing policy drive to combat grand corruption, 
has prompted law enforcement initiatives 
targeting prolific actors, and their assets. Although, 
problematically the liberal financial, corporate and 
capital regimes, which have become engrained parts 
of the kleptocratic edifice, remain largely untouched 
by any substantive reform effort. 
Given its impact and nature, the Uzbek case is a 
crucial test of the international resolve to combat 
grand corruption. The case itself demonstrates the 
transnational and institutionalised nature of grand 
corruption, and the associated difficulties this poses 
for state-centric models of justice and reform. 
Accordingly, making sense of the Karimova scandal, 
and how parties are responding to it, especially 
through assets-forfeiture, has the potential to offer 
critical insights into some of the core dilemmas 
confronting the global anti-corruption agenda.
1 Complaint. United States of America v. Any and all assets held in account numbers 102162418400, 102162418260, and 
102162419780 at Bank of New York Mellon SA/NV, Brussels, Belgium, on behalf of First Global Investments SPC Limited AAA 
Rate, et al, Case No. 1:15-cv-05063 (S.D.N.Y. June. 29, 2015); Complaint. United States of America v. all funds held in account 
number CH1408760000050335300 at Lombard Odier Darier Hentsch and Cie Bank, Switzerland, on Behalf of Takilant 
Limited, and Any Property Traceable Thereto et al, Case No. 1:16-cv-01257 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2016); See also: Freedom House, 
‘Uzbekistan: Country Profile’, Freedom on the net 2016, 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2016/uzbekistan 
(accessed 1 February 2017); P. Weiss, ‘$1.4 Billion Global Settlement Offer to Telia Portends Major Foreign Bribery Prosecution’, 
Paul Weiss, 23 September 2016, https://www.paulweiss.com/media/3733225/23sep16fcpa.pdf (accessed 1 February 2017); 
UNODC, ‘Settlements and other alternative mechanisms in transnational bribery cases and their implications for the recovery 
and return of stolen assets’, Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Asset Recovery, 25-26th August 2016, para. 
36, https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/workinggroup2/2016-August-25-26/V1604599e.pdf 
(accessed 1 February 2017). 
1.2 Report Aims
Against the above backdrop, this report is underpinned by  
a number of core aims. It will:
• Use novel data-analysis tools to systematically 
document the networks, transaction sequences, 
and commercial-political repertoires employed  
by Gulnara Karimova to establish and expand  
her Uzbek business empire, focusing on its 
illegitimate dimensions.
• Employ the modelled data to critically examine 
the role(s) which state actors have played in 
facilitating, and confronting Karimova’s activities. 
• Document the transnational infrastructure used 
by Karimova to conduct her business activities, 
evaluating its criminogenic dimensions. 
• Examine the relationship between corruption and 
human rights abuses. 
• Consider evidence-based methods for identifying 
victims of grand corruption in Uzbekistan, and 
complimentary principles of justice that can help 
guide the return of seized assets.
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1.3 Methodology
This report is grounded in the corruption investigative framework (CIF), 
a qualitative approach that employs bespoke units of analysis, that are 
twinned with a range of digitally enhanced tools designed to increase rigour. 
The elementary units of analysis include nodes, 
ties, and transactions; the advanced units used in 
this study include network architecture, transaction 
sequences, node biographies, and repertoires. As 
a whole these units of analysis help disclose the 
illegitimate motivations, opportunity structures and 
compliance cultures underpinning regionally specific 
forms of grand corruption.
Data on Karimova was collected from a range of 
sources. First, documentary records were used, 
including case files (submissions, affidavits and 
exhibits), judicial decisions, arbitration decisions, 
deferred prosecution agreements, plea agreements, 
and audit reports. Corporate registry records relating 
to key entities implicated in the corrupt schemes 
were also identified. In addition to the documentary 
research, fourteen interviews were conducted with 
Uzbek state officials, and experienced business elites. 
Two core digitally enhanced methods were 
engineered to analyse the data – investigative social 
network analysis and transaction mapping. Both 
approaches use software that allow the elementary 
units of analysis to be systematised, upon which 
basis advanced forms of analysis can take place. 
In order to investigate the generalisability of the 
patterns observed in the Karimova case, further 
case studies were conducted drawing again on court 
documents, corporate registry records, archives, 
audits, media accounts, and interviews. A total of 
eight cases were completed, centring on companies 
targeted by state-organised rackets.
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1 The transnational dimensions of the Karimova syndicate
1.4 Empirical Findings
Using the above methodology, data from documentary and oral sources 
were modelled and analysed. Once triangulated this evidence indicates: 
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2 See for example: Complaint. United States of America v. Any and all assets held in account numbers 102162418400, 
102162418260, and 102162419780 at Bank of New York Mellon SA/NV, Brussels, Belgium, on behalf of First Global 
Investments SPC Limited AAA Rate, et al, Case No. 1:15-cv-05063 (S.D.N.Y. June. 29, 2015); Complaint. United States of 
America v. all funds held in account number CH1408760000050335300 at Lombard Odier Darier Hentsch and Cie Bank, 
Switzerland, on Behalf of Takilant Limited, and Any Property Traceable Thereto et al, Case No. 1:16-cv-01257 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
18, 2016).
1 Karimova headed a powerful organised crime 
syndicate that was embedded within the Uzbek 
state. This network featured an inner core of 
fixers, managers, envoys and proxies, who were 
intimately involved in the group’s day to day 
business affairs. In addition, the syndicate also 
enjoyed ties to a non-core set of high profile fixers 
and envoys, who prosecuted the group’s affairs on 
a needs basis. 
2 Syndicate activities were conducted with the 
assistance and complicity of senior state officials, 
and enacted through a diverse range of state 
organs. These organs include cabinet, government 
committees, ministries, the courts, sector regulators, 
and the security services. These different state levers 
enabled the syndicate to expropriate businesses, 
monopolise markets, solicit bribes, and administer 
extortion rackets. Such practices were often overt. 
Key state officials implicated in syndicate activities 
continue to enjoy high profile positions within the 
Uzbek government.  
3 Syndicate activities were predicated on the 
systematic persecution of particular civilian 
populations. For instance, successful businesses 
and executives, along with their family and 
employees, appear to have been the targets 
of violent extortion rackets. More generally, 
the Uzbek national population are persecuted 
through a regime of state terrorism, that 
underpins political power, and the illegitimate 
economies this power is instrumental to. Without 
a general climate of fear, and paranoia, the illicit 
tactics essential to the syndicate’s activities in 
Uzbekistan, would have been impossible. 
4 Given that grand corruption in Uzbekistan is 
enacted through the persecution of particular 
groups, and the population as a whole, employing 
a range of inhumane tactics, collectively these 
acts constitute gross human rights violations. 
5 The repertoire of activities prosecuted through 
the Uzbek state in the Karimova case are not 
anomalous. They are systemic in character, and 
essential to the accumulation of wealth and power 
in Uzbekistan. 
6 A range of international actors, and jurisdictions 
have in practice proven essential buttresses of 
grand corruption in Uzbekistan.2 For instance:
 a. It appears European and North American 
businesses have been willing parties to protection 
rackets. Foreign telecommunications providers in 
particular, were aware of the Karimova syndicate’s 
racketeering activities, and the ultimate beneficiary. 
 b. Overseas banks in the UK, Switzerland and 
Latvia have been employed as key conduits for 
syndicate money laundering operations.The 
group’s primary bankers in these regions have a 
documented criminal history. 
 c. A range of corporate services were offered 
by the British Overseas Territories. This enabled 
syndicate activities to be conducted with secrecy 
and security. 
 d. Foreign regulators in those jurisdictions directly 
implicated in the syndicate’s activities failed to 
react, despite explicit warnings raised in the media 
and during civil litigation. 
7 The activity examined in this study, and the 
institutional systems it rests upon, generates three 
distinctive sets of potentially overlapping victims. 
Transactional victims who suffer loss or harm, as 
a direct result of state organised rackets. System 
victims who suffer loss or harm, as a result of the 
broader regime of state violence and repression 
used to enforce rackets. And finally societal 
victims, who are denied essential opportunities 
to realise their human capacities, owing to the 
kleptocratic regime’s impacts on education, 
health, infrastructure, and economic development. 
8 The arrest of Karimova and her accomplices by 
Uzbek authorities was led by officials from the 
National Security Service (SNB), and appears to have 
been politically motivated. The SNB systematically 
uses torture, and other coercive tactics, to secure 
convictions, in league with a complicit judiciary. 
Furthermore, given the documented state of the 
criminal justice system in Uzbekistan, neither 
Karimova nor her accomplices could have been 
afforded a fair or transparent trial, on which a 
secure conviction could be made. The break-up of 
the syndicate and its asset-base, is more accurately 
described as an attack by rival power-factions, using 
the levers of criminal justice as a front to disguise 
the political nature of these manoeuvres.
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1.5 Key Recommendations
On the basis of these empirical findings, a number of core recommendations 
can be made for enhancing the administration of justice in the Karimova case. 
They include: 
1 Caution should be exercised before attempting 
to deliver justice through a white-collar crime 
lens, that is focused upon punishing individual 
deviance, through state-centric processes. Such 
an approach does not address the systemic 
nature of the offending; it risks entrenching the 
marginalised position of victims; and, will generate 
secondary forms of victimisation if seized assets 
are returned to the government of Uzbekistan.
2 The conduct being confronted through asset 
forfeiture should be framed as state organised 
and systemic, rather than individually organised 
and episodic. Furthermore, this systematic, state 
organised activity involves the persecution of 
distinct groups, in addition to a broader cross-
section of society victimised through a regime 
of state surveillance and repression essential to 
illicit economies in Uzbekistan. Both groups are, 
accordingly, important stakeholders in the justice 
making process.
3 The political-economic arrangements essential  
to state-organised crime in Uzbekistan, are 
wedded to different forms of structural violence, 
including, for instance, democratic restrictions 
that preclude the public from meaningfully 
participating in spaces of political power; labour 
regimes that violate fundamental worker rights; 
rackets which prevent private sector actors from 
enjoying market freedoms essential to growing 
businesses; and, models of state asset allocation 
that reduce productivity and deny the public 
essential services. As a result, reform and justice 
need to be pursued in a strategic manner, that 
acknowledges their mutual dependency. 
4 The principles of transformative justice could 
usefully inform how stolen assets are returned 
to victim populations. In short, a transformative 
approach to asset-forfeiture would require 
processes oriented towards (a) redress of the 
diverse social harms suffered by victimised 
populations, (b) securing non-reoccurrence, 
and (c) assisting movements and initiatives that 
can instigate reforms which confront structural 
violence. To achieve these ends, a transformative 
approach encourages the engagement of victim 
groups in the design of enacting mechanisms for 
asset return, and defining desirable outcomes. 
This promotes a return process that is bottom-up, 
victim oriented, context driven and calibrated to 
important systemic changes.       
5 It would be beneficial – from a participatory 
perspective – if the seized assets were 
transferred into an institutional context, where 
civil society engagement could take place. This 
would appear to disqualify – at least in the short 
term – returning the assets to the Uzbek state, 
which in its present iteration would be unable to 
oversee such a democratic conversation, leaving 
aside the fact its institutions remain unreformed 
perpetrators of the illegitimate activities 
documented in this report. 
6 An alternative approach would be to create a new 
space where an inclusive, democratic conversation 
could take place, through the vehicle of an 
independent trust. Providing it was underpinned 
by robust oversight mechanisms, a representative 
board from civil society, and transparent reporting 
requirements, a trust could create the institutional 
context where complex policy questions are 
handled, free from state-centric pressures. It would 
also generate a safe space where victims can be 
engaged, in diagnosing the problem, setting desirable 
outcomes, and designing implementing measures.
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2 International complicity in the Karimova syndicate
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1.6 Data Visualisation
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4 Banking institutions allegedly employed by Karimova
ASSOCIATED COUNTRY: 
UNITED STATES
ATTEMPT TO PROSECUTE
OR FORFEIT ASSETS:
NO 
JURISDICTIONS
INVOLVED:
N/A
ASSOCIATED COUNTRY: 
UNITED STATES
ATTEMPT TO PROSECUTE
OR FORFEIT ASSETS:
NO 
JURISDICTIONS
INVOLVED:
N/A
International
Communications Group
through CCJV
ASSOCIATED COUNTRIES: 
RUSSIA, NORWAY AND 
THE NETHERLANDS
ATTEMPT TO PROSECUTE
OR FORFEIT ASSETS:
YES
JURISDICTIONS
INVOLVED:
UNITED STATES,
NETHERLANDS,
SWITZERLAND, NORWAY
ASSOCIATED COUNTRY: 
RUSSIA
ATTEMPT TO PROSECUTE
OR FORFEIT ASSETS:
YES
JURISDICTIONS
INVOLVED:
UNITED STATES,
SWITZERLAND
ASSOCIATED COUNTRY: 
SWEDEN, NETHERLANDS
ATTEMPT TO PROSECUTE
OR FORFEIT ASSETS:
YES
JURISDICTIONS
INVOLVED:
UNITED STATES,
SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND
5 Companies accused in court of paying bribes to Gulnara Karimova
3 A whistleblower from the Latvian banking sector claims that the Prosecutor’s Office has turned a blind eye to financial crimes in return 
for bribes. See: J. Christmas, ‘Parex Bank fraud perpetrated by the Latvian Finance Ministry and EBRD against the IMF, EU, and World Bank’, 
Lawless Latvia, 31 March 2011, http://www.lawlesslatvia.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/EBRD-fraud-letter.pdf.
BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS
SORDEX VENTURES
Holding Vehicle
ROCKDALE HOLDINGS
Holding Vehicle
TOZIAN LTD
Holding Vehicle
AQUTE HOLDINGS
Bribery
WATERTRAIL LTD
Bribery
GIBRALTAR
TAKILANT LTD
SWISDORN LTD
Organised Crime
Organised Crime
UNITED KINGDOM
PANALLY LTD
Holding Vehicle
HSBC
Financial Services
STANDARD 
CHARTERED BANK
Financial Services
CAYMAN ISLANDS
FIRST GLOBAL
INVESTMENT
Financial Services
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6 UK complicity in Karimova syndicate
7 Uzbek state agencies alleged to have acted on the instructions of Karimova
Cabinet of Ministers
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Defence
State Property Committee
Anti-monopoly Committee
Ministry of Internal Affairs
National Security Service
Presidential Security Service
General Prosecutor’s Office
Mirabad District Court
Economic Court of Tashkent
Supreme Court of Uzbekistan
Uzpischeprom
Agency for  Communications  
and Information
IM
PL
EM
ENTI
NG STATE ORGANS
Bekhzod Akhmedov
Nationality: Uzbek
Notable roles: Director-
General, Uzdunrobita 
Alleged link: Envoy, 
fixer, manager, advise.
Aliyer Ergashev
Nationality: Uzbek
Notable roles: Executive, 
Coca-Cola Bottlers of 
Uzbekistan 
Alleged link: Manager.
Sodiq Safoyev
Nationality: Uzbek
Notable roles: Deputy 
Foreign Minister, Chair 
of the Foreign Relations 
Committee
Alleged link: Envoy, fixer.
Gayane Avakyan
Nationality: Armenian
Notable roles: Director, 
House of Style 
Alleged link: Proxy, 
manager.
Harry Eustace, Snr
Nationality: US
Notable roles: Adviser, 
Zeromax GmbH; 
Director, American 
Uzbekistan, Chamber of 
Commerce; Co- Owner, 
FMN Logistics. 
Alleged link: Adviser.
Alisher Sayfuddinov
Nationality: Uzbek
Notable roles: Deputy 
Chief, Presidential 
Security Service 
Alleged link: Envoy, fixer.
Brian Bowen
Nationality: US
Notable roles: Founder, 
Uzdunrobita
Alleged link: Adviser, 
envoy.
Rustam Madumarov
Nationality: Uzbek
Notable roles: Singer, 
DADO 
Alleged link: Proxy, 
manager.
Irina Avtaikina
Nationality: Uzbek
Notable roles: –
Alleged link: Proxy.
Farhod Inogambaev 4
Nationality: Uzbek
Notable roles: –
Alleged link: Adviser, 
manager, fixer, envoy.
Mirabror Usmanov
Nationality: Uzbek
Notable roles: Minister 
of Trade, Deputy Prime 
Minister
Alleged link: Adviser.
Miradil Djalalov
Nationality: Uzbek
Notable roles: Owner, 
CEO, Zeromax
Alleged link: Manager, 
proxy.
Sharuh Sabirov
Nationality: Uzbek
Notable roles: 
Executive, Coca-Cola 
Bottlers of Uzbekistan
Alleged link: Manager.
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8 Selected list of Karimova’s alleged associates
4 It is claimed by Farhod Inogambaev, he assisted the Karimova syndicate after his brother was held hostage by the Presidential Security 
Service and Karimova’s Chief of Security, and threats were made to his family.
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9 Karimova syndicate structure
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‘Moscow-based Mobile 
TeleSystems on Friday  
agreed to pay as much as  
$159 million for a cellphone  
company owned by the 
controversial daughter  
of authoritarian Uzbek  
President Islam Karimov  
or roughly 33 times  
what the company  
valued itself at just  
two years ago’
Simon Ostrovsky, The Moscow Times, 19 July 2004
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2. Overview and Methodology 
2.1 Introduction
Over the past decade grand corruption,5 and kleptocratic regimes,6 have 
emerged as global challenges that must be tackled with urgency, vigour and 
collective resolve by the international community. A growing movement 
against grand corruption in all its forms – which includes civil society, 
governments, international institutions, businesses, and the broader 
public – articulates a widespread outrage against criminal forms of wealth 
accumulation, that transcends class, ethnic and geopolitical boundaries.
This rare point of synthesis between such a 
wide nexus of stakeholders, reflects the deep 
and damaging impact grand corruption has on 
security, human rights, democracy and markets. 
Yet even as global literacy on the dangers posed 
by grand corruption improves, it is still very often 
framed as a financial or economic crime. This often 
conceals the intricate relationship between grand 
corruption and mass human rights violations. As a 
form of state organised crime, grand corruption is 
frequently coupled to targeted forms of violence 
and broader regimes of terror, marked by torture, 
disappearances, and persecution, all of which is 
designed to enforce illicit economies, and uphold 
the impunity of offenders. Moreover, the direct 
impact of grand corruption on democratic freedoms, 
public administration and service delivery, further 
violates the right of victim populations to health, 
housing, security and education. It is for these 
reasons, that a persuasive argument is emerging that 
grand corruption deserves to be regarded as one of 
the most egregious human rights challenges facing 
the global community.7
Indeed, as the following report will evidence, when 
forensic qualitative methodologies are used to 
investigate grand corruption in its concrete forms, 
we witness systematic and widespread attacks on 
distinct groups, using a range of inhumane methods. 
The emerging consensus that grand corruption 
constitutes an international crime of the most serious 
kind, places a burden on the international community 
to act decisively, in order to protect persecuted 
communities, remedy harm suffered by victims, and 
engage in initiatives that ensure non-reoccurrence.
Confronting grand corruption in a direct and urgent 
manner, however, does not require incursions that 
will necessarily threaten the sovereignty of offender 
states. Evidence strongly indicates that grand 
corruption is inherently transnational in character.8 
It thrives on a permissive international framework 
of shell companies, banks, asset warehouses, 
and professional/corporate collaborators, which 
allow the looted funds to be extracted, laundered, 
anonymised and invested in offshore locations. 
Given that the apparatus used to execute grand 
corruption is transnational in character, it can often 
therefore be confronted through international 
cooperation targeted against its offshore spokes.
5 The Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (2013: 3) observes: ‘Grand corruption takes place at 
high levels of the political system, when “politicians and state agents entitled to make and enforce the laws in the name 
of the people, are misusing this authority to sustain their power, status and wealth.” Essentially, grand corruption not only 
breaks national laws, but more seriously still, it distorts and undermines the rule of law itself. Grand corruption is systemic, 
becoming an integrated and essential aspect of the very economic, social, and political systems that should combat it.’
6 Menkaus and Prendergast (2016) define kleptocracy as a ‘a system of state capture in which ruling networks and 
commercial partners hijack governing institutions for the purpose of resource extraction and for the security of the 
regime’. Accordingly, kleptocracies are regimes marked by such a high degree of grand corruption that there is virtually no 
governmental space for accountability or reform.
7 See for example: G. Zasada, ‘Uzbekistan: The major source of instability in Central Asia?’, Centre for Eastern Studies 
(OSW), 2004, https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/prace_15_3.pdf (accessed 13 February 2017); Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘The Human Rights Case Against Corruption’, OHCHR, November 2013, 
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Development/GoodGovernance/Corruption/HRCaseAgainstCorru ption.pdf (accessed 
13 February 2017); T. Soreide, ‘Driver of Corruption: A Brief Review’, World Bank Group, 2014, http://elibrary.worldbank.
org/doi/abs/10.1596/978-1-4648-0401-4 (accessed 13 February 2017).
8 A. Cooley and J.C. Sharman, ‘Blurring the line between licit and illicit: transnational corruption networks in Central Asia 
and beyond’, Central Asian Survey, vol. 34 no. 2, 2015, pp. 11-28.
 
RANK COUNTRY 2015 SCORE
158 Guinea-Bissau 17
158 Venezuela 17
161 Iraq 16
161 Libya 16
163 Angola 15
 163 South Sudan 15
165 Sudan  12
166 Afghanistan 11
167 Korea (North) 8
167 Somalia 8
RANK JURISDICTION FSI VALUE SECRECY SCORE GLOBAL SCALE WEIGHT
1 Switzerland 1.466,1 73 5,625
2 Hong Kong 1.259,4 72 3,842
3 USA 1.254,8 60 19,603
4 Singapore 1.147,1 69 4,280
5 Cayman Islands  
 (British Overseas Territory) 1.013,2 65 4,857
6 Luxembourg 817,0 55 11,630
7 Lebanon 760,2 79 0,377
8 Germany 701,9 56 6,026
9 Bahrain 471,4 74 0,164
10 United Arab Emirates (Dubai) 440,8 77 0,085
10 The 10 worst secrecy havens in the Tax Justice Network’s  
Financial Secrecy Index 2015
11 The bottom 10 performers in Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index 2015
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Arguably one of the most predatory kleptocracies 
in operation today, which represents a litmus test 
of the international resolve to confront grand 
corruption, is the government of Uzbekistan. Over 
the past twenty years a body of evidence has 
emerged, which strongly suggests organised crime 
rackets are systematically employing state levers, 
with the active participation of senior government 
officials and politicians.9 The range of predatory 
economic activities prosecuted through the Uzbek 
state apparatus, are myriad, and include:
 •  Protection rackets   
 •  Bribery
 •  Extortion rackets   
 •  Kidnap and ransom   
 •  Misappropriation    
 •  Asset expropriation    
 •  Forced labour
 •  Black markets   
 •  Drug trafficking
In July 2012, Swiss authorities initiated one of the 
first foreign prosecution efforts directed against 
those involved in facilitating state-organised crime 
in Uzbekistan, which included two officials from the 
joint-venture, Coca-Cola Bottlers of Uzbekistan.10 
An exposé broadcast by Swedish public television 
in September 2012,11 led to a further wave 
of prosecutions against telecommunication 
multinationals implicated in the bribery of Uzbek 
officials, including Swedish firm TeliaSonera, and the 
Dutch based company, Vimpelcom.
These scandals centred on Gulnara Karimova, 
the eldest daughter of long-standing Uzbek 
President, Islam Karimov, who officially passed 
away on 2 September 2016. It is alleged that in the 
telecommunications sector alone she was the ultimate 
beneficiary of at least $850 million in illicit payments.12 
9 See for example: D.G. Lewis, ‘Tackling Corruption in Uzbekistan: A White Paper’, Open Society Foundations, June 2016, 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/tackling-corruption-uzbekistan- 20160524.pdf (accessed 17 
February 2017).
10 J. Lillis, ‘Uzbekistan: Swiss Confirm Laundering Probe After Reports of Googoosha Protest’, EurasiaNet, 6 September 
2012, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65873 (accessed 27 November 2016).
11 S. Bergman, ‘TeliaSonera in milliondollar deal with dictatorship’, SVT, 19 September 2012, http://www.svt.se/ug/
TeliaSonera-i-miljardaffar-med-diktatur (accessed 27 November 2016).
12 U.S. Department of Justice, ‘VimpelCom Limited and Unitel LLC Enter into Global Foreign Bribery Resolution of More 
Than $795 Million; United States Seeks $850 Million Forfeiture in Corrupt Proceeds of Bribery Scheme’, Office of Public 
Affairs (News), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/vimpelcom-limited-and-unitel-llc-enter-global-foreign-bribery- resolution-
more-795-million (accessed 27 November 2016). 
12 Alleged illicit payments made  
to Karimova front companies
US $381 million
US $176 million
US $350 million
It would be strategically dangerous, and factually 
incorrect, however, to view this as an example 
of individual deviance. Systematic analysis of the 
data presented in court, and to the media, coupled 
with insider interviews, reveals a more complex 
phenomenon implicating all three branches of the 
Uzbek state, and a corporate and financial edifice 
rooted in Europe and North America. Indeed, 
evidence analysed for this report suggests:
1 Karimova headed a powerful syndicate that was 
embedded within the Uzbek state.
2 Illicit activities authored by the syndicate were 
conducted with the assistance and complicity 
of senior state officials, and enacted through 
a diverse range of state organs. These organs 
include cabinet, government committees, 
ministries, the courts, sector regulators, and the 
security services.
3 The repertoire of activities prosecuted through 
the Uzbek state in the Karimova case are not 
anomalous. They are systematic and systemic in 
character, and essential to the accumulation of 
wealth and power in Uzbekistan.
4 A range of international actors, and jurisdictions, 
are essential to the practice of state- organised 
crime in Uzbekistan. In particular, it appears 
European and North American businesses have 
been willing parties to protection rackets, while 
banks in the same regions have been employed as 
key conduits for money laundering operations.13 To 
ensure secrecy and security, the British Overseas 
Territories have solicited a range of corporate 
services to syndicate members.
5 The illicit activity, and the institutional systems 
it rests upon, generates three distinctive sets 
of potentially overlapping victims. Transactional 
victims who suffer loss or harm, as a direct result 
of state organised rackets. System victims who 
suffer loss or harm, as a result of the broader 
regime of state violence and repression used 
to enforce rackets. And finally societal victims, 
who are denied essential opportunities to 
realise their human capacities, owing to the 
kleptocratic regime’s impact on education, health, 
infrastructure, and economic development.
It is important to note that the category ‘syndicate’ 
is purposely employed in this report. The empirical 
case studies detailed below contain evidence which 
indicates that Karimova’s operations, were grounded 
in an organised network, that she presided over. 
The data suggests that this network featured an 
inner core of fixers, managers, envoys and proxies, 
who were intimately involved in the group’s day to 
day business affairs. In addition, the syndicate also 
enjoyed ties to a non-core set of high profile fixers 
and envoys, who prosecuted the group’s affairs on a 
needs basis. Through this core and non-core set of 
actors, the executive, judiciary and security apparatus 
were used to prosecute syndicate business.
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13 Complaint. United States of America v. Any and all assets held in account numbers 102162418400, 102162418260, and 
102162419780 at Bank of New York Mellon SA/NV, Brussels, Belgium, on behalf of First Global Investments SPC Limited 
AAA Rate, et al, Case No. 1:15-cv-05063 (S.D.N.Y. June. 29, 2015); and Complaint. United States of America v. all funds held 
in account number CH1408760000050335300 at Lombard Odier Darier Hentsch and Cie Bank, Switzerland, on Behalf of 
Takilant Limited, and Any Property Traceable Thereto et al, Case No. 1:16-cv-01257 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2016).
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The first aim of this report is to set out the evidence 
upon which the above five core claims are grounded, 
drawing on pioneering data-analysis techniques. 
This objective will be achieved by conducting a 
critical biography of the Gulnara Karimova syndicate 
focusing on the period between 2001 and 2012. 
Using four case studies, we will examine how 
syndicate activities were organised through state 
machinery, and the precise deleterious impacts they 
had on different persecuted populations. However, 
when producing this portrait, data will be cross 
referenced with information acquired from interviews 
and documentary research, which point to the 
systematic quality of the activities under examination, 
which stretch far beyond the Karimov family. 
The second aim of this report is to consider 
the ramifications of these five core claims, for 
the methods and mechanisms with which the 
international community confronts this activity. 
Given that there is an international effort currently 
underway to seize and return assets associated with 
Karimova’s activities, it is an opportune occasion 
to reflect on the principles and processes that can 
most effectively deliver justice.
It will be argued that an approach must be employed 
which recognises that these assets emerged from 
activities which are systemic, state-driven, and 
rooted in a structure that denies Uzbek people their 
capacity to fully participate in political, economic 
and social life. Justice oriented responses must, 
therefore, be driven by enacting mechanisms that 
incorporate victimised populations – however, 
difficult this may practically be – in ways which 
enable this stakeholder group to decide how assets 
are applied to address the questions of restitution 
and non-reoccurrence.
To that end, it will be suggested that important 
lessons can be drawn from transitional justice 
initiatives set up to confront and reform regimes of 
violence, and the critiques they have engendered. 
These critiques raise serious concerns over 
state-centric models of justice, that are led by 
technocratic specialists, which instrumentalise 
victim agency through set forums, where they 
assume prescribed roles. Crucially, it is claimed, 
transitional models often fail to bring about durable 
solutions that allow victimised and marginalised 
sectors of the population to meaningfully participate 
in political, economic and cultural life.
In response, a new paradigm of transformative 
justice has emerged. This paradigm recognises 
that there is an intimate relationship between 
direct forms of violence, such as persecution 
and state terror, and broader, structural forms of 
violence rooted in closed political spaces, economic 
exploitation and social exclusion. The latter 
phenomena are deliberately framed as structural 
violence, owing to the significant impacts these 
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processes have on the capacity of individuals to 
realise their capacities, and enjoy a full range of 
civil, political and socio- economic rights. As a 
result, transformative justice promotes holistic 
responses which address both direct and structural 
forms of violence, through a process oriented 
paradigm where victimised populations are central 
drivers, both in defining outcomes and constructing 
mechanisms for achieving these outcomes.
In the final section of this report, therefore, a 
transformative justice lens will be employed to 
develop an approach for asset forfeiture in the Uzbek 
case that builds on lessons drawn from the field of 
transitional justice. To that end, it will be argued: 
1 Delivering justice through a white-collar crime 
lens that focuses efforts on punishing individual 
deviance, through state-centric models, will not 
address the causes underpinning the individual 
offending event. Furthermore, it risks entrenching 
the marginalised position of victims, and will in 
the Uzbek case generate secondary forms of 
victimisation if seized assets are returned to  
the state.
2 The conduct being confronted through asset 
forfeiture should instead be framed as state 
organised and systemic, rather than individually 
organised and episodic. Furthermore, this 
systematic, state organised activity involves the 
persecution of distinct groups, in addition to a 
broader cross-section of society victimised through 
a regime of state surveillance and repression 
essential to illicit economies in Uzbekistan. Both 
groups are, accordingly, important stakeholders in 
the justice making process.
3 The political-economic arrangements essential to 
state-organised crime in Uzbekistan, are wedded 
to different forms of structural violence, including, 
for instance, democratic restrictions that preclude 
the public from meaningfully participating in 
spaces of political power; labour regimes that 
violate fundamental worker rights; rackets which 
prevent private sector actors from enjoying 
market freedoms essential to growing businesses; 
and, models of state asset allocation that reduce 
productivity and deny the public essential 
services. As a result, reform and justice needs to 
be pursued in a strategic manner, in a way that 
acknowledges their mutual dependency.
4 The principles of transformative justice could 
usefully inform how stolen assets are returned 
to victim populations. In short, a transformative 
approach to asset-forfeiture would require 
processes oriented towards (a) redress of the 
diverse social harms suffered by victimised 
populations, (b) securing non-reoccurrence, 
and (c) assisting movements and initiatives that 
can instigate reforms which confront structural 
violence. To achieve these ends, a transformative 
approach encourages the engagement of victim 
groups both in the design of enacting mechanisms 
for asset return, and defining desirable outcomes. 
This approach promotes a return process that is 
bottom-up, victim oriented, context driven and 
calibrated to important systemic changes.
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2.2 The corruption investigative framework:  
A toolkit for grand corruption inquiry
If initiatives are to be designed that are capable of confronting grand 
corruption in its concrete, regionally specific forms, there is a need to access 
reliable data on the particular schemas, and networks, through which it is 
enacted. Yet, in practice, this is difficult to do. Although grand corruption, 
by definition, involves significant sums of wealth, the illicit activity itself is 
hidden by an edifice of secrecy, sham-fronts, and obfuscation, deliberately 
set up by the responsible actors. This presents researchers, civil society and 
policy makers, with a methodological dilemma.
To date, the scholarly and practitioner literature 
has tended to focus on the methodological and 
analytical challenges associated with measuring 
corruption, and gauging its impact. Less emphasis 
has been placed on building qualitative methods 
that can document, in intricate detail, the social 
systems and processes that are responsible for these 
varying levels in corrupt activity.
This report is grounded in the corruption 
investigative framework (CIF), an approach to 
corruption research which has been developed by 
Lasslett to help address he above lacuna. In order 
to build and enrich data-sets on grand corruption, 
CIF employs bespoke units of analysis, which are 
twinned with a range of digital tools designed 
to increase rigour. These units of analysis have 
been inductively generated – in conversation 
with existing scholarly traditions – through over a 
decade of investigative inquiry into complex forms 
of corrupt activity. They represent, therefore, an 
empirically grounded attempt to distinguish, and 
methodically prioritise, certain social determinations 
that have proven to be among the most essential 
for building comprehensive understandings of grand 
corruption in its specific regional forms.
The units of analysis underpinning CIF may be 
differentiated into elementary and advanced 
components. The elementary units include nodes, 
ties, and transactions. They are among the most 
basic constituting components of corrupt schemes. 
The advanced units of analysis are the broader 
wholes which these elementary units form part of.14
They include, network architecture, transaction 
sequences, node biographies, and repertoires, 
which as a whole help to disclose the criminogenic 
motivations, opportunity structures and compliance 
cultures underpinning grand corruption. This is not 
an exclusive list, there is scope for refinement and 
flexibility. Nevertheless, establishing coherent units of 
analysis for inquiry, that are replicable, is essential for 
building national and international data-sets that are 
comparable, both on a geopolitical and longitudinal 
basis. Comparability in this respect is essential for 
building generalisable theories, teasing out regional 
nuances, and for appreciating change over time.
If we turn first to the basic units of analysis, nodes 
designate the differentiated material elements of 
a social system underpinning grand corruption. 
This includes, for instance, individual actors, public 
institutions, corporate entities, valuable assets, and 
forums (such as, a conference, court case, or social 
club). Clearly, if we are to empirically document 
grand corruption in its concrete, historical forms, 
key nodal points, such as fixers, front companies, 
political powerbrokers, targeted assets, important 
decision making forums, and civil society actors 
mounting resistance, must be plotted. It is also vital 
that the ties linking nodes are traced. Tie types will 
14 This distinction between elementary and advanced units of analysis is epistemological, rather than ontological. It 
recognises that while inorganic, organic, and social matter only exists through integrated systems, where elements obtain 
their concrete, historical characteristics from their position within these totalities – nevertheless, if the human mind is to 
comprehend such systems it must begin with elementary processes, before attempting to comprehend the more complex 
whole. As the latter appreciation forms, it also enriches understandings of the basic units, as we begin to comprehend 
their position within the broader totality.
vary depending on the nodes concerned, and the 
particular relation(s) shared. They might include: 
ownership, partnership, kinship, client, employment, 
or rivalry, to name just a few examples. The more 
entrenched the research becomes, the greater the 
number of ways ties might be coded to reflect the 
finer nuance of relationships.
Of course for a social system to exist, it must have 
active components that are driving momentum 
– otherwise the system falls into stasis. The 
transaction is a basic category designed to designate 
any single, identifiable action, which takes place 
within a social system. It might include, for example, 
the transfer of money between offshore bank 
accounts, or a government committee’s decision 
to grant a particular firm valuable economic rights. 
Transactions generate ties, and see resources 
circulate through the network, forming the pulse 
of social systems and the historical sequences they 
give rise to.
Given the size and complexity of the potential data-
sets being dealt with here at an elementary level, 
systematic tools are required which can help to 
extract, collate, and process the data. Two primary 
methodological vehicles have been developed to 
help in this respect. The first is a digitally enhanced 
method, investigative social network analysis 
(ISNA). ISNA is designed to enhance the rigour of 
data collection, and analysis, with specific respect 
to nodes and ties. This tool is complimented by 
transaction mapping, another digitally enhanced 
approach that systematises transaction data so that 
it can be interrogated to improve understandings 
of the broader sequences underpinning the illicit 
activity being scrutinised.
To date, ISNA has been conducted using the 
community version of Maltego Casefile. Casefile 
allows node and tie data to be coded and mapped 
on digraphs (directional graphs), so that it can then 
be evaluated drawing on concepts developed within 
the social network analysis literature, which help 
to disclose network power dynamics, weaknesses 
and vulnerabilities. In contrast to orthodox forms 
of social network analysis, however, ISNA does not 
rely on a uniform data-collection process. Indeed, 
grand corruption does not lend itself to a controlled 
field environment, where standardised surveys can 
be conducted. Rather, as a phenomenon it tends to 
be uncovered incrementally, through pain-staking 
investigation, that yields results in an uneven and 
unpredictable fashion.
In recognition of these challenges, ISNA embeds 
data-analytics in the fieldwork process to enhance 
the data yield. To that end, node and tie data can 
be plotted real-time while in the field using Maltego 
Casefile, thus allowing emerging network models 
to inform future iterations of the investigative 
process, armed with leads and hypotheses inspired 
by the digraph. Gradually, over the course of the 
investigation a large number of nodes and ties 
are inputted. Thus, once fieldwork concludes a 
significant digital asset exists which can then be 
subjected to further analysis using data-visualisation 
techniques, and social network analysis algorithms, 
to detect nuances in the network architecture.
Transaction mapping compliments ISNA, both as 
an in-field diagnostic tool, and a post- fieldwork 
analytical vehicle. In the Uzbek case, Tiki-Toki has 
been used. This timeline software package allows 
transaction data to be plotted on a graph, and coded 
on two bases, author and date. There is also capacity 
within the programme to embed in plotted data 
detailed event information so sequences can be 
reconstructed. Like with Maltego Casefile, data can 
be plotted real-time in the field, enabling researchers 
to develop working hypotheses on transaction 
sequences, which can be explored through further 
inquiry. Once the data has been fully plotted on a 
timeline it can then be analysed using a series of 
analytical concepts, designed to help researchers 
connect transactions into broader sequences, and 
draw certain evidence based meanings from them.
In practice, the data collected through fieldwork 
is coded in three steps that tend to be taken 
simultaneously. First, it is thematically coded using 
NVivo, or alternatively Excel. This creates a master 
database where all the processed data is stored. 
Then it is coded and embedded in a social network 
digraph, and transaction timeline, which constitute 
the second and third iterations of the coding 
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process. Collectively this creates a three dimensional 
model of the infrastructure and processes through 
which grand corruption is concretely organised. It is 
upon this foundation that the data can be harnessed 
in order to think about the advanced units of analysis.
The advanced units of analysis CIF employs have 
emerged inductively over a ten year period, whilst 
researching grand corruption in the Pacific and 
Eurasia. They evolved out of finer grained analyses 
conducted using the elementary units of analysis, 
which laid the foundation for building concepts 
capable of capturing the broader wholes these 
molecular processes are part of. 
The first advanced category, network architecture, 
focuses on the social network as an evolving 
totality, looking at the structured inter-relativeness 
between its constituting elements, and the concrete 
meanings these elements obtain as a result of the 
system they are part of. For example, politician 
A may act as a bridge between investors B, C 
and D, and the President. By acting as a conduit 
between the investors and a paramount decision 
maker, politician A is able to fix public tenders 
using the President’s office; while, the President 
enjoys insulation from the immediate zone of illicit 
activity, minimising the risk of exposure. From the 
President’s vantage point, Politician A is a buffer, 
from the vantage point of the investors, he is a fixer 
– for both sides Politician A is an asset. On the other 
hand, because Politician A has inside knowledge 
from their covert role, they represent a potential 
threat to the President, who fears exposure; while 
investor B, C and D’s dependency on Politician 
A as a fixer, means that if the latter is ousted by 
the President, they could face expropriation and 
loss of their assets. So when we talk of network 
architecture, it is a frame that instigates a strategic 
focus on the dynamics that emerge from forms 
of inter-relatedness, that can only be concretely 
uncovered by looking at the broader totality.
The transaction sequence is another advanced unit 
of analysis. It hones attention on an expanse of 
inter-connected transactions, authored by a single 
or multiple entities. In effect this frame focuses the 
investigative lens on the different ways in which 
transactions may connect together to form part 
of a sequence that drives a corrupt schema from 
conception to fruition. For example, an overarching 
sequence may involve marshalling security force 
members to intimidate rivals, journalists, and civil 
society, which occurs in tandem with the rigging 
of a government committee, so an oil contract is 
awarded to an offshore company, owned by members 
of the intelligence services, who provide kickbacks 
to the President. Meanwhile, lawyers, bankers and 
accountants are contracted to launder the proceeds 
into safe havens in Europe and North America. 
Here we see a series of inter-connected transaction 
chains, authored by multiple entities, whose concrete 
significance can only be fully appreciated by tracing 
the connections between these different threads. 
So, in effect, the transaction sequence involves 
forensically piecing together transactional data 
so we begin to see the broader sequences they 
are part of, which gives new meaning to the data 
collected. Elsewhere I have set out in greater detail 
precise techniques that can be used to reconstruct 
sequences (see Lasslett Forthcoming).
Entity biography, is another advanced unit of 
analysis. It hones attention on particular nodes 
within a network, looking at their characteristics 
through a life-history lens. Whether it be an 
individual, company or public institution, it is 
possible in some instances to capture how they 
have developed over time, including expansions in 
resources and influence, the honing of particular 
skill-sets, the acquisition of certain assets, the 
fostering of concrete cultures and customs, etc. 
For instance, put crudely, it may be that a certain 
corporate clique have a biography, extending back 
two decades, which is marked by the systematic 
use of bribery, price gouging, market rigging, and 
extortion. Pulling together this biography, alerts 
attention to behaviour and practices that have been 
refined and ratified through reward and impunity, 
which forms an important part of the motivation 
and opportunity structure, for the current scheme 
under examination. Similarly, it may be found after 
constructing a historical portrait of, for instance, 
the Lands Department, that a series of fraudulent 
techniques have been systemically used to forge 
titles, manipulate tax/rental rates, and solicit bribes, 
with upper management playing a key role, in 
league with politicians and senior business figures. 
All of which signals the emergence of a historically 
generated edifice designed to buttress the interests 
of a speculative class who have commandeered 
key sites of power within the state and business 
to administer a black economy in land. Entity 
biographies, in effect, offer a frame through which 
to understand how existing structures, processes 
and mechanisms articulate a longer process of 
manipulation and graft, that has now coagulated 
into criminogenic infrastructure.
Where multiple case-studies have been produced 
on certain corrupt schemas in a particular region, 
a comparative lens can be employed to detect 
patterned conduct that may constitute a repertoire. 
Repertoire here designates routine behaviour that 
has emerged within a particular social environment 
and become an established methodology for 
achieving a particular objective, in our case 
engineering illicit transactions. For example, 
when scrutinising multiple cases of bribery it may 
become apparent that foreign investors negotiate 
with fixers, using offshore corporate accounts 
to anonymously make illicit payments to senior 
politicians, protected by a buffer of proxies. Or, it 
might observed that successful businesses within 
a jurisdiction, after approximately five years of 
operation begin experiencing a series of escalating 
extortive demands administered by government 
agencies, until finally they are violently expropriated 
by security forces. In both cases, it could be 
surmised that there is evidence of an established 
repertoire. The hypothesis’ validity will increase with 
the number of supporting case studies. Critically 
though, repertoire as an advanced unit of analysis, 
hones attention on the way, even illicit practices, are 
enacted through standardised work processes, and 
forms of professional knowledge, which circulate 
and become a generalised methodology for graft.
As a whole then, CIF functions in the first instance 
by employing elementary units of analysis as a 
compliment to fieldwork and a building block for 
undertaking advanced forms of analysis, employing 
the frames cited above. Both steps are enacted 
through thematic analysis, ISNA and transaction 
mapping, aided by a number of software packages. 
However, if CIF is to render meaningful results, it 
requires a reliable supply of data from the field. To 
research the Karimova case, data was collected from 
a range of sources. First, documentary materials 
were located, including case files (submissions, 
affidavits and exhibits), judicial decisions, 
arbitration decisions, deferred prosecution 
agreements, plea agreements and audit reports. 
These materials emerged from five civil suits,15 
three criminal prosecutions,16 two international 
arbitration proceedings and an audit conducted for 
TeliaSonera.17 Corporate registry records relating 
to key companies implicated in the transaction 
sequences were also collated, many of which were 
initially sourced from the Organized Crime and 
Corruption Reporting Project. Documents emerging 
from the prosecution of banks linked with Karimova, 
initiated by the US Department of Justice, New York 
State Department of Financial Services, and the 
UK Financial Conduct Authority were employed, 
complimented by related audits and consultancy 
reports, including most notably the Mannheimer 
Swartling18 and Brown Rudnick19 investigations 
into foreign bribery, and Latvian money- laundering, 
respectively. A survey of the media reporting was 
conducted using Nexis.
In addition to the documentary research, fourteen 
insider interviews were conducted with Uzbek state 
officials, and experienced business elites. In a closed 
society, accessing insider sources is a challenging 
task, which requires locating the right gatekeepers, 
and ensuring the contact is kept discrete. Given 
the risks participants’ faced, their evidence was 
given anonymously and will only be cited generally 
to ensure no information is disclosed which could 
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15 This includes two civil forfeiture actions against assets linked to Karimova initiated by the US Department of Justice, 
two civil suits taken out by Karimova’s former husband, and a civil action launched by Interspan Distribution Corporation 
against their insurer.
16 This includes, US Department of Justice prosecutions against Vimpelcom and Unitel, and the Dutch prosecution of 
Takilant Limited.
17 Arbitration proceedings were launched by Roz Trading, and Oxus Gold.
18 Mannheimer Swartling, ‘Rapport till styrelsen i TeliaSonera AB: Har TeliaSoneras investering i en 3G-licens tillsammans 
med frekvenser och nummerserier i Uzbekistan år 2007 och därefter inneburit att företrädare för TeliaSonera gjort 
sig skyldig till korruptionsbrott eller penningtvätt?’, OCCRP, https://cdn.occrp.org/projects/corruptistan/documents/
uzbekistan/Telecoms_18.pdf (accessed 30 November 2016).
19 Brown Rudnick, ‘Hermitage Capital Management Limited/Notice of Suspected Money Laundering and Request for 
criminal investigation in respect of the violations of Latvian Laws on Prevention and Combating Money Laundering and 
Terrorism Finance Request for criminal investigation and for issuance of asset freeze order for violation of Latvian Laws on 
Prevention and Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Finance’, Brown Rudnick, 30 July 2012.
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reveal their identity. This accords with the research 
protocol and risk-assessment approved by the Ulster 
University ethics committee.
These interviews with insider sources have been 
complimented by conversations with the Uzbek 
exiles, international civil society organisations, 
Central Asia researchers and diplomats with  
Uzbek experience.
It ought to be noted that the research was not 
confined to the Karimova case alone. In order to 
investigate the generalisability of the patterns 
observed, further case studies were conducted 
drawing again on court documents, corporate 
registry records, archives, audits, media accounts, 
and interviews. A total of eight cases studies were 
conducted. They focused on companies targeted 
by state-organised rackets, spanning the textile, 
construction, mining and manufacturing industries 
in Uzbekistan. This provided important insights 
into the repertoires employed by organised crime 
syndicates operating through government agencies. 
While these case studies will be presented in a 
separate output, they have informed the analysis 
presented in this report. 
Once collected, data on the Karimova case – 
complimented by further studies – was analysed 
using thematic coding, ISNA and transaction 
mapping, guided by the elementary and advanced 
units of analysis outlined above. In particular, a 
thematic database was generated using Excel, in 
which coded data was imported. The imported data 
was simultaneously embedded in a Casefile digraph, 
and a Tiki-Toki timeline. Drawing on the thematic 
database, digraph and timeline, a biographical 
narrative was generated that pulls together the 
threads emerging from the elementary units of 
analysis, thus allowing the Karimova syndicate’s 
core characteristics to be plotted. In light of the 
research aims, a particular focus was placed on the 
syndicate’s structure, the repertoires employed, and 
the national/transnational infrastructure utilised, 
set against a broader political-economy of state-
organised crime in Uzbekistan.
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‘...The prosecutor is working 
only on  the basis of instructions 
from someone who is in power 
and they couldn’t care less about 
the consequence of not following 
legal procedures. Who is going to 
punish them?  No one!’
Uzbek informant
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Over the last two decades, Uzbekistan’s journey into 
independent statehood has been synonymous with 
the country’s former figurehead, Islam Karimov, who 
officially passed away on 2 September 2016. After 
ascending to the Presidency in 1991 – from his 
previous role as First Secretary of the Communist 
party – Karimov oversaw a deeply authoritarian 
regime. Although the Karimov government has been 
commended by some international commentators,20 
for its role in countering extremism, and overseeing 
modest levels of economic growth – although 
impossible to verify – nonetheless, a large volume 
of evidence collated by local and international civil 
society reveal a state dependent on systemic forms 
of corruption, mass-surveillance, torture, forced 
labour, and repression.21
These illicit activities are underpinned by a system 
of political and economic power, which has led the 
government of Uzbekistan to be labelled a ‘mafia’ 
or ‘gangster’ state, by citizens, investors,22 and 
foreign prosecutors.23 This label captures a number 
of dynamics that have been documented over the 
past two decades by scholars, journalists and civil 
society: 
• First, the exercise of power takes place through 
informal networks populated by senior figures 
in government, business and organised crime. 
These distinct networks, organised by senior 
figureheads, share support, resources and fealty, 
in a bid to secure their mutual interests, vis-à-vis 
rival networks. Such networks are sometimes 
3. A biographical portrait of the Karimova 
syndicate: Beyond the ‘Uzbek princess’ 
3.1 The political backdrop
After 67 years of Soviet administration, Uzbekistan achieved independence 
in 1991. As the most populous nation, in a region of geopolitical significance 
– bridging Asia and Europe – China, Russia and the United States have each 
jockeyed for influence. So too has global capital. With a sizable consumer base, 
a nascent private sector, and a political elite cautiously courting market reforms, 
Uzbekistan has been targeted both by global brands and small businesspeople 
alike, seeking the potent returns promised by a green-fields investment site, 
where political patronage can secure privileged market access.
20 M. Kamp, ‘Karimov’s economy: a memoir from 25 years of periodic observation’, Central Asia Survey, 2016, http://www.
tandf.co.uk/journals/pdf/5_Kamp_final220916.pdf (accessed 13 February 2017); G. Ó Colmáin, ‘Uzbekistan: A prime target 
for western imperialism’, Global Research, September 2016, http://www.globalresearch.ca/uzbekistan-a-prime-target-for-
western- imperialism/5548048 (accessed 1 February 2017).
21 See for example: G. Zasada, ‘Uzbekistan: The major source of instability in Central Asia?’, OSW Studies, 2015, pp. 68-84; 
International Crisis Group, ‘Uzbekistan: In for the Long Haul’, Europe and Central Asia, 2006, https://www.crisisgroup.
org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/uzbekistan/uzbekistan-long-haul (accessed 1 February 2016); Uzbek-German Forum 
for Human Rights, ‘Uzbek Government Continued Systematic Forced Labor to Weed the Cotton Fields in 2015’, Uzbek-
German Forum for Human Rights, August 2015, http://uzbekgermanforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Weeding- 
Report-2015.pdf (accessed 1 February 2017); Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights, ‘Forced Labor in Uzbekistan’s 
Cotton Sector: Preliminary Findings from the 2016 Harvest’, Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights, December 2016, 
http://uzbekgermanforum.org/wp- content/uploads/2016/12/20161205-Forced-Labor-in-Uzbekistans-Cotton-Sector_final-
memo-1.pdf (accessed 1 February 2017); Human Rights Watch, ‘Uzbekistan: Events of 2015’, Human Rights Watch: World 
Report, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/uzbekistan#61a2bb (accessed 1 February 2017).
22 In interviews with foreign investors and exiled citizens, this was the most common phrase used to describe the modus 
operandi of the Uzbek state.
23 R. Orange, ‘Swedish Prosecutor Characterizes Uzbekistan as “Gangster State”’, EurasiaNet, 2015, www.eurasianet.org/
node/76246 (accessed 27 November 2016).
described using the term ‘clan’.24 However, 
ethnic, locational and kinship ties are not 
ends in themselves, they are instead points of 
solidarity, which support the overriding priorities 
of commanding key state agencies, obtaining 
control over lucrative rackets, controlling black 
markets, directing licit industries, and extracting 
rents from different sectors of the economy.
• Second, social status, employment, and the 
provision of public services, are secured through 
leveraging personal ties, ‘clan’ affiliations, and/or 
through the provision of bribes. This is a means 
of survival for the general population, and a 
mechanism through which to secure economic 
and political ascendency for elites.
• Third, owing to the complexity and ambiguity 
of laws in Uzbekistan, all members of society 
engage in illegal activity, whether intentionally 
or unwittingly. On the one hand, this renders the 
entire population vulnerable to state organised 
extortion rackets, on the other it increases 
the everyday importance of maintaining ties 
with different networks of influence that can 
help insulate individuals from severe forms 
of persecution. Even where an individual or 
organisation has not committed an offence, 
the SNB, prosecutors and the courts, permit 
and are party to, forms of coercion, and fraud, 
designed to unfairly convict targets. Set against 
this backdrop organised crime in Uzbekistan 
operates through the state using the precarious 
and exposed position of the national population 
to coerce, extort and steal, under the garb of 
civil and criminal ‘justice’.
• Fourth, formally speaking Uzbekistan has a 
state edifice that mimics the characteristics of 
a parliamentary democracy, where there is a 
division of power, rule of law, and due process. 
However, this formal appearance belies a more 
opaque structure that sees the state edifice 
operated on the basis of personal dictates, 
delivered by senior ranking officials, embedded 
within clan networks, who have assumed key 
positions of power. Historically important 
seats of power have included the Office of the 
President, the Chief of the National Security 
Service, the Office of the Prime Minister, the 
Interior Minister and the Minister of Finance.
Given these conditions, Uzbekistan has consistently 
scored low ratings in international indexes which 
measure good governance, democratic participation 
and human rights compliance. Nevertheless, during 
his tenure, Islam Karimov, proved a charismatic 
political figure, adept at managing, and playing off, 
domestic and international power-brokers, which 
enabled his government to endure these criticisms, 
with only modest forms of censure. 
However, this “fatherly” image of a Central Asian 
“strongman”, carefully nursing a fragile country into 
independent nationhood, was diluted internationally 
when Karimov’s eldest daughter, Gulnara Karimova, 
was implicated during 2012 in an international 
exposé focused on bribery in the telecoms sector. 
Up until this moment, Karimova had attempted to 
cultivate a public image typified by her contributions 
to the arts, charities and scholarship. Indeed, by 
2010, at the age of just 38, she had an accomplished 
career as a pop star, diplomat, academic, fashion 
designer, poet and Deputy Minister. These 
achievements were offset, to an extent, by a slew 
of critical commentary which drew attention to 
Karimova’s economic scandals, socialite lifestyle, 
connections with organised crime, and unedifying 
court battles.
However, perhaps most critically, Karimova 
positioned herself as the natural successor for 
the Presidency. This bid for power was backed by 
the considerable business empire Kairmova had 
accumulated over the short space of a decade. 
Indeed, she framed herself as the enterprising voice 
of Uzbekistan’s predominantly youth population, a 
figure who would help internationalise and modernise 
the country bringing it into cosmopolitan circles.
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24 See for example: A. Ceccarelli, ‘Clans, politics and organized crime in Central Asia’, Trends in Organized Crime, vol. 
10, no. 3, 2007, pp.19-36; I. Tunçer-Kılavuz, ‘Political and social networks in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan: ‘clan’, region and 
beyond’, Central Asia Survey, vol. 28, No. 3, 2009, pp.323-334; A. Ilkhamov, ‘Neopatrimonialism, interest groups and 
patronage networks: the impasses of the governance system in Uzbekistan’, Central Asia Survey, vol. 26, No. 1, 2007, 
pp.65-84.
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This bid for the Presidency occurred within a 
complex field of struggle, organised around 
shifting balances of power between clan networks, 
international business figures, and key power-
brokers within the Uzbek state, including the SNB 
Chief, Rustam Inoyatov, the new President Shavkat 
Mirziyoyev, and the Finance Minister Rustam 
Azimov. Ultimately Karimova experienced economic 
and political overreach, when she began to seize 
economic interests, and sites of political power, 
without the requisite leverage to secure these assets 
in the long-term, vis-à-vis rivals. This overreach led 
to her rapid downfall in 2014, as rival power-brokers 
dispossessed Karimova of her business and political 
assets using techniques that came from the same 
repertoire the Karimova syndicate is alleged to have 
mastered and employed between 2001 and 2012.
It is this period to which we will now turn, focusing 
first on Karimova’s return to Tashkent from the 
United States in 2001, moving progressively on 
to her involvement in a range of sectors, with 
a particular emphasis on telecommunications. 
Our analytical focus will be on documenting the 
organised, state-centred nature of these activities, 
and the role played by a transnational edifice of 
corporate shell companies and offshore bank 
accounts. The telling of this narrative will pivot 
upon four case studies, that examine allegations 
surrounding syndicate activity in the beverage, 
mining, tea, and telecommunication industries. The 
analysis emerging out of these case studies will lay 
the foundations for introducing a transformative 
approach to justice that can help remediate and 
empower the syndicate’s victims, including through 
asset-recovery.
16 The case studies
BEVERAGES TEA MINING TELECOMS
During this period, an important tie was established 
with Mansur Maqsudi. Born in Afghanistan to a 
powerful clan of ethnic Uzbeks, Maqsudi emigrated 
to the United States in 1979 at the age of 12. 
After meeting Karimova at her 19th birthday party 
in 1991, the pair were married during November 
that year, relocating to a primary residence in New 
Jersey. Maqsudi was then appointed Managing 
Director of Roz Trading Limited, a Cayman Island 
company ‘involved in the manufacture, trade, 
and distribution of consumer goods in numerous 
countries’.25
Roz Trading had a fully owned Uzbek subsidiary, 
by the same name, which was approved by the 
Uzbek Department of Finance and registered with 
the Department of Justice. During the early 1990s, 
Roz Trading’s Uzbek subsidiary established a joint 
venture with the Coca-Cola Export Corporation 
(Coca-Cola) and the Government of Uzbekistan.  
The joint venture mechanism, is a popular 
framework for establishing public-private 
partnerships in Uzbekistan. However, they have 
also been connected to a range of illicit activities, 
including bribery, extortion and expropriation.26
Given the strong weight of evidence on foreign 
investment in Uzbekistan, it is fair to surmise that 
Coca-Cola’s entry into the Uzbek beverage market, 
required support from key power- brokers within 
the Uzbek state if it was to secure the requisite 
approvals and permissions.27 Certainly it appears 
Coca-Cola wanted the infrastructure in place that 
would mitigate against arbitrary acts of extortion or 
expropriation. To that end, as a condition of entry, 
Coca-Cola sort ‘the President’s and Cabinet of 
Ministers’ guarantee that all necessary government 
approvals would be forthcoming’.28
Given that Maqsudi at the time was directly tied 
to the President by marriage, he was an attractive 
local partner for any company seeking secure market 
access in Uzbekistan. While there is no evidence on 
the public record to suggest any illegal payment was 
made to Maqsudi, at the very least partnering with 
Roz Trading, was an astute and pragmatic choice in 
Uzbekistan’s turbulent political environment.
A joint-venture was formally entered into on 16 
June 1993, establishing Coca-Cola Bottlers of 
Uzbekistan (CCBU).29 Roz Trading, Coca-Cola, and 
the Uzbek government each owned a third of CCBU. 
3.2 From New Jersey to Tashkent:  
Karimova and the Coca-Cola Joint Venture
During the 1990s Gulnara Karimova made a modest entry into public life. 
Graduating from Tashkent State University in 1994 with a Bachelor of Arts,  
she served in a range of senior positions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
while she studied on a Masters programme.
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25 Complaint. ROZ Trading Ltd., v. Coca-Cola Export Corp. et al., Case No. SCH-4986, para. 2.1 (Int’l Arbitral Centre of the 
Austrian Fed. Econ. Chamber, June. 6, 2006). 
26 Joint-ventures, in this respect, is a gatekeeping mechanism. Investors are frequently prohibited from entering 
Uzbekistan without a local partner. To secure a local joint-venture partner, bribe payments often must be paid to the 
industry patron, who becomes the investor’s ‘friend’ ensuring requisite approvals are given. Once enmeshed in the 
joint-venture, the investor is vulnerable to acts of extortion – protection payments, to avoid arbitrary shut-downs – and 
expropriation, particularly if their patron is ousted by a rival.
27 Which is not to say this, in itself, is evidence of any misconduct on Coca Cola’s behalf.
28 Complaint. ROZ Trading Ltd., v. Coca-Cola Export Corp. et al., Case No. SCH-4986, para. 3.2 (Int’l Arbitral Centre of the 
Austrian Fed. Econ. Chamber, June. 6, 2006).
29 Complaint. ROZ Trading Ltd. v. Zeromax Group, Inc., et al., Case 1:06-cv-01040-CKK, para. 6 (D.D.C. June. 6, 2006).
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The Uzbek government’s share in the joint-venture 
was administered by Uzpischeprom, an agency set 
up through Presidential decree to regulate and 
oversee the operation of the food industry. Under 
the joint venture agreement, Uzpischeprom was 
responsible for securing ‘all necessary government 
approvals, permits, consents, authorisations and 
licences’.30 Roz Trading claims that Uzpischeprom 
‘remained entirely subservient to the will of the 
President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov’.31
The joint-venture was a success. CCBU’s assets 
were valued at approximately US$150 million in 
2000.32 The Uzbek subsidiary was also the first 
bottler to receive Coca-Cola’s Bottler of the Year 
award, two years in a row.
That said, the joint-venture faced operational 
difficulties, which were connected to Uzbekistan’s 
restrictive currency controls. Under this system, 
individuals and companies must obtain state approval 
to convert the Uzbekistani so’m into US Dollars 
(USD), a process that is regulated by strict quotas. 
This has become a vehicle for soliciting bribes from 
the private sector, extorting payments from currency-
control violators, and profiteering from Uzbekistan’s 
sizable currency-exchange black market.
As a result of this restrictive system, Roz Trading 
claims that CCBU was unable to convert its 
revenues from Uzbekistani so’m into USD, to pay off 
approximately $US12 million in accounts receivable 
for purchased concentrate from Coca-Cola.33 In 
order to circumvent currency restrictions, Roz Trading 
was evidently given special permission by the Uzbek 
government to purchase raw materials such as oil 
and cotton in Uzbekistani so’m. Cotton in particular is 
one of Uzbekistan’s chief exports, which is produced 
through a system of state- organised forced labour, 
that includes children. In this instance, the oil and 
cotton was allegedly sold by a CCBU subsidiary in 
USD, allowing repayments to be made to Coca-Cola.
Onerous economic restrictions, alongside arbitrarily 
enforced, ambiguous regulations such as this, 
dictate that commercial advantage in Uzbekistan 
often comes from special political dispensations, 
rather than innovation. This creates a context 
where the corporate goal of competitive advantage, 
and patronage politics rooted in rent-seeking, 
can come into alignment. In the case of CCBU, 
the special dispensation Roz Trading claims it was 
awarded, would appear symptomatic of the distinct 
commercial privileges that businesses derive when 
they have direct ties to powerful state figures. 
Although there is no evidence available to suggest 
the influence deployed here was of an illicit form.
During this successful operational period for Roz 
Trading, Maqsudi and Karimova had two children. 
They maintained their New Jersey residence, while 
travelling to Uzbekistan for business. In 1998, the 
family temporarily relocated to Massachusetts, 
so Karimova and Maqsudi could pursue Masters 
degrees at Harvard University. This overlapped 
with PhD research conducted by Karimova at the 
University of World Economy and Diplomacy, 
Tashkent. She completed her doctorate in less than 
two years.34
During 1999 the couple purchased a ‘large and 
luxurious home’ in New Jersey’s affluent Mendham 
area.35 The home was reportedly, ‘lavishly furnished’.36 
Indeed, the couple is said to have amassed a fortune 
approaching US$80 million.37 According to one press 
report Karimova ‘owned $ 4.5 million (£2.47 million) in 
jewellery, $11 million in bank and investment holdings 
in Geneva and Dubai, a $10 million retail complex and 
nightclubs worth $4 million’.38
30 Complaint. ROZ Trading Ltd., v. Coca-Cola Export Corp. et al., Case No. SCH-4986, para. 2.1 (Int’l Arbitral Centre of the 
Austrian Fed. Econ. Chamber, June. 6, 2006). 
31 Ibid, para. 2.3.
32 Complaint. ROZ Trading Ltd. v. Zeromax Group, Inc., et al., Case 1:06-cv-01040-CKK, para. 11 (D.D.C. June. 6, 2006).33 
Which is not to say this, in itself, is evidence of any misconduct on Coca Cola’s behalf.
33 Ibid, para. 3.24.
34 R. Norland, ‘Biographic Information on Uzbekistan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Gulnara Karimova’, Wikileaks, 6 May 2008, 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08TASHKENT529_a.html (accessed 28th November 2016).
35 Judgement. Mansur Maqsudi v. Gulnara Karimova Maqsudi, Case No. 830 A.2d 929. Section I, para. 9 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. Sept. 12, 2002).
36 Ibid.
37 R. L. Jones, ‘Immigrant Wins Custody of Children, Who Are With Mother in Uzbekistan’, The New York Times, 11 
February 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/11/nyregion/immigrant-wins- custody-of-children-who-are-with-
mother-in-uzbekistan.html, (accessed 28 November 2016).
38 J. Page, ‘”Uzbek princess” lives it up in a one-party state’, The Times (UK), 6 August 2004, p.15. 
Two years later their marriage came to an abrupt 
end. It is alleged that Maqsudi was assaulted by 
Karimova’s security detail, following a heated 
argument on 28 July 2001.39 Karimova then took 
their two children and left for Tashkent with her 
‘entourage’.40 Once back in Uzbekistan, Karimova 
filed for divorce and custody of the children at the 
Mirabad District Court of Uzbekistan.41
Divorce and custody was granted on 5 October 
2001.42 When the matter was considered in the US, 
by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Judge Wilson 
concluded that Karimova had knowingly mislead the 
Mirabad court. The US Judge also suggested that 
the Mirabad District Court had been party to false 
documents, forged in order to complete service 
requirements under Uzbek law. 43
By the time of the divorce proceedings, Roz 
Trading’s interest in CCBU had grown to 55.118%,44 
Coca-Cola retained its 42.882% stake, while 
Uzpischeprom’s interest was now 2%.45 Roz Trading 
insists that during 2001/02 Karimova initiated a 
violent campaign to destroy the company’s Uzbek 
subsidiary and expropriate its share in CCBU, using 
state instruments.46
In a complaint lodged with the District Court of 
Columbia, Roz Trading claims that within weeks of 
the separation between Karimova and Maqsudi, 
 Uzbekistan’s feared National Security Service 
(the successor to the KGB in Uzbekistan) (“Secret 
Police”) raided both ROZs and CCBUs offices 
in Tashkent, seized company documents, and 
threatened employees, holding some of them 
hostage. CCBUs Managing Director and his Deputy 
were both taken away by the Secret Police and 
held for interrogation for more than 24 hours.47 
This type of coercive activity, administered through 
the National Security Service – known by the acronym, 
SNB – is commonplace in Uzbekistan. The SNB has 
an expansive presence throughout the country, 
with strong infiltration within the state apparatus. In 
addition to being a powerful economic actor in its own 
right – which extracts rents and controls industries – 
state officials, well connected businessmen and clan 
leaders, leverage their ties with the SNB to conduct 
raids designed to extort businesses, expropriate 
companies, and destroy rivals.48 As we will shortly see, 
there is compelling evidence to suggest that Karimova, 
through her father’s political allies and security chief, 
was able to have personal orders implemented by a 
range of state agencies. This lends credibility to Roz 
Trading’s allegation.
During this period of contention, Karimova recruited 
a talented young business adviser to the Maqsudi 
family, Farhod Inogambaev, who had specialist 
expertise in international finance. According to 
Inogambaev, he agreed to work for Karimova after 
his brother was taken hostage by the Presidential 
Security Service, and Karimova’s Chief of Security on 
24 August 2001.49 It is alleged that Karimova was 
able to influence the activities of the Presidential 
Security Service, through her ties with its Deputy 
Chief, Alisher Sayfuddinov.50 With Inogambaev’s 
brother in detection, it was indicated that harm would 
come to his family unless Inogambaev returned from 
his post in Dubai to act for Karimova.51 
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39 Complaint. Mansur Maqsudi v. Gulnara Karimova Maqsudi, Case No. 830 A.2d 929, Section I, para. 15 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. Sept. 12, 2002).
40Ibid, Section I, para. 17.
41 Ibid, Section II, para. 1.
42 Ibid, Section II, para. 4.
43 Ibid, Section II, para. 1.
44 Complaint. ROZ Trading Ltd., v. Coca-Cola Export Corp. et al., Case No. SCH-4986, para 3.43 (Int’l Arbitral Centre of 
the Austrian Fed. Econ. Chamber, June. 6, 2006).
45 Ibid, para. 2.
46 See: Complaint. ROZ Trading Ltd., v. Coca-Cola Export Corp., et al., Case No. GZ SCH-4986 (Int’l Arbitral Centre of the 
Austrian Fed. Econ. Chamber, June. 6, 2006); Complaint. ROZ Trading Ltd. v. Zeromax Group, Inc., et al., Case 1:06-cv-
01040-CKK (D.D.C. June. 6, 2006). 
47 Ibid, para. 14-15.
48 These insights are drawn from insider interviews outlined in section 1.2. This included senior state and business officials. 
To ensure participant anonymity no information will be cited or referenced that might disclose the source.
49 Witness Statement of Farhod Inogambaev. ROZ Trading Ltd et al., v. The Coca-Cola Export Corp. et al., Case No. GZ 
SCH-4986, para. 10-12 (Int’l Arbitral Centre of the Austrian Fed. Econ. Chamber, June. 6, 2006).
50 Ibid, para. 27-29.
51 Ibid, para. 9.
1 Personal ties (who you know) and the networks 
to which you belong
2 Tribute (payments to secure loyalty or services)
3 Violence (coerce target audience, terrorise 
general population, via law enforcement and the 
state’s security apparatus)
This coercive tactic is not novel in Uzbekistan. 
State security agencies are frequently used as an 
instrument to kidnap and imprison individuals. This 
can occur for a range of reasons, sometimes it is 
to extract a ransom payment or to expropriate a 
business owned by the kidnapped individual.52  
On other occasions prisoners are merely a devise, 
the real agenda is to coerce a family member, wider 
community or colleagues.53 With no independent 
judiciary, the victim of these tactics are faced 
with the choice of compliance or exile.54 When 
the individual has family resident in Uzbekistan, 
compliance is often the only feasible option.
In Inogambaev’s case, he conceded to Karimova’s 
request, becoming her senior financial adviser. After 
accepting the position, Inogambaev claims it was 
made clear to him in September 2001 by Karimova, 
that ‘high-level Uzbek officials’, acting under her 
instruction, were seeking Coca-Cola’s support for 
excising Roz Trading from the CCBU joint-venture.55 
Deputy Foreign Minister Sodiq Safoyev,56 was 
said to be the primary envoy between Coca- Cola 
and Karimova.57 Before being appointed Deputy 
Foreign Minister in 2001, Safoyev had served as the 
Ambassador to the United States between 1996 and 
2001, a time in which Karimova had been a New 
Jersey resident. Evidence suggests that Safoyev had 
a range of senior level contacts within Coca-Cola 
through which to facilitate negotiations.58 
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Social networks are frequently made up of distinct 
subgroups. For example, there may be a cluster 
of actors connected by their employment within 
Corporation A, who operate in separation from 
actors working in Government Department A. If 
Government Department A is overseeing a tender 
for a large public contract, which Corporation A 
wishes to bid for, commercial advantage can be 
obtained if an actor from Corporation A, is able 
to establish a tie with an actor in Government 
Department A. This tie is known as a bridge, 
because it connects together two subgroups. 
 
Evidence suggests that Karimova was effective at 
exerting influence over the state apparatus, and 
the private sector, by establishing bridges with 
actors, who had either influence or control over 
key organs. For example, Sodiq Safoyev was said to 
be an effective bridge into Coca-Cola’s executive 
hierarchy, while Alisher Sayfuddinov was a bridge 
into Uzbekistan’s criminal justice agencies. Karimova 
could only connect with these bridges because 
of the advantageous position she enjoyed as the 
President’s daughter. This demonstrates the way in 
which established hierarchies, create imbalanced 
playing fields, that advantage some over others.
52 Insider interviews conducted during 2016. See section 1.2
53 See for example: Witness Statement of Farhod Inogambaev. ROZ Trading Ltd et al., v. The Coca- Cola Export Corp. 
et al., Case No. GZ SCH-4986, para. 9 (Int’l Arbitral Centre of the Austrian Fed. Econ. Chamber, June. 6, 2006); Notice 
of Arbitration. Oxus Gold PLC v. The Republic of Uzbekistan et al, para. 73 (Arbitral Tribunal, Aug. 31, 2011); Complaint. 
Interspan Distribution Corp., v. Liberty Insurance Underwriters, Inc., Case No. 4:07-cv-1078, para. 2-5 (S.D. Tex. March 30, 
2007). 
54 Witness Statement of Farhod Inogambaev. ROZ Trading Ltd et al., v. The Coca-Cola Export Corp. et al., Case No. GZ 
SCH-4986 (Int’l Arbitral Centre of the Austrian Fed. Econ. Chamber, June. 6, 2006).
55 Ibid, para. 32.
56 At the time of writing Safoyev is Chair of Uzbekistan’s Foreign Relations Committee. He recently spoke in Washington 
D.C. on post-Karimov policy in Uzbekistan.
57 Witness Statement of Farhod Inogambaev. ROZ Trading Ltd et al., v. The Coca-Cola Export Corp. et al., Case No. GZ 
SCH-4986, para. 36 (Int’l Arbitral Centre of the Austrian Fed. Econ. Chamber, June. 6, 2006).
58 Ibid, para. 36 and 39.
17 The three currencies of 
power in Uzbekistan
18 The Bridge
In early 2002 a meeting was allegedly held with the 
President of Coca-Cola’s Eurasia Division, Ahmet 
Bozer,59 in the lobby of the Intercontinental Hotel 
in Tashkent. 60 Inogambaev notes he attended on 
Karimova’s behalf, along with her adviser, Brian 
Bowen, the founder of Uzbek telecommunications 
firm Uzdunrobita, and a Karimova aid, Irina 
Avtaikina.61 According to Inogambaev, Bozer 
pledged his company’s support for Karimova in 
her dispute with Roz Trading.62 Inogambaev claims 
it was agreed that Karimova would take over as 
a joint-venture partner, with immediate control 
over personnel decisions at CCBU.63 In return for 
Coca-Cola’s cooperation, she ‘would assist with a 
number of issues that were crucial to the success of 
CCBU, including convertibility of Uzbek currency’.64 
It is also claimed that Karimova met personally with 
Cem Kozlu, a senior Coca-Cola official, at the World 
Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.65 Coca-
Cola’s support for Karimova was again said to have 
been pledged.66
 
 
Of course, at this stage Coca-Cola had a highly 
profitable operation in Uzbekistan, opposing the 
President’s daughter could have lead to the loss of 
their subsidiary. Indeed, the personalised, arbitrary 
administration of political power in Uzbekistan, leaves 
commercial actors dependent on patrons for survival. 
Coca-Cola was also concerned that Karimova 
had entered into negotiations with rivals Pepsi.67 
Accordingly, expropriation of company assets and 
their replacement with a competitor was a possibility 
unless Coca-Cola conceded to her requests.
At a day to day level, Karimova’s involvement 
in CCBU’s management is said to have been 
prosecuted through a proxy, Irina Avtaikina, who 
acted as the senior assistant to the company’s 
General Manager.68 Again, appointing proxies 
(Avtaikina), and fixers (Inogambaev and Bowen), is 
customary practice for senior Uzbek power-brokers. 
Face-to- face contact with clients, tends to be of a 
ceremonial, rather than practical nature. This creates 
insulation between patron and client, allowing the 
latter to more effectively control and manage the 
relationship, with a degree of plausible deniability.
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59 Up until August 2015 Bozer was Executive Vice President and President of Coca-Cola
International.
60 Witness Statement of Farhod Inogambaev. ROZ Trading Ltd et al., v. The Coca-Cola Export Corp. et al., Case No. GZ 
SCH-4986, para. 33 (Int’l Arbitral Centre of the Austrian Fed. Econ. Chamber, June. 6, 2006). 
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid, para. 34.
63 Ibid, para. 35.
64 Ibid, para. 36.
65 Ibid, para. 42.
66 Ibid.
67 Witness Statement of Farhod Inogambaev. ROZ Trading Ltd et al., v. The Coca-Cola Export Corp. et al., Case No. GZ 
SCH-4986, para. 46 (Int’l Arbitral Centre of the Austrian Fed. Econ. Chamber, June. 6, 2006).
68 Ibid, para. 41.
19 Key actors in CCBU/Coca-Cola negotiation
ENVOY
Sodiq Safoyev
Deputy Foreign Minister, 
FIXER 
Alisher Sayfuddinov
Deputy Chief, Presidential 
Security Service 
ADVISER/FIXER
Brian Bowen
Founder, Uzdunrobita
PROXY
Irina Avtaikina
ADVISER/FIXER
Farhod Inogambaev
Financial Adviser
When transactions are mapped onto a timeline, 
it is important to decipher potentially hidden 
relationships between events. Graph proximity is 
helpful in this respect. The temporal correlation 
between events can be a signal of a deeper 
relationship between them. For instance, on the 
same day that Karimova’s divorce proceeding 
against Maqsudi began, the Uzbek Anti-Monopoly 
Committee launched an action to dispossess Roz 
Trading of shares in CCBU.75 This would appear to 
suggest a range of government agencies and actors, 
were working together to achieve the common goal 
of dispossessing Maqsudi of his business and family.
Methodological note: Using transaction mapping to uncover hidden relationships
20 Approximate transactions
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Whilst Karimova’s advisers attempted to secure 
Coca-Cola’s backing, legal action in Uzbekistan was 
orchestrated against Roz Trading. On 28 September 
2001 – the day of Karimova’s divorce hearing in the 
Mirabad District Court – the Uzbek Anti-Monopoly 
Committee initiated action in the Economic Court 
of Tashkent against Roz Trading, arguing post-1993 
share reallocations within CCBU were illegal.69 Just 
six months prior, the committee had approved these 
transactions. Attorneys representing Roz Trading 
were denied visas into Uzbekistan, which hindered 
the company’s defence.70
Following a number of appeals, on 5 February 2002 
the Supreme Court of Uzbekistan reduced, without 
compensation, Roz Trading’s interest from 55.118% to 
23.416%.71 In parallel with this case, the Ministry of 
Justice initiated proceedings to liquidate the remaining 
23.416% interest, alleging a failure to comply with 
charter funding requirements.72 On 11 September 
2002, the Supreme Economic Court of Uzbekistan 
approved the liquidation request.73 Accordingly, Roz 
Trading lost its majority stake in a business said to be 
worth approximately US$150 million.74 
Inogambaev maintains that this was an act of 
economic persecution. He argues Karimova used her 
power to influence the actions of Uzbek prosecutors 
and judges:
 She orchestrated every detail of the court 
proceedings against ROZ. For example, she told 
the prosecutors precisely what charges to bring 
and how to prosecute the case. Ms. Karimova 
knew that there was no merit to these charges. 
Ms. Karimova, through Alisher Sayfuddinov and 
others, even told judges exactly what actions to 
take in the court proceedings against ROZ. Ms. 
Karimova ordered Mr. Sayfuddinov and others to 
bring her drafts of all court decisions relating to 
ROZ, CCBU, and Mansur Maqsudi. Ms. Karimova 
then reviewed, edited, and approved these 
decisions. Ms. Karimova often wrote substantial 
portions of the decisions herself to make sure that 
they contained the exact language and ordered 
the precise outcome she desired.76
69 Complaint. ROZ Trading Ltd. v. Coca-Cola Export Corp. et al., Case No. SCH-4986, para 3.38 (Int’l Arbitral Centre of the 
Austrian Fed. Econ. Chamber, June. 6, 2006).
70 Ibid, para. 3.41.
71 Ibid, para. 3.43.
72 Ibid, para. 3.44-3.45.
73 Ibid, para. 3.45
74 Complaint. ROZ Trading Ltd. v. Zeromax Group, Inc., et al., Case 1:06-cv-01040-CKK, para. 11 (D.D.C. June. 6, 2006).
75 Complaint. ROZ Trading Ltd. v. Coca-Cola Export Corp. et al., Case No. SCH-4986, para. 3.38 (Int’l Arbitral Centre of the 
Austrian Fed. Econ. Chamber, June. 6, 2006).
76 Witness Statement of Farhod Inogambaev. ROZ Trading Ltd et al., v. The Coca-Cola Export Corp. et al. Case No. GZ 
SCH-4986, para. 28-29 (Int’l Arbitral Centre of the Austrian Fed. Econ. Chamber, June. 6, 2006).
Coupled to prosecutions and liquidation 
proceedings, Maqsudi’s family was evidently 
persecuted through a campaign of state violence. It 
is alleged:
In December 2001, some of Mr. Maqsudi’s 
family members were taken in the middle of a 
winter night from their homes in Uzbekistan to 
the border of Afghanistan and simply left there 
with no belongings. His elderly grandmother was 
forced to leave her home without her diabetes 
medication. Other family members were taken 
hostage and remain imprisoned. Indeed, their 
exact whereabouts are still unknown today. 
Further, Mr. Maqsudi’s mother’s home was 
demolished ... Family members who remain 
in Uzbekistan remain subject to detention, 
intimidation, and torture.77
There are also allegations that Karimova, through 
the Uzbek state, abused the Interpol system 
in an attempt to restrict Maqsudi’s freedom of 
movement.78 US Congressman Nick Smith claimed 
Karimova ‘used her family connection to have 
Uzbekistan issue an Interpol Red Notice throughout 
many of the countries in which Interpol operates 
to have Mr. Maqsudi arrested when he travels 
overseas’.79
Over this period when Roz Trading’s CCBU stake 
was being liquidated, Karimova’s involvement in the 
joint-venture was said to have grown. According 
to Inogambaev, Karimova ‘directed that CCBU 
purchase sugar and other raw materials from her 
companies [Revi Holdings and United International 
Group80] at inflated prices’.81 The majority of these 
‘inflated’ payments were then evidently transferred 
into Karimova’s personal bank accounts.
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77 Complaint. ROZ Trading Ltd. v. Coca-Cola Export Corp. et al., Case No. SCH-4986, para. 3.37 (Int’l Arbitral Centre of the 
Austrian Fed. Econ. Chamber, June. 6, 2006).
78 P. Baker, ‘Battle Royal’, The Washington Post, 13 April 2004, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/
lifestyle/2004/04/13/battle-royal/2462663c-5a2d-4b69- 8ef0-228b92953599/?utm_term=.03e7094f3042 (accessed 29 
November 2016); C. Smith, ‘Battle Royal’, US Congressional Record, 11 May 2004, Pages E807-E809. See: https://www.
congress.gov/crec/2004/05/11/CREC-2004-05-11-pt1-PgE807.pdf (accessed 29 November 2016); C. Smith, ‘A Parent’s 
Worst Nightmare: The Heartbreak of International Child Abductions’, Committee on International Relations, US House of 
Representatives, 22 June 2004, p.39, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa94505.000/hfa94505_0.HTM 
(accessed 29 November 2016).
79 C. Smith, ‘A Parent’s Worst Nightmare: The Heartbreak of International Child Abductions’, Committee on International 
Relations, US House of Representatives, 22 June 2004, p.39, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/
hfa94505.000/hfa94505_0.HTM (accessed 29 November 2016).
80 Brian Bowen and Farhod Inogambaev helped Karimova set up United International Group, initially to manage her 
proposed stake in CCBU.
81 Witness Statement of Farhod Inogambaev. ROZ Trading Ltd et al., v. The Coca-Cola Export Corp. et al., Case No. GZ 
SCH-4986, para. 50 (Int’l Arbitral Centre of the Austrian Fed. Econ. Chamber, June. 6, 2006). 
82 Complaint. ROZ Trading Ltd. v. Coca-Cola Export Corp. et al., Case No. SCH-4986, para. 2.1 (Int’l Arbitral Centre of the 
Austrian Fed. Econ. Chamber, June. 6, 2006); D. Stern, ‘Rich pickings for Uzbek leader’s daughter’, Financial Times, 18 
August 2003, http://bactra.org/sloth/2003-09-24b.html (accessed 29 November 2016).
DATE TRANSACTION SENDER RECEIVER
14/1/2003 US $467,477.44 CCBU Revi Holdings
 21/1/2003 US $350,000 Revi Holdings Gulnara Karimova
6/4/2003 US $399,958.16 CCBU Revi Holdings 
6/4/2003 US $350,000 CCBU United International Group
9/4/2003 US $362,000 United International Group Gulnara Karimova
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A subsequent investigation conducted by  
L’Hebdo claims:
 Banking documents we have consulted indicate how 
the president’s daughter used Coca-Cola Bottlers of 
Uzbekistan (CCBU) to serve her personal interests. 
Between early 2002 and March 2003, two entities 
registered under her name in Dubai, Revi Holdings 
and OA Stores, received large sums from CCBU, 
which were then transferred to the private accounts 
of Gulnara Karimova at the Citibank of Dubai and 
HSBC in Jersey. She collected in this way $5.1 
million during the period.83
A Financial Times feature also notes that Revi 
Holdings was set up in the Sharjah free trade zone, 
with a sister company in the UK. Revi Holdings, it 
reports, acted ‘as parent company for Ms Karimova’s 
various businesses and collect[ed] the revenues 
from their activities’.84
If accurate, these transactions presage the broad 
characteristics that marked Karimova’s role in 
the telecommunications industry, as set out in 
subsequent prosecutions and asset forfeiture 
proceedings. In particular, ostensibly legitimate 
transactions with offshore companies, were used to 
mask illicit payments designed to secure Karimova’s 
protection. These payments were then channelled 
into offshore bank accounts, linked to Karimova. 
However, it appears that in this instance, Karimova 
had not insulated her role in Revi Holdings, using a 
protective layer of proxies. Later she is alleged to 
have changed tact in this respect, employing proxy 
directors and shareholders in her offshore corporate 
vehicles (see section 2.4).
Having been squeezed out of the Uzbek market, 
Roz Trading alleges that its stake in CCBU was 
eventually acquired by the Swiss company, Zeromax 
GmbH, through its subsidiary Muzimpex. Zeromax 
GmbH is commonly pointed to as one of several 
offshore vehicles Karimova employed to prosecute 
her business interests in Uzbekistan.85 According to 
Karimova’s former financial adviser, this relationship 
with Zeromax began when Karimova acted as a high 
level fixer for the company:
 In 2003, Zeromax paid Karimova for her 
assistance in obtaining a multi-million dollar 
contract with Uzbekistan for the construction of 
the Shurtan-Sherabad natural gas pipeline. Upon 
information and belief, shortly after Uzbekistan’s 
Cabinet of Ministers approved this contract on 
March 3, 2003, Zeromax deposited a $1 million 
payment in Karimova’s personal account in the 
Rietumu Bank in Riga, Latvia.86
Although on paper the company was owned by 
Miradil S. Djalalov, an alleged frontman with ‘close 
ties to the Karimov family and Russian-Uzbek 
tycoon Alisher Usmonov’,87 the contention is that 
Karimova held a significant beneficial stake in the 
firm. For instance, US diplomatic cables allege: ‘She 
... reportedly has agreed with local mafia boss, Gafur 
Rakhimov, to take over his share of Zeromax in 
return for not interfering in his other businesses’.88
This assessment is supported by Farhod Inogambaev 
who observes ‘Ms. Karimova gained control over 
Zeromax’, and then ‘used Zeromax to formalize her 
control over CCBU’.89 He continues: ‘among other 
strategies designed to hide its true businesses, 
Zeromax re-registered several times, changed 
ownership, and created and systematically altered 
different websites’.90 A Central Asian analyst 
quoted in a 2009 edition of Foreign Policy, expands 
83 J. Zaugg, ‘Les Ouzbeks lavent leur argent à Genève’’, L’Hebdo, 15 August 2012, http://www.hebdo.ch/les_ouzbeks_
lavent_leur_argent_a_geneve_163215_.html (accessed 1 December 2016).
84 D. Stern, ‘Rich pickings for Uzbek leader’s daughter’, Financial Times, 18 August 2003, http://bactra.org/sloth/2003-09-
24b.html (accessed 29 November 2016).
85 Motion. ROZ Trading Ltd et al., v. The Coca-Cola Export Corp. et al., Case No. GZ SCH-4986 (Int’l Arbitral Centre of the 
Austrian Fed. Econ. Chamber, Aug. 23, 2006); Memorandum and Order. Interspan Distribution Corp. v. Liberty Insurance 
Underwriters, INC., Case No. 4:07-cv-1078, Section L, para. 3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 2009); Complaint. Interspan Distribution 
Corp. v. Liberty Insurance Underwriters INC., Case No. 4:07-cv-1078, (S.D. Tex. March 30, 2007), para 62; Notice of 
Arbitration, Oxus Gold PLC v. The Republic of Uzbekistan et al, para. 50 (Arbitral Tribunal, Aug. 31, 2011).
86 Complaint. ROZ Trading Ltd. v. Zeromax Group, Inc., et al., Case 1:06-cv-01040-CKK, para. 25 (D.D.C. June. 6, 2006).
87 R. Norlad, ‘Uzbekistan: From A to Zeromax’, Wikileaks, 20 January 2010, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/
cables/10TASHKENT27_a.html (accessed 1 February 2017).
88 J. Purnell, ‘Gulnora Inc. Strikes Again’, Wikileaks, 28 January 2005, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/
cables/05TASHKENT284_a.html (accessed 29 November 2016).
89 Declaration of Farhod Inogambaev. ROZ Trading Ltd. v. Zeromax Group, Inc., Case 1:06-cv- 01040-CKK, para. 20 (D.D.C. 
December. 8, 2006).
90 Ibid, para. 21.
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on Inogambaev’s allegation, arguing ‘Zeromax is 
essentially one of the facades behind which Gulnara 
Karimova continues to tighten her grip on any and 
all available sources of income in the country by any 
means she deems necessary, with little or no regard 
for legal niceties’.91
Before we examine Karimova’s entry into the 
telecommunications sector, from which she is said 
to have extracted almost US$1 billion,93 it is worth 
touching upon other serious allegations  
levelled against Zeromax in civil litigation  
and international arbitration.
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22 Key offshore entities linked to Gulnara Karimova92
Court documents reveal that Interspan was a 
family company owned and administered by US 
businessman, Eric Johnson, along with Uzbek 
national, Emir Kiamilev. Kiamilev’s father Eskender, 
and Johnson’s brother-in-law, Mikhail Matkarimov, 
helped run Interspan on the ground in Uzbekistan. 
By 2005 the company evidently controlled 30% of 
Uzbekistan’s packaged tea market.95 
However, in Uzbekistan a growing market share 
can be a mixed blessing. While it may contribute to 
improved economies of scale and investor returns, 
it increases the company’s visibility, with the related 
risks personnel or family members will be held to 
ransom, or the business expropriated, unless well 
protected through the solicitation of payments to 
senior regime figure.
On 13 February 2006 this risk materialised for 
Interspan when ‘hooded men with machine guns 
stopped the vehicle in which Eskender Kiamilev 
– the father of Emir Kiamilev, one of Interspan’s 
principals – was travelling’.96 In addition, ‘armed 
government agents also entered Interspan’s offices 
and warehouses in Tashkent and demanded all 
of Interspan’s physical property, including a large 
inventory of tea’.97 Interspan employees were 
arrested, threatened with torture and forced to 
sign statements incriminating Eskender Kiamilev.98 
This type of state organised repertoire is commonly 
employed in Uzbekistan when expropriating 
businesses, or extorting payments from its owners.99
From Interspan’s perspective, this was now 
a hostage negotiation involving a criminal 
organisation, the Uzbek state.100 The company’s 
insurer, Liberty, was contacted. They instructed 
Interspan to liaise with a crisis response team, 
Corporate Risk International (CRI), who specialises in 
the areas of kidnap, ransom, extortion and detention.
CRI coordinated its response through a senior 
business figure in Uzbekistan, who possessed 
intelligence sources within the state. It advised 
Interspan: ‘Tea is currently considered to be the 
monopoly of the state. The Samarqand Tea Factory 
is the primary raw tea processor and monopoly 
supported by the state and has drawn the interest  
of the first family [the Karimovs]’.101 The prognosis 
for Interspan and its detained manager was not 
good: ‘[T]he best case scenario is to see him 
[Kiamilev] classified as a persona non grata and 
deported, with a complete loss of all business 
holdings in Uzbekistan’.102
3.3 Tea and mining
Until it was liquidated in 2010, Swiss multinational, Zeromax GmbH, was one 
of Uzbekistan’s largest ‘foreign’ investors, with a substantial interest in natural 
resources, including oil, gas and minerals, in addition to wheat, cotton, textiles, 
sugar, cooking oil, food processing, and cement factories. The company enjoyed 
a prolific rise following its establishment in 2001. It is claimed to have “muscled” 
into some of the country’s most lucrative sectors, causing disquiet among 
business and political elites within Uzbekistan, Russia and Germany. However, 
the first company to direct serious allegations against Zeromax, was the tea 
importer, Interspan Distribution Corporation.94
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99 Interviews conducted with senior business figures, see section 1.2.
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Unexpectedly, Eskender was released on 21 
February 2006 after suffering heart problems.103 
This surprise act of clemency was linked to lobbying 
from the US Embassy, and certain high level 
connections Eskender enjoyed as a former Soviet 
diplomat. The respite was short-lived. Three days 
later the wife of Mikhail Matkarimov – Interspan’s 
Uzbek manager – was abducted.104 Interspan 
claim Mikhail then surrendered ‘himself to the 
government agents who Interspan was advised were 
operating under Gulnara Karimova’s direction’.105 
Initially Matkarimov was accused of economic 
crimes.106 Prosecutors later linked him to drug 
trafficking and terrorism.
During ransom negotiations with the Uzbek state, 
prosecutors pursue their monetary claim by offering 
to drop the more serious charges, in return for a 
payment. In effect, this means victims will serve a 
short period of custody for economic crimes, before 
being given a Presidential amnesty.
In this instance, contacts inside the Tashkent 
prosecutor’s office, and the Uzbek business 
community, were drawn on by CRI to uncover  
the reasons behind this attack on Interspan and  
its management.
It was alleged that this was an expropriation effort, 
directed by those connected with Zeromax. This 
evidently included the former Deputy Prime Minister, 
Mirabror Usmanov, the President’s daughter, Gulnara 
Karimova, and US businessman, Harry Eustace Snr. 
According to CRI’s business informant:
Harry is the “whiteman” face of Gulnara and her 
investments. Gulnara is the “Brain,” Usmanov is 
the “Muscle and experience” and Harry is the 
“Front and buffer.” Be very careful if you choose 
to contact him [Harry Eustace Snr]. If I were to 
contact him I would limit the conversation to 
informing him that you suspect he and ZeroMax 
are behind all the events which are going on now 
and you consider them to be financially and legally 
responsible for all your losses. He has no sympathy 
for anyone except himself and his son who is often 
here in Tashkent. Treat any encounter with him as a 
“dance with the cobra”.107
The team alleged to be working with Karimova, 
in this instance, was an influential one. According 
to the International Crisis Group, Deputy Prime 
Minister Usmanov controlled ‘much of [Uzbekistan’s] 
retail trade and import/export operations’ including 
the ‘Ardus chain of supermarkets’.108 After leaving 
government in 2005, Usmanov has gone on to 
become a senior sports official, taking up positions 
as President of the Uzbek Football Federation, 
National Olympic Committee,109 and Central Asian 
Football Federation.110
Karimova’s alleged “frontman”, Harry Eustace 
Snr, served as a senior adviser to Zeromax GmbH 
between 2002 and 2008.111 In addition he acted 
as Director (1999-2008), then Emeritus Chair 
(2008-2010) of the American-Uzbekistan Chamber 
of Commerce, an influential body with strong 
Uzbek government and US State Department 
connections.112 His son, Eustace Jnr, served as 
Zeromax’s Vice President for Business Development 
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(2002-2006), and then as Vice President Corporate 
Development and Investor Relations at Oxus Gold, 
a company that will be examined in more detail 
shortly.113
Eustace Snr and Jnr went on to establish US firm, 
FMN Logistics. Notably the company won a lucrative 
line haul trucking contract with the US army’s 
northern distribution network in Afghanistan during 
2010, which was routed through Uzbekistan. It was 
alleged at the time that FMN Logistics had acted as 
a US subsidiary of Zeromax.114 For instance, leaked 
emails obtained by Eurasianet indicated close links 
between the two companies,115 while an early FMN 
Logistics sales presentations boasted ‘FMN Logistics 
is the U.S. small business contracting arm of 
Zeromax’.116 Eustace Jnr, however, denied any link 
between the two companies, while disassociating 
his family from Karimova.117
Nevertheless, in the case of Interspan’s tea business, 
the company’s primary concern was the alleged 
role being played by Karimova, whose position 
of centrality within government, and ambitious 
reputation, made her a significant threat. Indeed, it 
was CRI’s view that, ‘the whole process surrounding 
Misha’s [Mikhail Matkarimov] arrest is illegal’ but 
they added,
we must understand we are in a country where 
there [is] only one law – ‘The law of the lord of 
the manor.’ The prosecutor is working only on 
the basis of instructions from someone who 
is in power and they could care less about the 
consequence of not following legal procedures. 
Who is going to punish them? No one!!!! Misha is 
just a hostage to be used to extract the maximum 
from you and the rest of the family.118
On 11 August 2006, Matkarimov was successfully 
convicted of various economic crimes. His defence 
attorney alleges that this occurred despite 
‘discrepancies in testimony and the lack of any 
legitimate evidence’.119 Coupled to this CRI allege 
that ‘Gulnara Karimova and the government agents 
that she directed, utilised torture, and threats of 
torture, to coerce false statements from witnesses 
to support the charges against Mr. Matkarimov and 
Interspan’.120
Matkarimov’s sentence, relatively speaking, 
was light. It included three years probation, and 
a US$10,000 fine.121 Critically, however, the 
judgement confirmed that Interspan’s seized 
property would not be returned.122 According to 
Interspan, their assets ‘ultimately were taken over 
by companies reported to be controlled by Gulnara 
Karimova and her business associates’.123
Less controversial allegations were later levied 
against Zeromax by British mining company, Oxus 
Gold. Led by an experienced outfit of mining 
industry specialists, Oxus had been involved in 
developing two ore deposits in Uzbekistan. After 
having navigated the complex protocols associated 
with investing in Uzbekistan, and then anchoring the 
group’s capital in- country, Oxus began experiencing 
operating difficulties.124 
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These difficulties began when Cabinet of Minister 
decrees, delivered on 1 May 2006,125 and 7 July 
2006,126 revoked a series of tax and currency 
control exemptions enjoyed by Oxus Gold, a move 
which the company complained would cost it US$43 
million in 2006/07.127 Then on 11 July 2006, the 
State Tax Committee conducted an audit to verify 
the company’s compliance with tax, currency and 
customs laws.128 A report was published on 18 
August 2006, by the State Tax Committee and the 
State Customs Committee, which alleged Oxus, 
through its Uzbek subsidiary, had breached health 
and safety codes, gold and silver recovery rates 
regulations, in addition to tax, customs and currency 
laws.129 The total penalty levied for these violations 
was US$225 million.130
While Oxus strenuously rejected the substance of 
the allegations against it, on 7 September 2006, 
the State Tax Inspectorate of Zarafshan City 
recommended enforcement proceedings for non-
payment of tax in the Navoi Regional Economic 
Court.131 Additionally, the Central Bank placed 
currency conversion restrictions on Oxus.132 A 
month later, the Navoi Regional Economic Court 
issued collection orders against Oxus assets, 
allegedly without informing their Uzbek subsidiary, 
‘let alone allowing it an opportunity to contest or 
challenge them’.133
Oxus’ fortunes abruptly changed in December 
2006, which the company links to an intervening 
event. On 30 November 2006, a ‘Share Subscription 
Agreement’ was signed with Zeromax GmbH.134 
This gave the latter concern a 16% stake in Oxus 
at £.21 per share, and the right to appoint a Non-
Executive Director to the Oxus Board.135 In the 
same month Zeromax Vice President, Harry Eustace 
Jnr, left his position to take up a Vice President 
post at Oxus Gold.136 In 2008 Zeromax’s CEO, 
Miradil Djalalov, was appointed Oxus Non-Executive 
Director.137
Shortly after Zeromax acquired a stake in Oxus  
Gold, the Navoi Regional Economic Court’s decision 
was largely overturned by the Board of Appeal of the 
Navoi Regional Court and then the Tashkent Supreme 
Court. Oxus Gold observes: ‘Given that the Uzbek 
courts act at the behest of the executive branch, 
Oxus can only assume that the decision by the Navoi 
Regional Economic Court and the Tashkent Supreme 
Court to refuse to uphold most of the taxes, duties, 
fines and penalties levied against [our subsidiary] 
AGF stemmed from an ownership interest Zeromax 
GmbH acquired in Oxus in November 2006’.138 Oxus 
continues: ‘As a Swiss- registered company, Zeromax 
GmbH never disclosed its real ownership. While 
formally owned by an Uzbek citizen identified as 
Miradil Djalalov, it is widely speculated that the elder 
daughter of President Karimov of Uzbekistan, Gulnara 
Karimova, represented the majority shareholder in 
Zeromax GmbH’.139
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The examples of Roz Trading, Interspan Distribution 
Corporation and Oxus Gold would appear to 
evidence a consistent pattern of conduct relating to 
entities alleged to be closely linked with Karimova. 
However, it is important to note, that even during 
this early period of commercial ascendance, 
questions were raised publicly over Karimova’s 
potential involvement in illicit activities.
For instance, the defection of her financial advisor to 
the United States, facilitated an exposé published in 
The Financial Times, on 18 August 2003. Written by 
David Stern, it shone a light on the activities of Revi 
Holdings and United International Group, including 
irregular consultancy fees,140 and discounted 
acquisitions of ‘prime industrial assets’ within 
Uzbekistan.141 Crucially, Stern drew particular 
attention to Karimova’s substantial international 
financial activity. For instance, he claimed that her 
HSBC account in the British Overseas Territory 
of Jersey received a payment of US$362,000 on 
10 March 2002, while an account held with the 
US multinational, Citibank, received US$950,000 
and US$800,000 on 25 March and 13 April 2002, 
respectively.142 Stern also alleged that a HSBC 
account established in the name of her 10-year-old 
son, Islam Karimov, contained a balance of  
US$1.4 million.143
The airing of this information did not trigger any 
notable reaction from regulators or prosecutors. 
Both banks mentioned by Stern, however, were 
later found to be complicit more generally in money 
laundering activities for organised crime groups. 144 
Before we go on to consider Karimova’s role in 
Uzbekistan’s telecommunications sector, it is 
worth examining the patterns observed in court 
documents and witness testimony, provided during 
the Roz Trading/Coca-Cola, Interspan and Oxus 
Gold cases. Key observations include:
1 Karimova is characterised as an actor enjoying 
extensive reach within the government of 
Uzbekistan. This reach is linked to the strong 
leverage she has with senior decision makers in 
government, the security apparatus, and business, 
as daughter of President Karimov. Through these 
ties, Karimova enjoyed access to high-level envoys 
and fixers who could implement her instructions, 
within a wide range of state agencies, including 
government departments, regulatory bodies, 
prosecutors, the courts and the SNB.
2 Karimova did not enact these activities alone. 
Around her was a core and non-core set of 
actors, each of which had a structured role in 
group activities. Her network included advisers, 
managers, fixers, proxies, and envoys. As a result, 
the label syndicate may be applied, owing to the 
existence of a solidified network, with a division 
of labour, operational repertoire, and chains of 
command, that endured over an expansive period.
3 It is consistently alleged that Karimova set up 
extensive corporate and financial machinery 
in Uzbekistan, and offshore, to facilitate her 
business interests. This organisational structure, 
it appears, rested on the ties she established with 
experienced and technically proficient business 
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23 Uzbek state agencies alleged to have acted on the instructions of Karimova
people both in Uzbekistan and abroad, who acted 
as expert advisers and fixers.
4 The Karimova syndicate, it is claimed, 
systematically employed coercion and violence, 
administered through a range of state agencies, 
including the Presidential Security Service, SNB, 
and Interior Ministry. Additionally, the Prosecutor’s 
Office and Courts were said to be complicit 
in kidnap and ransom activities. The alleged 
violence tended to focus on employees and family 
members of targets, in a bid to prompt the latter’s 
compliance, or to expropriate company assets. 
5 The Karimova syndicate’s business model appears 
to be rooted in a series of practices. First, the 
evidence presented indicates Karimova positioned 
herself as a sector gatekeeper, whose protection 
had to be purchased by major market actors. 
Second, it appears by setting up rackets, Karimova 
was also able to dictate the terms of transactions 
between her companies and market actors,  
 
leading to significant inflated profits. Third, when 
Karimova wished to enter an industry, or remove 
rivals, it is claimed expropriation was employed, 
using state instrumentalities.
6 Testimony provided by Karimova’s adviser, backed 
by documentary records, suggests the syndicate’s 
activity was transnational in character. Not only did 
we observe the involvement of a major international 
brand in bribery allegations, it is also claimed that 
the Karimova syndicate employed international 
corporate entities to prosecute its affairs. Initially 
this took place through offshore vehicles legally 
registered in Karimova’s name. However, it is 
suggested Karimova then circumvented the risk of 
exposure, by hiding her beneficial interest behind 
proxies. It is also suggested that high volume 
financial transactions initiated by Karimova were 
funnelled through a series of offshore accounts, 
administered through banks which US authorities 
later found to be complicit in money laundering for 
organised crime syndicates.
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These patterns will again appear in the records and 
evidence disclosed in the civil forfeiture actions, 
prosecutions and media exposés, which centre on 
Karimova’s role in Uzbekistan’s telecommunications 
industry. It is to this matter which we will now turn.
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The Karimova syndicate’s initial foothold in the 
industry, took place through US-Uzbek joint venture, 
Uzdunrobita (meaning ‘gateway to the world’). 
Uzdunrobita was the invention of six US investors 
from Perry, Georgia. The unlikely consortium 
included ‘a certified public accountant ... a dentist, 
an eye doctor, an insurance man, an engineer and  
a stockbroker’.147 One of the lead investors, was  
Brian Bowen, who would go on to become 
Karimova’s adviser.148
A Wall Street Journal feature on the joint-venture 
notes the six US entrepreneurs shunned ‘detailed 
business blueprints filled with minutia ... [and] 
simply went looking for a big city with bad phone 
service’.149 They found it in Tashkent. Through 
the corporate investment vehicle, International 
Communications Group, a venture with the 
government of Uzbekistan was negotiated after the 
Uzbek Minister for Communications was taken on a 
successful US tour, which included a meeting with 
Georgian grandee, former President Jimmy Carter.150
The company’s early success was attributed, in 
part, to its general director, Yuriy V. Snezhkov. 
Brian Bowen noted, ‘I don’t have any experience 
dealing with the KGB, the mafia, the family 
connections in the bureaucracy here’.151 Snezhkov, 
on the other hand, had both the local literacy 
and essential connections, including with the 
Communications Minister who was his ‘boyhood 
pal’.152 The Wall Street Journal observes, it was 
Snezhkov ‘who persuaded Mr. Bowen to give free 
phones to Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov and 
to government ministers. Eventually, everyone in 
the government wanted one’.153 He also ‘pressed 
friends at [the state owned] Uzbek Air, the nation’s 
airline, to buy $160,000 worth of phones. That gave 
Uzdunrobita an office in Tashkent, a desk, a car and 
a couple of Uzbek staffers’.154 By 1996, we are told, 
Uzdunrobita had ‘7,000 subscribers, 240 employees 
and could be worth as much as $100 million by 
industry estimate’.155
3.4 Establishing a telecommunications foothold  
and transnational network
While an embryonic mobile telecommunications sector had emerged in 
Uzbekistan during the 1990s, by 2003 when the Karimova syndicate is alleged 
to have begun establishing a political monopoly over the market, consumers 
remained under-serviced. For instance, BMI Research claimed in 2007, that 
with mobile penetration below 10% in a country of 27 million, ‘consumer 
demand for mobile services ... is quite simply, rampant’.145 While more recently, 
the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) observed, 
‘everyone wanted a piece of the Uzbek market, which eventually grew to  
25 million subscribers by 2012’.146
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According to Karimova’s former financial adviser, her 
syndicate gained a sizable foothold in Uzdunrobita 
during 2001, using extortion and misappropriation. 
Inogambaev observes:
... Uzdunrobita, a joint venture between the Uzbek 
Government and International Communications 
Group, an Atlanta based company (“ICG”), [at the 
time] was the largest cellular telecommunications 
company in Uzbekistan. In December 2001, 
Ms. Karimova and I met with Shahid Feroz, the 
President of ICG, and Begzod Ahmedov, the 
Director of Uzdunrobita. Ms. Karimova demanded 
a 20% stake in Uzdunrobita from ICG, and 
in exchange she would provide lobbying and 
consulting services. She made it clear that, without 
her support, Uzdunrobita would be destroyed. So, 
in late December 2001, Shahid Feroz agreed to 
transfer 20% of the ownership in Uzdunrobita to 
Revi Holdings, Ms. Karimova’s off-shore company. 
Through these explicit threats, Ms Karimova had 
acquired a large stake in a multimillion dollar 
company without spending a penny.156
Uzdunrobita’s founder, Brian Bowen, is accused 
of then becoming Karimova’s accomplice, during 
subsequent attempts to expropriate Roz Trading’s 
stake in CCBU.157 It is not clear whether Bowen’s 
involvement was voluntary, or coerced.
Karimova is said to have expanded her stake in 
Uzdunrobita during February 2002. Inogambaev 
reports: ‘Ms. Karimova directed the Government of 
Uzbekistan to transfer 31% of the State’s ownership 
in Uzdunrobita to Revi Holdings, at no charge. The 
Uzbek State Property Committee acquiesced to Ms. 
Karimova’s demands’.158 Like Zeromax, Uzdunrobita 
dismissed accusations of Karimova’s involvement 
as ‘just a rumour’.159 However, in this case The 
Financial Times was able to independently verify that 
this acquisition had indeed taken place.160
Having become a majority shareholder, Inogambaev 
claims Karimova began embezzling company 
funds through sham agreements. He recalls: ‘Once 
she controlled the company, she began directing 
marketing and consulting contracts to herself. 
Through these sham contracts, where no services 
were actually provided, she stole millions of 
dollars and deposited this money into her personal 
account’.161 One example cited in The Financial 
Times was a payment of US$330,000 to Revi 
Holdings, for ‘consultation services of the contract 
without number on 31.07.2002’.162 This mimics 
similar transactions alleged to have taken place 
between Coca- Cola and Revi Holdings. 
The Financial Times also reports that Karimova 
received a $1m payment from Huawei Technology, 
a Chinese telecommunication firm that had been 
awarded a lucrative contract by Uzdunrobita to set up 
a GSM network outside Tashkent. The paper reports: 
As part of the contract, Huawei hired Global 
Communications, a Caribbean offshore company, 
paying it just over $1m for GSM equipment. 
Global, however, turned around and hired Revi 
[Holding], depositing the same amount into Revi’s 
bank account. Bank documents show the amount 
being passed on in November 2002, first from 
Huawei to Global’s Citibank account in Dubai, and 
then to Revi Holdings.163
In total, it is estimated that the Karimova syndicate 
‘siphoned some $20 million out of Uzdunrobita 
using such fraudulent invoices’.164
Having established a foothold in an adolescent 
mobile telecommunications industry, Karimova it 
appears was able to employ her position of centrality 
and prestige within the Uzbek state to construct a 
political monopoly over the sector. Market access, 
it appears from the evidence, now depended on her 
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support, which could be purchased at a premium. An 
example of this may be observed with the entry of 
the telecommunications multinational, Vimpelcom, 
into the Uzbek market during 2005,165 a concern 
owned by Russian and Norwegian interests.
Vimpelcom sort to facilitate this entry through 
the purchase of Unitel from the Dutch company 
Silkway Holdings BV, for US$200 million.166 
At the time, Unitel had approximately 300,000 
subscribers, making it the second largest service 
provider in Uzbekistan.167 However, to safely 
operate in Uzbekistan, it was made clear that 
Vimpelcom would need to purchase Buztel, an 
Uzbek telecommunication firm with a mere 2,700 
subscribers, for the sum of US$60 million.168 At 
a meeting of Vimpelcom’s Finance Committee, 
the business case for spending $60 million on a 
minor player was questioned, given that the capital 
could be more prudently spent on developing 
Unitel’s network.169 It was also queried whether 
this arrangement might damage the company’s 
international standing, given it risked violating the 
US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.170 
In response to the committee’s concerns, 
Vimpelcom management made clear that entry 
into the Uzbek market depended on the backing 
of a beneficial owner standing behind Buztel, who 
was anonymously referred to as ‘the partner’.171 
Management informed the committee: ‘Due to 
certain political reasons (and this message should 
be taken by us as is), Buztel should be considered 
as an entry ticket into [the] Uzbekistan market and 
the buyer of Buztel would be considered a preferred 
buyer of Unitel’.172 The committee was also told 
that it is ‘more important to follow the political 
requirements suggested for entry into the market 
versus [the] questionable risk of acquisition of 
Unitel as [a] standalone’.173 Indeed were Vimpelcom 
to flout political requirements for market entry in 
Uzbekistan, management warned the company 
would be placed ‘in opposition to a very powerful 
opponent and [this] bring[s] [the] threat of 
revocation of licenses after the acquisition of Unitel 
[as a] stand-alone’.174 This is just one of several 
examples, grounded in corporate records and court 
documents, which strongly suggests Karimova had 
successfully established a racket in the cellular 
telecommunications sector, which enabled her 
syndicate to extract rents from foreign investors.
To organisationally enact this gatekeeper role, 
it appears that Karimova set up an intricate 
transnational corporate and financial structure 
– almost certainly using experienced advisers – 
expertly designed to conceal her involvement, and 
the illicit transactions being prosecuted. The primary 
vehicle employed by Karimova – which appears to 
have been the successor to Revi Holdings – was 
Takilant Limited.175 Incorporated on 2 January 2004 
in the British Overseas Territory of Gibraltar, Takilant 
was the parent company for Karimova’s diverse 
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portfolio of interests in Uzbekistan, which included, 
airport duty free, real estate investment, medical 
and diagnostic services, express payment systems, 
entertainment, tourism, aviculture, and of course 
telecommunications.176
On paper, Takilant’s sole shareholder/director was 
Gayane Avakyan, an Armenian national resident in 
Tashkent.177 At the time of incorporation, Avakyan 
was just 20 years old.178 She is alleged to have been 
a ‘close associate’ of Karimova,179 and a director at 
her fashion business, ‘House of Style’.180 
The other major vehicles employed by the Karimova 
syndicate were Swisdorn Limited and Expoline 
Limited.181 Swisdorn was incorporated on 3 July 
2003 in Gibraltar.182 Its sole shareholder/director 
was Rustam Madumarov.183 Born on 26 March 
1977, Madumarov is an Uzbek of Tajik ethnicity.184 
At the time Madumarov was resident in Tashkent.185 
In addition to being a member of the popular Uzbek 
pop-group, DADO, he was said to be Karimova’s 
boyfriend.186
Alongside Madumarov, the US Department of 
Justice claims that the head of Uzdunrobita, 
Bekhzod Akhmedov, ‘held power of attorney 
to conduct company and banking business for 
Swisdorn’.187 He is also alleged to have enjoyed 
authority over Takilant’s accounts held with the 
Swiss private bank, Lombard Odier.188
The third company, Expoline Limited,189 was 
incorporated in Hong Kong. Its owner/director, 
again, was Madumarov.190 
All three companies employed by the Karimova 
syndicate to mediate transactions in Uzbekistan’s 
176 Mannheimer Swartling, ‘Rapport till styrelsen i TeliaSonera AB: Har TeliaSoneras investering i en 3G-licens tillsammans 
med frekvenser och nummerserier i Uzbekistan år 2007 och därefter inneburit att företrädare för TeliaSonera gjort 
sig skyldig till korruptionsbrott eller penningtvätt?’, OCCRP, https://cdn.occrp.org/projects/corruptistan/documents/
uzbekistan/Telecoms_18.pdf
177 Ibid, Bilaga [Annex] 4.
178 Complaint. United States of America v. Any and all assets held in account numbers 102162418400, 102162418260, and 
102162419780 at Bank of New York Mellon SA/NV, Brussels, Belgium, on behalf of First Global Investments SPC Limited 
AAA Rate, et al, Case No. 1:15-cv- 05063, para. 18 (S.D.N.Y. June. 29, 2015).
179 Ibid.
180 S. Bergman et al, ‘TeliaSoneras “partner” - Karimova’s closest confidant’, SVT, 19 September 2012, http://www.svt.se/
ug/TeliaSoneras-partner-karimova-s-closest-confidant (accessed 3 February 2017). 
181 Complaint. United States of America v. Any and all assets held in account numbers 102162418400, 102162418260, and 
102162419780 at Bank of New York Mellon SA/NV, Brussels, Belgium, on behalf of First Global Investments SPC Limited 
AAA Rate, et al, Case No. 1:15-cv- 05063, para. 21A – 21B (S.D.N.Y. June. 29, 2015).
182 Registrar of Companies Gibralter, ‘Certificate of the Incorporation of a Company: Swisdorn Limited’, OCCRP, 2 July 
2003 (certified), https://cdn.occrp.org/projects/corruptistan/documents/uzbekistan/Swisdorn_03.pdf (accessed 3 
February 2017).
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102162419780 at Bank of New York Mellon SA/NV, Brussels, Belgium, on behalf of First Global Investments SPC Limited 
AAA Rate, et al, Case No. 1:15-cv- 05063, para. 21B (S.D.N.Y. June. 29, 2015).
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102162419780 at Bank of New York Mellon SA/NV, Brussels, Belgium, on behalf of First Global Investments SPC Limited 
AAA Rate, et al, Case No. 1:15-cv- 05063, para. 21C (S.D.N.Y. June. 29, 2015).
telecommunications sector were situated in known 
secrecy jurisdictions, so named because corporate 
filings are notoriously opaque, and difficult to 
access, even for foreign governments. Nevertheless, 
it is claimed by the US Department of Justice, 191 
and other authorities,192 that in all three cases the 
beneficial owner of the company concerned was 
indeed Gulnara Karimova.
Connected to these companies were a range 
of offshore bank accounts. Initially, Karimova’s 
companies conducted their business primarily 
through three banks. Two of which were the 
Latvian banks Aizkraukles 193 and Parex,194 while 
a substantial amount of illicit proceeds went into 
Takilant’s account held with the UK bank, Standard 
Chartered.195 Later, Swiss bank Lombard Odier 
would take over as the primary offshore financial 
vehicle for Takilant.196
It is important to add, that an early attempt 
was made to launder funds through an account 
held with Citibank UK in the name of Revi UK 
Limited.197 It, however, was shut down by the 
bank after Karimova failed to adequately explain 
suspicious transactions.198 In this case, the company 
holding the account was registered in Karimova’s 
name, which may have heightened bank scrutiny. 
Subsequently the proceeds primarily went through 
accounts held by Takilant Limited. Nevertheless 
Takilant is a company registered in a known secrecy 
haven, and managed by a young Armenian woman, 
with links to Karimova.199 Thus it is reasonable to 
ask why these tenuous transactions were not also 
subjected to heightened due diligence checks.
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24 Banking institutions allegedly employed by Karimova
BANK: HSBC 
HQ: UK 
BRANCH:  Jersey
PROSECUTED FOR 
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
BANK: Citibank 
HQ: US 
BRANCH:  Dubai
PROSECUTED FOR 
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
BANK: Lombard  
 Odier 
HQ: Swizterland 
BRANCH:  Geneva
PROSECUTED FOR 
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
BANK: Union 
Bancaire Privée 
HQ: Swizterland 
BRANCH:  Geneva
PROSECUTED FOR 
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
BANK: Rietumu  
 Banka 
HQ: Latvia200
BANK: Aizkraukles  
 Banka 
HQ: Latvia
BANK: Parex   
 Banka 
HQ: Latvia
BANK: Standard  
 Chartered 
HQ: UK 
BRANCH:  Hong Kong
PROSECUTED FOR 
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
Many of the initial payments, which the US 
Department of Justice has designated the proceeds 
of crime (foreign bribery), went to accounts in 
Latvia held by Swisdorn and Takilant. A former 
Latvian bank executive points to the permissive 
financial regime that exists in Latvia: ‘Latvia is 
the offshore banking centre for the former Soviet 
Union. Of the 21 banks licensed in Latvia, 16 are 
boutique offshore specialists and most are linked 
with notorious oligarchs’.201 Furthermore, the same 
executive argues, ‘published phone call transcripts 
clearly indicate that the Latvian Prosecutors Office 
is protecting this activity in exchange for bribes’.202
200 A whistleblower from the Latvian banking sector claims that the Prosecutors Office has turned a blind eye to 
financial crimes in return for bribes. See J. Christmas, ‘Parex Bank fraud perpetrated by the Latvian Finance Ministry and 
EBRD against the IMF, EU, and World Bank’, Lawless Latvia, 31 March 2011, http://www.lawlesslatvia.com/wp-content/
uploads/2012/03/EBRD-fraud-letter.pdf. 
201 J. Christmas, ‘Parex Bank fraud perpetrated by the Latvian Finance Ministry and EBRD against the IMF, EU, and World 
Bank’, Lawless Latvia, 31 March 2011, http://www.lawlesslatvia.com/wp- content/uploads/2012/03/EBRD-fraud-letter.pdf.
202 Ibid. 
A range of independent audits, and whistle-blower 
accounts, have shed further light on the state of the 
industry in Latvia.203 One investigation conducted 
by Brown Rudnick LLP, on behalf of the Hermitage 
Fund – which led to a Latvian Financial and Capital 
Market Commission probe – found evidence of 
systemic money laundering. They allege that Russian 
criminal groups, in particular, have laundered 
money through a range of Latvian banks, which 
includes, notably, Aizkraukles Banka.204 Brown 
Rudnick observe, ‘our clients have discovered that 
funds held at and which moved through these 
[Latvian] accounts represent a portion of some 
US$800 million in illicit proceeds generated in a 
criminal scheme involving the theft of funds from 
the Russian Treasury, as well as proceeds of similar 
crimes committed earlier, payments to corrupt 
Russian officials and members of their families 
involved in the scheme, and fraud’.205 The Latvian 
bank accounts, Brown Rudnick argue, were held in 
the name of shell companies incorporated in known 
secrecy havens such as the British Virgin Islands and 
Seychelles.206
Aizkraukles Banka, in particular, has been accused 
by a range of commentators as being one of the 
most significant players in Latvia’s booming offshore 
industry.207 It is well positioned to target Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia with offices in Russia, 
Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan. Bowen and Galeotti claim ‘large 
portion of its business [is] in non-resident deposits 
and [it] has been implicated in several money 
laundering scandals’.208 For instance, investigative 
reports published on corruption and money 
laundering in Russia, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova, have 
traced significant volumes of laundered money back 
to accounts held at Aizkraukles Banka.209
Serious allegations have also been levelled against 
Parex Banka. For example, former Head of the 
International Relations Group at Parex, John 
Christmas, claims his previous employer has acted as 
a significant spoke in international money laundering 
operations and tax evasion. Christmas states, ‘I gave 
a long list of material frauds to Ernst & Young and 
the FSA [UK Financial Service Authority] between 
2004 and 2006. Both organisations informed me 
that they already knew that Parex was criminal and 
both ignored the fraud information’.210 Christmas 
further claims, ‘I was told that 80% of deposits were 
non-residents and that these deposits were mostly 
coming from Parex representative offices in CIS 
[Commonwealth of Independent States] countries ... 
the purpose of these accounts was tax evasion’.211 
He concludes, ‘half of the banks in Latvia today have 
reputations as boutique money launders’.212
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The bleak image projected by whistle-blowers such 
as Christmas, and analysts such as Brown Rudnick, 
Global Witness and Kroll, is further corroborated 
by OCCPR. OCCPR contend that Latvian banks 
are actively involved in schemes and shams set 
up to help clients launder money. Drawing on 
leaked documents obtained by the project, OCCRP 
observes: ‘Latvian banks appear to offer instructions 
to clients on how to use fake offshore companies 
associated with the bank to launder money or evade 
taxes. The documents outline specific ways to 
mislead regulators and avoid red flags to regulators 
and law enforcement’.213
Perhaps not surprisingly then, Latvia is a popular 
expatriate hub for Uzbek elites, with family members 
of notable politicians and public officials holding 
substantial real-estate holdings in the country.214 
This includes Karimov’s nephew, who is said to  
have owned one of the most expensive luxury  
cars in the country – although no specific allegations 
of impropriety have been leveled against him.215
However, it would be unfair to single out the Latvian 
financial sector. There is compelling evidence to 
suggest the Swiss and UK banking institutions 
said to be employed by Karimova, were also 
proactively engaged in illegal conduct relating to 
money laundering and tax evasion. For example, 
Standard Chartered Bank (SCB) was the subject of 
a New York State, Department of Financial Services 
investigation. It found:
For almost ten years, SCB schemed with the 
Government of Iran and hid from regulators 
roughly 60,000 secret transactions, involving 
at least $250 billion, and reaping SCB hundreds 
of millions of dollars in fees. SCB’s actions 
left the U.S. financial system vulnerable to 
terrorists, weapons dealers, drug kingpins and 
corrupt regimes, and deprived law enforcement 
investigators of crucial information used to track 
all manner of criminal activity.216
To enact these illicit schemes, SCB was 
‘programmatically engaged in deceptive and 
fraudulent misconduct’.217 Allegedly SCB’s Group 
Executive Director rejected internal compliance 
warnings, informing a US colleague: ‘You f---ing 
Americans. Who are you to tell us, the rest of 
the world, that we’re not going to deal with 
Iranians’.218 SCB was fined US$667 million in 2012 
by US authorities. During 2014 a second fine of 
US$300 was levied after deficiencies were found in 
SCB’s ‘money laundering transaction surveillance 
system’.219 As part of the settlement, SCB agreed to 
cease US dollar transactions with high risk clients in 
its Hong Kong branch, where Karimova’s companies 
are alleged to have conducted their business.220
The UK’s Financial Conduct Authority also had 
cause to investigate SCB for breaching section 20 
of the Money Laundering Regulations 2007. Under 
the regulations, SCB is obliged to identify corporate 
customers connected to politically exposed persons, 
and implement enhanced due diligence measures. 
213 G. Stack and A. Giga, ‘Latvian Banks Promote Money Laundering Companies’, OCCRP, 16 June 2016, https://www.
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in_latvias_shadows.html (accessed 30th November 2016). 
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Standard Charter News & Media, 19 August 2014, https://www.sc.com/en/news-and-media/news/global/19-08-2014-
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220 Consent Order Under New York Banking Law §§39 and 44. Department of Financial Services In the Matter of 
Standard Chartered Bank, New York Branch, para. 9 (N.Y. D.F.S 19 August 2014). 
221 Decision Notice. UK Financial Conduct Authority to Standard Charter Bank, Financial Conduct Authority Publications, 
para. 2.6 (UK FCA 22 January 2014).
222 Ibid, para. 5.2.
223 Ibid, para. 1.1; UK Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Standard Bank PLC fined £7.6m for failures in its anti-money laundering 
controls’, UK Financial Conduct Authority News, 23 January 2014, https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/standard-
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Following a review of 48 corporate customer 
files,221 all of which were linked to politically 
exposed persons, the Financial Conduct Authority 
concluded that SCB had failed to consistently 
implement risk assessments; neglected to apply 
appropriate risk ratings to corporate clients; did 
not carry out appropriate enhanced due diligence 
measures before establishing business relationships 
with corporate customers that had connections to 
politically exposed persons; and failed to adequately 
monitor existing accounts.222 In this instance a fine 
of £7,640,400 was levied against the bank.223
Karimova’s Swiss banker, Lombard Odier has also 
come under media and prosecutorial scrutiny, 
over its link to a number of illicit transactions. For 
instance, it has been alleged Yasser Arafat laundered 
US$300 million of Palestinian Authority funds 
through the bank, using a British Virgin Islands 
company.224 The Marcos family is also accused of 
storing looted assets with Lombard Odier, on this 
occasion, by the Philippines Presidential Commission 
on Good Government.225 David Leigh and Rob 
Evans writing for The Guardian, linked the bank to a 
scheme BAE Weapons allegedly used to hide bribe 
payments made to state clients.226
Most recently, the US Department of Justice has 
had cause to investigate Lombard Odier for a range 
of illegal practices involving its US clients. As part of 
a non-prosecution agreement, the bank acquiesced 
to a statement of facts, outlining its illicit activities, 
which include:
 With respect to at least 173 U.S. Related Accounts, 
Lombard Odier assisted U.S. clients in concealing 
their assets and income by opening and maintaining 
accounts in the names of non-U.S. corporations, 
foundations, trusts, or other entities (collectively, 
“entities”) that it knew were beneficially owned  
by U.S. persons. The non-U.S. jurisdictions in 
which the entities were incorporated or formed 
included Liechtenstein, Panama, and the British 
Virgin Islands.227
It needs to be emphasised, this was just one 
example, of many, documented in the statement of 
facts, illustrating the lengths to which the bank went 
to help US citizens evade tax.228 In this instance, 
a US$99,809,000 fine was levied against Lombard 
Odier by the Department of Justice.229 
Given the fact that many of the financial institutions 
and corporate regimes Karimova employed to set 
up the international infrastructure for her Uzbek 
rackets, had a documented history of helping 
clients to covertly break the law, it is reasonable 
to suggest her syndicate found a highly favourable 
transnational opportunity structure.
Although the US government in particular has made 
laudable efforts to punish and reform these financial 
institutions, it is notable that the scale of the fines 
are modest in comparison to the profits generated 
by the banks concerned. Given that some of the 
clients which have been helped to evade the law, and 
launder illicit profits, are involved in the systematic 
persecution of distinct groups – which is essential 
to their illicit economic strategies – it is difficult to 
suggest by any reasonable standard, such punishments 
are commensurate with the seriousness of the crimes, 
measured in terms of culpability and harm.
As a result, it is fair to conclude that Karimova, 
along with other Uzbek state officials, have by 
and large found an international financial and 
corporate terrain that is implicitly permissive of their 
activities. Which is not to say governments and 
other international institutions explicitly approve of 
state organised crime, rather the contention is that 
as matters currently stand, global conditions are 
materially favourable to this type of illicit activity. 
Until such time as the material balance shifts – 
through major reforms to international finance and 
corporate regulation – the global system must be 
categorised as permissive.
On that note, we will now look more closely at 
Karimova’s alleged racketeering activity in the 
telecommunications sector, in which transnational 
actors again play a critical role.
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One of the first MNCs to successfully enter the 
Uzbek market during this period was, Mobile 
TeleSystems OJSC (MTS). Headquartered in Russia, 
MTS’ main shareholders at the time were Sistema, 
a company owned by influential Russian oligarch, 
Vladimir Yevtushenkov 231, in addition to Deutsche 
Telekom.232 Its entry into the sector was secured 
through the purchase of local telecommunications 
company, Uzdunrobita.233 It will be recalled that 
Karimova acquired a majority stake in this company 
during 2001/02, allegedly using extortion and 
misappropriation. Furthermore, evidence furnished 
in a range of legal proceedings and audits, indicate 
Uzdunrobita’s Director General, Bekhzod Ahkmedov, 
acted as an envoy, fixer, adviser and manager for 
Karimova, including her overseas financial affairs.
In July 2004 a formal deal was struck with MTS. It 
was agreed that it would purchase a controlling stake 
in Uzdunrobita, by acquiring 33 percent of Swisdorn 
Limited’s 59 per cent share in the company, and 
ICG’s entire 41 percent holding.234 It was a matter of 
public record at the time that Karimova was a major 
stakeholder in Uzdunrobita. Indeed, just months 
earlier, Karimova told The Independent, that she had a 
‘major share’ in Uzdunrobita, after having ‘personally 
built up to 150,000 subscribers’.235 In addition, The 
Financial Times had reported on Karimova’s alleged 
use of offshore companies, to channel irregular 
payments.236 Given that she was the President’s 
daughter, and a Minister-Counsellor in Uzbekistan’s 
Russian embassy, MTS should have been aware  
of the significant risks this acquisition posed, 
especially as the company claimed to be a  
proactive corporate citizen.
3.5 Inside the telecommunications ‘racket’
By 2003/04, a range of credible sources suggest that the Karimova syndicate 
had succeeded in establishing what effectively appears to have been a racket 
in Uzbekistan’s telecommunications sectors.230 This meant in practice that 
any prospective investor who wished to gain market entry, had to pay one 
of Karimova’s proxy companies an entrance fee, in violation of Uzbek law, 
international law and foreign bribery legislation. In this section we will examine 
the particular organisational structures, and transaction chains, used to extract 
fees from international telecommunications companies seeking entry into 
Uzbek’s prospective cellular market.
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18, 2016). 
231 JSFC Sistema, ‘Annual Report’, Investor and Shareholder Information, 2004, http://www.sistema.com/fileadmin/user_
upload/media/48817/annual_report_2004.pdf (accessed 7 February 2017).
232 US Securities and Exchange Commission, ‘Form 20-F’, OCCRP, 2004, https://cdn.occrp.org/projects/corruptistan/
documents/uzbekistan/MTS_01.pdf (accessed 7 February 2017).
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The Independent, 7 January 2004, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/she-is-the-jet-setting-daughter-of-
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236 M. Seddon, ‘VimpelCom agrees deal in corruption case’, Financial Times, 17 February 2016, https://www.ft.com/
content/e5f63772-d693-11e5-8887-98e7feb46f27 (accessed 7 February 2017).
Nevertheless, the purchase went ahead. MTS paid 
US$100 million for the acquisition of Swisdorn’s 33 
percent stake,237 while only $21 million was paid for 
ICG’s 41 per cent holding.238 In effect, US$3 million 
was paid for each percentage of Swisdorn’s stake, 
while just over $500k was paid for each percentage 
of ICG’s share.239 Inexplicably the purchase price  
for Swisdorn’s shares in the same company, was  
six times ICGs. 
In addition, Swisdorn and MTS entered into a ‘put 
and call option agreement’.240 Under the agreement, 
MTS could opt at a later date to acquire Swisdorn’s 
remaining 26 percent stake for US$37.7 million, 
plus five percent interest per annum.241 When this 
option was enacted in June 2007, an addendum was 
made to the original agreement. It increased the 
purchase price to US$250 million.242
However, even before the 2007 addendum, the 
irregular price paid for Uzdunrobita was pointed 
to by The Moscow Times reporter Simon Ostrovsky. 
Ostrovky wrote in July 2004, ‘Moscow- based 
Mobile TeleSystems on Friday agreed to pay as much 
as $159 million for a cellphone company owned by 
the controversial daughter of authoritarian Uzbek 
President Islam Karimov -- or roughly 33 times 
what the company valued itself at [US$4.7 million] 
just two years ago’.243 Yevgeny Golossnoi of Troika 
dialogue, is quoted in The Moscow Times as saying, 
‘at best, MTS is paying double what Uzdunrobita is 
currently worth’, though Golossnoi adds MTS is not 
buying the company ‘its buying the market’.244
The initial tranche of US$100,033,000 was 
transferred on 9 August 2004 from MTS’s ING Bank 
account in the UK to Swisdorn’s Aizkraukles account 
in Latvia.245 The second tranche was transferred in 
2007, this time from MTS’s account at the Moscow 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, into 
Swisdorn’s Standard Chartered account in  
Hong Kong.246
25 Disparity in purchase price 
of Uzdunrobita 
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The next major telecommunications firm to enter 
the Uzbek market was Vimpelcom. At the time, 
Vimpelcom’s two largest shareholders were Telenor, 
a Norwegian multinational, and Russia’s Alfa Group, 
a private investment consortium. The company 
was initially headquartered in Moscow, however, in 
2010 it relocated to Amsterdam. The circumstances 
surrounding Vimpelcom’s entry into the Uzbek 
telecommunications market was touched upon in 
the previous section.
To recap, the entry was predicated on discussions 
held between Vimpelcom and representatives of 
Takilant Limited in December 2005.250 Following 
these discussions, a number of options were put 
to Vimpelcom’s Board. First, on 14 December 
2005 it was proposed that Vimpelcom’s entry 
into Uzbekistan should take place through the 
acquisition of Unitel 251 – a company with a 31% 
market share 252 – for a purchase price of US$200 
million.253 However, to safely enter the market 
without risk of arbitrary interference from the 
Uzbek state, it was made clear that the company 
would need to purchase Buztel, which had a mere 
.3% market share, for US$60 million, plus the 
assumption of a US$2.4 million debt.254 
247 D. Stern, Financial Times, para. 1-36.
248 M. Dejevsky, The Independent, para. 13.
249 S. Ostrovsky, The Moscow Times, para. 21-24 and 27-33. 
250 Deloitte, Telenor, Section 0.3, para. 2.
251 Ibid, Section 2.2.1, para. 3.
252 Complaint. United States of America v. all funds held in account number CH1408760000050335300 at Lombard 
Odier Darier Hentsch and Cie Bank, Switzerland, on Behalf of Takilant Limited, and Any Property Traceable Thereto et al, 
Case No. 1:16-cv-01257, para. 47 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2016).
253 Deloitte, Telenor, Section 2.2.1, para. 1.
254 Complaint. United States of America v. Any and all assets held in account numbers 102162418400, 102162418260, and 
102162419780 at Bank of New York Mellon SA/NV, Brussels, Belgium, on behalf of First Global Investments SPC Limited 
AAA Rate, et al, Case No. 1:15-cv-05063, para. 39 (S.D.N.Y. June. 29, 2015).
By the end of 2004 any company entering Uzbekistan’s telecommunications sector should have been alert 
to the high corruption risks posed, following a series of authoritative media investigations. Furthermore, 
financial institutions handling corporate clients in Uzbekistan’s telecommunications industry were now 
under a duty to flag associated accounts as high-risk and apply enhanced due-diligence measures.
18 August 2003: A feature article by David Stern in the Financial Times draws attention to Karimova’s 
commercial activities in a range of sectors, and the offshore entities being used to prosecute these 
activities.247 Her entry into the telecommunications sector through Uzdunrobita is documented, along with 
the irregular service contracts standing behind the transfer of significant sums into accounts held by her 
offshore holding companies. This report by Stern also links Karimova to Bekhzod Akhmedov, rendering the 
latter a politically exposed person.
7 January 2004: In a generally sympathetic interview with Gulnara Karimova, conducted by The 
Independent’s Mary Dejevsky, Karimova states that her principal source of wealth is derived from 
her commercial stake in the telecommunications sector. The article specifically cites her stake in 
Uzdunrobita.248
19 July 2004: A perceptive and hard-hitting piece by Simon Ostrovskyin the Moscow Times draws on 
testimony provided by Farhod Inogambaev,249 and documentary evidence collected by Global Witness. 
The article alleges that Gulnara Karimova had established a racket in Uzbekistan’s telecommunications 
sector. Moreover, it also states that Karimova used sham service contracts, and offshore entities, to 
facilitate illicit payments made by telecom companies.
26 How were we to know?
Board papers explicitly disclosed that Buztel was 
owned by a Russian company ‘and a partner’.255 
While the partner’s name was not stated, the US 
Department of Justice alleges that Vimpelcom 
management was aware Karimova had an indirect 
beneficial interest in Buztel.256
Indeed, management warned Vimpelcom’s board, 
that any attempt to enter Uzbekistan without 
purchasing Buztel would place the company ‘in 
opposition to a very powerful opponent’, and would 
‘bring threat of revocation of licenses’.257
Vimpelcom’s board agreed to the proposal, on 
the condition a legal opinion was sort confirming 
that the deal complied with the US Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).258 This caveat was a 
concession to the board’s independent member, 
and Telenor nominee. The US Department of Justice 
claims that once a law firm had been instructed to 
undertake the assessment, Vimpelcom management 
failed to alert them that Karimova was known to be 
a key beneficiary of the proposed arrangement.259 
As a result, ‘the legal opinion did not address the 
critical issue identified by the Vimpelcom board as a 
prerequisite to the acquisition’.260
The purchase of Buztel was finally executed on 29 
December 2005.261 On 17 January 2006, US$60 
million was transferred to an account held by 
Buztel’s Russian owners, through a British Virgin 
Islands subsidiary.262 Three days later, a third of the 
funds (US$19 million), was transferred to Takilant 
Limited’s Aizkraukles account in Latvia, ostensibly 
‘for consulting services’.263 At the time, of course, 
Takilant was owned and managed on paper by a 22 
year old Armenian, domiciled in Tashkent, connected 
to Karimova’s fashion house.264 
Following the Buztel acquisition, Vimpelcom proceeded 
to purchase Unitel on 9 February 2006, for US$200 
plus the assumption of a US$7.7 million debt.265
A second proposal was put forward to Vimpelcom’s 
board on or about 7 April 2006. It recommended 
a share purchase agreement be entered into with 
Takilant Limited, in effect making the latter a local 
partner. Management noted that the partnership 
would facilitate ‘[r]evision of the licensing agreement 
for the major [telecommunications] licenses’ and 
‘transfer of frequencies’.266 This proposal was again 
approved subject to a FCPA compliance review, which 
was executed with the same flaws as the first.267
58  Confronting Grand Corruption in Uzbekistan 
255 Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Statement of Facts). United States v. VimpelCom Ltd, Case No. 16-cr-137, para. 15 
(S.D.N.Y 10 February 2016).
256 Complaint. United States of America v. Any and all assets held in account numbers 102162418400, 102162418260, and 
102162419780 at Bank of New York Mellon SA/NV, Brussels, Belgium, on behalf of First Global Investments SPC Limited 
AAA Rate, et al, Case No. 1:15-cv- 05063, para. 41 (S.D.N.Y. June. 29, 2015).
257 Complaint. United States of America v. Any and all assets held in account numbers 102162418400, 102162418260, and 
102162419780 at Bank of New York Mellon SA/NV, Brussels, Belgium, on behalf of First Global Investments SPC Limited 
AAA Rate, et al, Case No. 1:15-cv- 05063, para. 41 (S.D.N.Y. June. 29, 2015).
258 Plea Agreement. United States v. Unitel LLC, Case No. 1:16-cr-00137-ER, Exhibit B para. 18 (S.D.N.Y 10 February 2016).
259 Ibid, para. 19.
260 Ibid.
261 Complaint. United States of America v. Any and all assets held in account numbers 102162418400, 102162418260, and 
102162419780 at Bank of New York Mellon SA/NV, Brussels, Belgium, on behalf of First Global Investments SPC Limited 
AAA Rate, et al, Case No. 1:15-cv- 05063, para. 39 (S.D.N.Y. June. 29, 2015)
262 Complaint. United States of America v. all funds held in account number CH1408760000050335300 at Lombard 
Odier Darier Hentsch and Cie Bank, Switzerland, on Behalf of Takilant Limited, and Any Property Traceable Thereto et al, 
Case No. 1:16-cv-01257, para. 49 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2016).
263 Ibid.
264 Ibid, para. 23. 
265 Ibid, para. 50
266 Plea Agreement. United States v. Unitel LLC, Case No. 1:16-cr-00137-ER, Exhibit B para 22 (S.D.N.Y 10 February 2016).
267 Ibid
   Confronting Grand Corruption in Uzbekistan  59
Final sign off on the share purchase agreement 
was given on 28 March 2007. This gave Takilant 
a 7% indirect stake in Unitel for US$20 million, 
which Vimpelcom could purchase back in 2009 for 
between US$57.5 million and US$60 million.268 On 
23 September 2009, Vimpelcom paid Takilant Limited 
$57.5 million to repurchase the 7% stake.269 The US 
Department of Justice argues this share purchase 
agreement was in effect a front set up to conceal 
what was in reality a bribe made to induce Karimova 
to ‘corruptly exercise’ her ties,270 including an ‘ability 
to influence other Uzbek government officials, to 
assist Vimpelcom in entering and operating in the 
Uzbek telecommunications market’.271
The third major entrant into Uzbekistan’s 
telecommunications sector during this period was 
the Swedish firm, TeliaSonera. Negotiations for 
TeliaSonera’s entry has been judiciously documented 
owing to investigations conducted by the Swedish 
public broadcaster, SVT,272 consultants Mannheimer 
Swartling,273 along with the US Department  
of Justice.274
Again, like their competitors, it appears that 
TeliaSonera’s management was aware that market 
entry in Uzbekistan, requires support from a 
powerful local partner. However, in a twist, it 
was Uzdunrobita’s Director General, Bekhzod 
Akhmedov, who headed a company owned by rivals 
MTS, that brokered TeliaSonera’s entry.275 By this 
stage Akhmedov’s link with Karimova, through his 
Uzdunrobita position, had been documented by 
The Independent,276 Financial Times 277 and Moscow 
Times 278. We also now know that Akhmedov 
managed Karimova’s international accounts held at 
Standard Chartered Bank 279 and Lombard Odier.280
The highly irregular nature of these negotiations, 
was remarked upon by a TeliaSonera executive 
interviewed by SVT. They observed, ‘it was a totally 
crazy situation. Bekhzod was the CEO for the 
competitor, MTS. And there sat TeliaSonera, in the 
competitor’s office, negotiating about money for the 
Karimov family’.281
Bekhzod’s connection to Karimova explicitly 
featured in an internal report compiled by Fintur 
Holdings, a majority owned subsidiary of TeliaSonera 
268 Ibid
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– here he was described as the ‘Chief Executive for 
Gulnara Karimova’s Investment Group’.282 However, 
when the matter was presented to the TeliaSonera 
Board, this information was anonymised. Directors, 
again, were only informed about an ‘Uzbek Partner’ 
by management.283
On 4 July 2007, a TeliaSonera subsidiary entered 
into a ‘cooperation agreement’ with the ‘Uzbek 
Partner’.284 It was signed by Akhmedov.285 As part 
of the arrangement, Akhmedov obtained a letter 
from UzACI – Uzbekistan’s telecoms regulator – 
supporting TeliaSonera’s entry.286 The company’s 
entry was formally enacted a month later through 
the purchase of Uzbek firm, Coscom.287 In 
particular, the TeliaSonera subsidiary, TeliaSonera 
Uzbek Telecom Holding B.V. (TeliaSonera Uzbek) 
acquired a 99.97% stake in the firm, while another 
subsidiary TeliaSonera UTA Holding B.V. acquired 
the remaining .03%.288 
In this case, the US Department of Justice claims a 
different sham arrangement was set up to channel 
market access fees to Karimova. To that end, a sales 
contract was signed with Takilant Limited during 
December 2007. In return for a fee of US$80 
million, Takilant’s Uzbek subsidiary Teleson, would 
send a formal waiver to the telecoms regulator, 
repudiating its rights to certain 3G frequencies and a 
numbering block, which would then be apportioned 
to Coscom.289 The agreement was formalised on 
or about 24 December 2007.290 Three days later, a 
US$80 million payment was made by TeliaSonera, 
from its Svenska Hadelsbanken’s account in Sweden 
to Takilant’s Parex account in Latvia.291
In addition, TeliaSonera and Takilant agreed that 
upon completion of the transfer, Takilant would have 
a right to acquire 26% of TeliaSonera Uzbekistan, 
the parent company of Coscom.292 A TeliaSonera 
executive interviewed by SVT admitted company 
personnel were aware of the transaction’s dubious 
nature: ‘I was ... informed that Gulnara would receive 
shares in the new company that TeliaSonera would 
form. And that she through a local company would 
receive around 20 percent. And that TeliaSonera 
would buy back the shares 2-3 years later – at a pre-
set price. I don’t know the amount’.293
The buy-back provision was enacted by TeliaSonera 
in 2010, when it elected to repurchase 20% of 
Takilant’s holding, for a price of US$220m.294 This 
was US$100m in excess of the price set in the 
original 2007 shareholder agreement, which only 
obliged TeliaSonera to pay US$112.5 for the entire 
26% holding.295 The alteration mirrored the put and 
call option agreement Swisdorn Limited made with 
MTS, where an initial repurchase price of US$37.7 
million, was increased to US$250 million.296 In 
TeliaSonera’s case, the payment was wired to Takilant’s 
Standard Chartered account in Hong Kong.297
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The US Department of Justice contends that this 
premium was paid in return for the protection, 
and political favours Takilant’s involvement in the 
operation afforded the company.298 A TeliaSonera 
executive quoted in US court records, states ‘the 
success of [Coscom] ... has to a large extent been 
dependent on the support from Takilant’.299 For 
this premium repurchase price, Takilant is also 
alleged to have assisted TeliaSonera with ‘converting 
Uzbek currency, renewing Coscom’s licenses and 
obtain[ing] an additional LTE license’.300 Again 
these are favours that hinge on Karimova’s informal 
leverage within the Uzbek state, rather than a 
capacity to expertly chaperon the company through 
complex regulatory procedures. 
In a subsequent audit of TeliaSonera’s Uzbek 
business dealings conducted by the law firm, 
Mannheimer Swartling – at the company’s request – 
it was found that executes at TeliaSonera paid little 
attention to the company’s local partner, Takilant 
Limited, or the significant risk that it was a politically 
exposed entity. The firm’s audit concludes, ‘the 
project management’s, as well as the board’s focus 
was forward-looking in terms of the political and 
commercials risks. There was a very limited focus 
on historical circumstances behind and surrounding 
the local partner, which could be risky from different 
perspectives’.301
By the end of 2007, three major international 
telecom brands had entered the Uzbek market, 
allegedly under the stewardship of Karimova. The 
US Department of Justice argues, once in operation, 
tributary payments were frequently made by these 
companies to the Karimova syndicate, through sham 
service and sales contracts.302 It is to this matter, we 
will now turn.
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On or about 18 October 2011, Takilant submitted 
two reports to Vimpelcom. The US Department of 
Justice observes, ‘large portions of both reports, for 
which Takilant was paid $30 million, contained little 
or no original content, relying instead on copied 
text from open source and other materials ... [such] 
as Wikipedia articles, blog entries, and PowerPoint 
presentations from Beeline-Vimpelcom’s 
telecommunications brand’.306 On or about the 
same day, Uzbek telecoms regulator, UzACI issued 
a decision amending Unitel’s licence (Vimpelcom’s 
subsidiary), permitting the company to employ  
LTE frequencies.307
The nature of the contract, triggered concern 
within Vimpelcom. On successive occasions a 
Vimpelcom executive warned that the deal ‘smells 
like and resembles corruption’, they added it ‘reeks 
and doesn’t look good’.308 Despite these explicit 
concerns the contract was executed. Payment was 
made in two tranches. An initial sum of US$20 
million was transferred from Watertrail Industries 
Limited’s ING bank account in the Netherlands, to 
Takilant’s Swiss bank account at Lombard Odier 
on 21 September 2011.309 A second payment of 
$US10 million was made between the same bank 
accounts on 19 October 2011.310
3.6 Tributary payments through sham agreements
A window into the alleged sham agreements, set up to channel tributary 
payments to Karimova, is provided by the US Department of Justice’s 
investigation into Vimpelcom, the accuracy of which was confirmed by the 
company in a deferred prosecution agreement.303 The Department of Justice 
discovered that the Vimpelcom subsidiary, Watertrail Industries Limited – a 
company registered in the British Virgin Islands – entered into a consultancy 
contract with Takilant Limited, on 19 September 2011.304 Takilant agreed to 
produce a range of technical reports for Vimpelcom. In addition, the Gibraltar 
firm – ostensibly owned and managed by a young Armenian fashion industry 
executive – agreed to secure certain LTE frequencies, even though Vimpelcom 
‘lacked the ability to employ LTE frequencies in Uzbekistan in 2011’.305
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311 See: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), ‘Report on the Application of the 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 2009 Revised 
Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions’, OECD Directorate for Financial and 
Enterprise Affairs, 2010, para. 61 and 86-87, https://www.oecd.org/unitedkingdom/46883138.pdf (accessed 1 February 
2017).
312 Ibid, para. 87.
In 2010 the UK government passed The Bribery Act 2010. It allows individuals and companies to be 
criminally prosecuted for the bribery of foreign public officials, even when the illicit financial transactions 
occurred outside the UK territory.311 In order to have jurisdiction over the offence, those involved must 
have a ‘close connection with the United Kingdom’.312
This includes ‘a body incorporated under the law of any part of the United Kingdom’. However, notably, 
it excludes bodies incorporated in British Overseas Territories (OTs) and Crown Dependencies (CDs). This 
has prompted criticism from the OECD, which observes: ‘the Bribery Act does not provide the U.K. with 
jurisdiction to prosecute legal persons incorporated in the CDs and OTs. It confers nationality jurisdiction 
to prosecute natural persons from the CDs and OTs, but not with respect to legal persons incorporated 
there. In this regard, the Act is identical to – and thus raises the same concerns as – the existing law’.
The significance of this loophole is pointed to in the Vimpelcom case. Here a British Virgin Islands 
company is alleged to have paid a bribe to a foreign public official, through a sham service contract, using 
a Gibraltar based holding company. Despite the fact the two alleged entities are incorporated in British 
Overseas Territories, under The Bribery Act 2010 the UK courts have no jurisdiction over this matter.
•  Takilant Limited and Swisdorn Limited organised rackets in Uzbekistan from the British Overseas 
Territory of Gibraltar.
•  A British Virgin Islands subsidiary of Takilant, Tozian Limited was used to launder money.
•  Two further British Virgin Islands companies, Rockdale Holdings and Sordex Ventures, were  
used to handle Karimova’s Uzbek businesses, in addition to Panally Limited, registered in England.
•  Bribe payments were allegedly made by companies registered in the British Virgin Islands,  
including Watertrail Limited and Aqute Holdings.
•  The proceeds were warehoused in British banks including HSBC and Standard Chartered Bank.
•  Bribe payments were funnelled into investment portfolios managed by First Global Investment,  
a Cayman Island registered company.
27 The Big British Loophole – The Bribery Act 2010
28 The British Connection
29 UK complicity in Karimova syndicate
In addition to sham service/consultancy agreements, 
the US Department of Justice found evidence 
of sham sales agreements.313 For instance, 
Karimova linked companies are alleged to have 
sold telecommunications providers frequencies, 
which the latter could lawfully acquire free of 
charge from the Uzbek regulator UzACI.314 On 
10 September 2007, for example, Takilant Limited 
established an Uzbekistan telecommunications 
company Teleson.315 On or about 27 September 
Takilant, through Teleson, then acquired a series of 
3G frequencies.316 Two weeks later, on 12 October, 
Vimpelcom board’s approved the purchase of these 
3G frequencies from Teleson for US$25 million.317  
A contract to this effect was signed on 29 
October.318 On or about the same day, Takilant 
repudiated its 3G frequencies in a letter to UzACI.319 
This transaction violated the licensing agreement 
issued to Teleson by UzACI, which states the ‘[l]
icensee cannot sell, in part or in full, or in any other 
way transfer to a third party the rights or obligations 
regarding this license’.320 Despite this violation, on 8 
November UzACI issued the repudiated frequencies 
to the Vimpelcom subsidiary, Unitel.321
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The US$25 million was transferred to Takilant’s 
Parex account in Latvia, in two tranches, from an 
account held by a Vimpelcom subsidiary at ING 
Bank in the Netherlands.322 The US Department 
of Justice claims ‘no part of the $25 million paid to 
Takilant was legally required to obtain rights to use 
the frequencies in Uzbekistan’.323 Accordingly the 
department concludes, the payments to Takilant 
were made for the ‘corrupt purpose’ of obtaining 
Karimova’s influence with Uzbek government 
officials, and to assist Vimpelcom operate in the 
national telecommunications market.324
Just over a month later, a similar agreement was 
entered into between Teleson and TeliaSonera, 
netting Takilant US$80 million.325 On this occasion 
the payment was made from the TeliaSonera’s 
Svenska Handelsbanken account in Sweden, to 
Takilant’s Latvian account held with Parex Bank.326
MTS is also alleged to have been involved in sham 
sale agreements. For instance, the US Department 
of Justice claims that on or about 21 August 2008 
MTS agreed to pay Takilant Limited US$30 million, 
if its subsidiary waived rights to certain mobile 
frequencies.327 Full payment would only be made if 
UzACI then reassigned the frequencies to MTS.328 
UzACI reassigned the frequencies on or about 25 
August 2008.329 The US$30 million payment was 
transferred through six tranches of $5 million, 20% 
of which was wired into Takilant’s Latvian Parex account, 
while the remaining 80% was paid into the company’s 
Standard Chartered account in Hong Kong.330
An important caveat needs to be added when 
framing these tributary payments. Karimova, we 
observed, appears to have enjoyed a political 
monopoly over the telecommunications industry. 
In addition, she enjoyed an evidenced capacity 
to influence the actions of a wide range of state 
agencies, from sector regulators, through to the 
prosecutor’s office. Complicating matters, all 
telecommunications companies were operating 
in an ambiguous regulatory environment, where 
legitimate or illegitimate charges could be laid, for 
economic crimes and regulatory violations relating 
to currency conversion, taxation and service 
provision. The companies also had in-country staff, 
who could be arrested and tortured, as leverage.331 
Accordingly, we must be careful when defining 
payments facilitated through sham agreements 
as bribes. While a significant number of these 
payments appear to have been tributary in nature, 
in return for Karimova’s protection and other 
political favours, nevertheless there is circumstantial 
evidence to suggest some payments may have been 
extortionate in character. 
For instance, it is alleged by the US Department 
of Justice that during 2008 ‘MTS received 
periodic complaints from Uzbek regulatory 
agencies, including UzACI, related to the quality 
of communication and other problems with 
Uzdunrobita’s operations’.332 UzACI, of course, 
had the capacity to cancel MTS’ operating license. 
Given the Uzbek political environment, this could 
be done without due process. Accordingly, the US 
Department of Justice claims, ‘in order to resolve 
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these complaints’ MTS representatives sought the 
assistance of Karimova and her associates, ‘because 
their connections to the Uzbek authorities were 
critical’.333 In the same approximate period MTS is 
said to have entered into a sham agreement with 
Karimova’s proxy company worth US$30 million.334
Further evidence pointing to the existence of an 
extortion racket in Uzbekistan’s telecommunications 
sector is provided in leaked cables composed by 
US Ambassador Jon Purnell, at the US embassy 
in Tashkent.335 Purnell alleges that Karimova was 
behind a plot to extort money or assets from Uzbek 
telecom firm, Skytel.336 Skytel at the time was part-
owned by a US company, NCI Projects International, 
337 and also had connections with Sergey Tsoy, 
the owner of Uzbekistan’s Business Bank, Poytaht 
Hotel and the Segura insurance company.338 It is 
alleged that Karimova and Tsoy were in dispute at 
the time.339 It appears in January 2005 Skytel began 
experiencing operational problems, when its mobile 
frequencies were jammed by the Department of 
Defence.340 According to embassy officials, ‘in 
earlier discussions’ with a Karimova intermediary 
which took place ‘before the company’s “technical 
problems” began, she wanted 50 percent’ of 
Skytel.341 In a subsequent meeting held with 
UzACI’s First Deputy Chairman, on 14 February 
2005, he,
gave the [Skytel] executives two options: a) allow 
the GOU [Government of Uzbekistan] to buy back 
the whole company at a significantly reduced rate 
(considering the depreciation of the equipment) or 
b) for an additional USD 30 million, [First Deputy 
Chairman] Isbasarov could personally guarantee 
that Skytel would be able to use the frequency 
without interference from other parties.342
Purnell concludes, ‘only a seriously influential 
individual like Gulnara [Karimova] could use 
this amount of GOU resources for her own self-
interest’.343 Given these examples it is reasonable to 
conclude that some of the illicit payments made to 
the Karimova syndicate, may have been coerced.
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The majority of the funds deposited were 
wired from a Takilant account held at Parex 
Bank in Latvia (US$102,864,623.01), and its 
Standard Chartered account held in Hong Kong 
(US$346,949,755.21).347 Approximately US$105m 
was directly wired to Takilant’s Swiss bank by 
TeliaSonera, Vimpelcom and their subsidiaries.348 
Subsequently, Takilant transferred US$200m to 
another Lombard Odier account held by its British 
Virgin Islands subsidiary, Tozian Limited.349 A small 
portion of these proceeds (US$3.5m), was then 
shifted to a Swiss account Tozian held with Union 
Bancaire Privee (UBP).350 All of these funds, the 
Department of Justice claims, can be linked to the 
proceeds of crime.
The remainder of the illicit proceeds appear to have 
been wired to a segregated portfolio fund, First 
Global Investments SPC Limited, based in British 
Overseas Territory the Cayman Islands.351 It appears 
the portfolio fund was registered in the Cayman 
Islands on 19 September 2007.352 Three months 
3.7 Laundering the proceeds
In total the US Department of Justice points to what it claims is $US850 million 
in illicit payments, inappropriately made to obtain the influence and protection 
of Karimova.344 Documents submitted to the courts, suggest the proceeds of 
this illicit activity can be traced to two principal financial warehouses. Over 50% 
was deposited in Swiss bank accounts held with Lombard Odier, by Takilant 
Limited and its subsidiary Tozian Limited.345 It is alleged by Pilet this move to 
the Swiss bank was initiated by Bekhzod Akhmedov.346
344 Ibid, para. 1; Complaint. United States of America v. all funds held in account number CH1408760000050335300 
at Lombard Odier Darier Hentsch and Cie Bank, Switzerland, on Behalf of Takilant Limited, and Any Property Traceable 
Thereto et al, Case No. 1:16-cv-01257, para. 1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2016).
345 Ibid.
346 F. Pilet, ‘La princesse a perdu la clé de son trésor genevois’, François Pilet, 30 September 2012, https://francoispilet.
net/la-princesse-a-perdu-la-cle-de-son-tresor-genevois/ (accessed 11 February 2017).
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30 International complicity in the Karimova syndicate
later, Karimova linked companies began wiring 
funds into different segregated portfolios. In total, 
US$247,999,954.32 was transferred from Swisdorn 
Limited’s Standard Chartered account in Hong Kong, 
to a series of bank accounts held at Citibank UK, 
linked to the First Global Investment portfolios.353 A 
further, $38,000,000 was transferred from Takilant’s 
account in Parex bank in Latvia,354 while Expoline 
Limited wired US$14,000,000 355 from its Hong 
Kong account at the Standard Chartered Bank.  
It will be recalled, Expoline Limited was a Hong Kong 
registered company, owned and managed by  
Rustam Madumarov,356 Karimova’s alleged  
proxy and boyfriend.357
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The precise events which precipitated the 
eradication of this syndicate from within key 
sites of state power in Uzbekistan are not yet 
clear. Nevertheless, a number of evidence based 
statements can be made on the integrity of the 
process underpinning the break-up of the  
Karimova syndicate
First, it ought to be noted that as early as 2004, 
evidence relating to Karimova’s racketeering activity 
had been presented in high profile news publication, 
after her financial adviser had fled to the US with 
documentary and experiential evidence on her 
business dealings. That Farhod Inogambaev had to 
seek asylum in the US, before he could talk openly 
about these transactions, speaks volumes about the 
rule of law in Uzbekistan.
In addition to this, many of the sham contracts 
Karimova allegedly employed to conceal bribe 
payments, were apparent to the sector’s regulator. 
Rather than prevent this activity, it appears that the 
telecommunications regulator became a party to 
the racket. For example, on 21 August 2008, MTS 
agreed to pay Takilant US$30 million, if the latter’s 
Uzbek subsidiary Teleson Mobile LLC, waved its 
right to certain frequencies.359 Full payment would 
be made on condition that these frequencies were 
reassigned to MTS’ subsidiary, Uzdunrobita, by 
the telecommunications regulator.360 Teleson, a 
shelf company, had acquired the frequencies just a 
week before the agreement was struck with MTS. 
According to the US Department of Justice, the 
frequencies were reassigned to Uzdunrobita by the 
telecommuncations regulator 361 despite the fact 
it is prohibited under Uzbek law for private entities 
to directly transfer frequencies, indeed as has 
already been noted, telecommunication companies 
can obtain these frequencies from the Uzbek 
government without payment of upfront fees.362
Despite these irregular activities, which the media 
reported on, Karimova was able to assume a series 
of high profile political positions in the Uzbek state. 
For example, in 2008 she was appointed Deputy 
Foreign Minister, and Permanent Representative 
3.8 The demise of Karimova:  
Rupture rather than justice
Following her prolific rise between 2001 and 2010, Karimova’s business  
empire collapsed rapidly, concluding with her arrest in 2014. It appears that 
Karimova’s commercial interests in Uzbekistan have now been liquidated, and 
many of those involved in the syndicate are reported to have been arrested  
and imprisoned by Uzbek authorities. A significant portion of the offshore 
fortune alleged to have been amassed by Karimova is now frozen and  
currently the subject of asset forfeiture proceedings, by an international 
coalition of state actors.358
358 For example, see: Complaint. United States of America v. all funds held in account number CH1408760000050335300 
at Lombard Odier Darier Hentsch and Cie Bank, Switzerland, on Behalf of Takilant Limited, and Any Property Traceable 
Thereto et al, Case No. 1:16-cv-01257 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2016); Complaint. United States of America v. Any and all assets 
held in account numbers 102162418400, 102162418260, and 102162419780 at Bank of New York Mellon SA/NV, Brussels, 
Belgium, on behalf of First Global Investments SPC Limited AAA Rate, et al, Case No. 1:15-cv- 05063, para. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 
June. 29, 2015).
359 Complaint. United States of America v. all funds held in account number CH1408760000050335300 at Lombard 
Odier Darier Hentsch and Cie Bank, Switzerland, on Behalf of Takilant Limited, and Any Property Traceable Thereto et al, 
Case No. 1:16-cv-01257, para. 40 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2016).
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of Uzbekistan to the United Nations.363 In 2010, 
Karimova also became Uzbek Ambassador to Spain.364
Added to this, Abdulla Aripov, who headed 
the telecommunications regulator between 
2005 and 2009, was recently appointed Prime 
Minister of Uzbekistan.365 This appointment 
occurred after international civil forfeiture 
proceedings, criminal prosecutions, audit reports, 
and media investigations, had revealed that 
the telecommunications regulator was party 
to numerous sham sales contracts between 
front companies linked to Karimova, and major 
international concerns including MTS, Vimpelcom 
and TeliaSonera.
Another figure connected to the Karimova 
syndicate, Salim Abduvaliyev, has also recently been 
appointed to an official position, in this case, Deputy 
Head of the Uzbek Olympic Committee. US Embassy 
cables published by Wikileaks, label Abduvaliyev 
a ‘mafia chieftain’.366 Citing embassy intelligence 
sources, Ambassador Purnell claims ‘Salim locates 
foreign and other investors interested in GOU 
tenders, putting them in touch with an Iranian 
businessman holding British citizenship. The Iranian 
prepares the paperwork, submitting the tender to 
First Daughter Gulnora Karimova for approval’.367
Part of the reason that no enforcement action was 
taken against Karimova or her collaborators, despite 
the publicity their activities attracted, lies in the 
lack of an independent prosecutor, judiciary or legal 
profession in Uzbekistan. Problematically many high 
profile criminal cases in Uzbekistan, with a political 
dimension, are handled and directed by the SNB. 
Given that senior SNB officials employ the agency 
to secure their own business interests, and the 
political- economic interests of power-brokers in the 
Uzbek state and business community, it is unable 
to act in an independent or impartial manner when 
investigating crimes.
Furthermore, the SNB’s modus operandi is covert 
and violent. Those prosecuted by the SNB face 
interrogation under coercive conditions marked 
by threats, torture, forced confessions, doctored 
evidence, and rigged trials. Other governmental 
agencies involved in the prosecution process 
are unable to act independently of SNB orders. 
Accordingly, those ostensibly responsible for 
handling cases within the General Prosecutor’s 
Office must follow SNB directions, regardless of the 
evidence, or face dismissal. Lawyers who robustly 
defend clients, face revocation of their operating 
license, while Judges who fail to observe the 
dictated outcome, risk removal by a judicial selection 
commission controlled by the President and SNB.
Thus the events of 2014-15, which saw Karimova 
and her alleged accomplices arrested, must be 
read in this light. To that end, on 17 February 
2014, the SNB launched a raid of Karimova’s 
Tashkent apartment.368 She was taken to the main 
family residence in Tashkent and placed under 
indeterminate house-arrest, without formal charges 
being laid against her.369 Patrucic reports, ‘Uzbek 
prosecutors have said she operated an organised 
crime group that stole US$ 53 million from the state 
and state businesses through forgery, blackmail 
and extortion in running her businesses, including 
Uzbekistan Airways, Coca Cola, a refinery and 
others’.370 Later, in July 2014, thirteen associates 
of Karimova were given custodial sentences, 
this included Rustam Madumarov, and Gayane 
Avakian, who were sentenced to 6.5 and 6 years 
respectively.371 The following year news reports 
noted ‘authorities in Uzbekistan have arrested  
nine more individuals with current or former 
business ties to Gulnara Karimova ... [including]  
two former senior managers of a local Coca-Cola 
bottler and a man thought to be a former financial 
adviser of Karimova’.372
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Given the corrupted character of Uzbekistan’s 
criminal justice system, we can confidently assume, 
that the decision to arrest Karimova and her 
accomplices was not an independent one, based 
off an impartial investigation overseen by police 
and the prosecutor’s office. To the contrary, it 
was administered through the SNB, and politically 
motivated.373 Furthermore, given the state of 
the criminal justice sector in Uzbekistan, neither 
Karimova nor her accomplices could have been 
afforded a fair or transparent trial, on which a secure 
conviction could be made according to international 
standards. The outcome of the trials – where they 
in fact took place – would have been decided in 
advance, and merely executed by the judiciary.
Of course, prosecutions have also taken place 
outside Uzbekistan in jurisdictions where there is 
a better track record of prosecutorial and judicial 
independence. These international interventions 
were triggered when Karimova’s close associate 
Bekhzod Akhmedov fled Uzbekistan, allegedly after 
relations with the President’s daughter fractured. 
Given that Akhmedov is alleged to have enjoyed 
power of attorney over the financial affairs of Takilant 
Limited and Swisdorn Limited, his flight abroad posed 
a significant threat to the Karimova syndicate.
It appears that actions taken to protect syndicate 
assets, alerted criminal justice authorities 
internationally to the illicit activities being 
conducted through offshore accounts and corporate 
vehicles. For instance, Takilant Limited’s proxy 
owner, Gayane Avakyan travelled to Geneva on 29 
June 2012, seeking to withdraw several hundred 
million Swiss francs held at Lombard Odier.374 
According to Patrucic, ‘while on paper she owned 
Takilant, she was not authorised to access the 
account and so was refused’.375 The only individual 
with apparent authority to access the account was 
Akhmedov.376 Avakyan’s visit, however, alerted 
Lombard Odier to an Interpol warrant that had been 
filed against Akhmedov by the Uzbek state (we will 
recall, an Interpol warrant against Maqsudi was 
also issued following a marriage breakdwon with 
Karimova).377 According to Pilet ,‘the day following 
the visit of Gayane Avakyan, 30 June, Lombard 
Odier sends a suspicious activity report of money-
laundering to the federal authorities’.378
A second attempt was then made by members of 
the Karimova syndicate to access the account. This 
time it was two Coca-Cola Bottlers of Uzbekistan 
executives, Aliyer Ergashev and Shahruh Sabirov, 
who were ‘known to be under the control of Gulnara 
Karimova’.379 According to the Financial Times, ‘Mr 
Ergashev manages properties on the Cote d’Azur 
and Paris’ chic 16th arrondissement. Registration 
papers for the properties show Ms Karimova as 
the beneficial owner. Other documents show links 
between Mr Sabirov and Ms Karimova through two 
companies based in Hong Kong’.380 Both men were 
arrested by Swiss authorities.381 An official probe 
was then launched by the prosecutor and US$650 
million of Takilant’s funds was frozen.382
373 To that end, it has been noted that the Karimova syndicate had begun to significantly encroach on the economic 
interests of Uzbek power-brokers, in addition to Russian and German financial interests. Furthermore, Karimova had 
exacerbated the situation by publicly signaling her ambition to be President. Nevertheless, owing to the secretive nature 
of clan politics, it is impossible to know with any confidence the precise reasons behind the maneuvers against the 
Karimova syndicate. 
374 M. Patrucic, ‘Following Gulnara’s Money’, OCCRP, 21 March 2015, https://www.occrp.org/en/corruptistan/uzbekistan/
gulnarakarimova/following-gulnaras-money (accessed 12 February 2017).
375 Ibid, para. 2.
376 Uppdrag granskning, SVT, para. 19.
377 M. Patrucic, OCCRP, para. 3.
378 F. Pilet, François Pilet, para. 7.
379 Ibid; J. Zaugg, L’Hebdo, para. 5.
380 C. Weaver and N. Buckley, ‘Uzbekistan: The Leading Lady’, The Financial Times, 7 March 2013, https://www.ft.com/
content/e73db090-85b7-11e2-9ee3-00144feabdc0, (accessed 13 February 2017). 
381 J. Lillis, ‘Uzbekistan’s Coca-Cola Problem: Is It the Real Thing?’, EurasiaNet, 27 February 2013, http://www.eurasianet.
org/node/66608 (accessed 13 February 2017)
382 M. Patrucic, OCCRP, para. 3.
Bekhzod Akhmedov
Nationality: Uzbek
Notable roles: Director-
General, Uzdunrobita 
Alleged link: Envoy, 
fixer, manager, advise.
Aliyer Ergashev
Nationality: Uzbek
Notable roles: Executive, 
Coca-Cola Bottlers of 
Uzbekistan 
Alleged link: Manager.
Sodiq Safoyev
Nationality: Uzbek
Notable roles: Deputy 
Foreign Minister, Chair 
of the Foreign Relations 
Committee
Alleged link: Envoy, fixer.
Gayane Avakyan
Nationality: Armenian
Notable roles: Director, 
House of Style 
Alleged link: Proxy, 
manager.
Harry Eustace, Snr
Nationality: US
Notable roles: Adviser, 
Zeromax GmbH; 
Director, American 
Uzbekistan, Chamber of 
Commerce; Co- Owner, 
FMN Logistics. 
Alleged link: Adviser.
Alisher Sayfuddinov
Nationality: Uzbek
Notable roles: Deputy 
Chief, Presidential 
Security Service 
Alleged link: Envoy, fixer.
Brian Bowen
Nationality: US
Notable roles: Founder, 
Uzdunrobita
Alleged link: Adviser, 
envoy.
Rustam Madumarov
Nationality: Uzbek
Notable roles: Singer, 
DADO 
Alleged link: Proxy, 
manager.
Irina Avtaikina
Nationality: Uzbek
Notable roles: –
Alleged link: Proxy.
Farhod Inogambaev
Nationality: Uzbek
Notable roles: –
Alleged link: Adviser, 
manager, fixer, envoy.
Mirabror Usmanov
Nationality: Uzbek
Notable roles: Minister 
of Trade, Deputy Prime 
Minister
Alleged link: Adviser.
Miradil Djalalov
Nationality: Uzbek
Notable roles: Owner, 
CEO, Zeromax
Alleged link: Manager, 
proxy.
Sharuh Sabirov
Nationality: Uzbek
Notable roles: 
Executive, Coca-Cola 
Bottlers of Uzbekistan
Alleged link: Manager.
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Following the Swiss probe, Swedish investigative 
news programme, Uppdrag Granskning, aired an 
exposé during September 2012. The programme 
claimed that TeliaSonera paid bribes worth 
US$335m to Takilant Limited, a company owned 
by Gayane Avakyan, a young fashion industry 
executive, with close ties to Karimova.383 Shortly 
after the exposé Swedish anti- corruption police 
launched an investigation into TeliaSonera.384
These investigations, and exposés, led to further 
prosecutions and civil forfeiture actions. During 
March 2014, Vimpelcom was informed that it was 
under criminal investigation in the United States 
and Netherlands.385 Later on 4 November 2015, 
former Vimpelcom CEO, Jo Lunder, was arrested by 
Norwegian police as part of a corruption probe.386 
Then in 2016, the US Department of Justice 
announced that a deferred prosecution agreement 
had been reached with Vimpelcom.387 As part of 
the settlement, Vimpelcom agreed to pay a criminal 
penalty of US$230 million.388 The Dutch based firm 
has also reached settlements with the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission, and Netherland’s Public 
Prosecution Service, leading to fines of US$375m 
and US$230m respectively.389 Over this general 
period, the US Department of Justice also launched 
two asset forfeiture actions directed at what are 
claimed to be Karimova’s illicit proceeds, seizing 
US$550m held in Swiss bank accounts, and a further 
US$330m held in a series of offshore investment 
portfolios.390 Most recently it has been announced 
that the US and Dutch authorities have offered to 
settle prosecutions against TeliaSonera for US$1.4 
billion,391 while in the Netherlands Takilant Limited 
has been successfully prosecuted.392
Accordingly, there is evidence to support the 
contention that justice is in the process of being 
served at an international level, through a series 
of prosecutions and asset forfeiture proceedings – 
although questions could be raised over whether 
fines are commensurate with the seriousness of 
the criminality. However, at a domestic level in 
Uzbekistan, the prosecution of those connected to 
the Karimova syndicate has been conducted largely 
in secret, under the auspices of the SNB. Here the 
imprisonment of syndicate actors is more a signal of 
shifts in the local power terrain, than any genuine 
attempt to enact justice.
383 Uppdrag granskning, ‘TeliaSonera billion deal with dictatorship’, SVT, 18 September 2012, http://www.svt.se/ug/
TeliaSonera-gjorde-miljardaffar-med-diktatur-genom-bolag-i- skatteparadis (accessed 1 December 2016).
384 Telia News Articles (2012), ‘Uzbekistan Update’, Telia Company, 26 September 2012, http://www.teliacompany.com/
en/newsroom/news/news/news-articles/2012/uppdatering-uzbekistan/ (accessed 13 February 2017).
385 VimpelCom Ltd. ‘VimpelCom Announces Investigations’, PR Newswire, 12 March 2014, http://www.prnewswire.com/
news-releases/vimpelcom-announces-investigations-249681601.html (accessed 13 February 2017).
386 M. Eckel, ‘Norway Arrests Ex-VimpelCom CEO As Uzbek-Linked Probe Expands’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 5 
November 2015, http://www.rferl.org/a/russia-norway-vimpelcom-ex-chief- arrested/27347218.html (accessed 13 February 
2017).
387 Office of Public Affairs, ‘VimpelCom Limited and Unitel LLC Enter into Global Foreign Bribery Resolution of More 
Than $795 Million; United States Seeks $850 Million Forfeiture in Corrupt Proceeds of Bribery Scheme’, US Department of 
Justice, 18 February 2016, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/vimpelcom-limited-and-unitel-llc-enter-global-foreign-bribery- 
resolution-more-795-million (accessed 13 February 2017). 
388 Ibid.
389 Ibid.
390 Complaint. United States of America v. all funds held in account number CH1408760000050335300 at Lombard 
Odier Darier Hentsch and Cie Bank, Switzerland, on Behalf of Takilant Limited, and Any Property Traceable Thereto et al, 
Case No. 1:16-cv-01257 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2016); Complaint. United States of America v. Any and all assets held in account 
numbers 102162418400, 102162418260, and 102162419780 at Bank of New York Mellon SA/NV, Brussels, Belgium, on behalf 
of First Global Investments SPC Limited AAA Rate, et al, Case No. 1:15-cv- 05063 (S.D.N.Y. June. 29, 2015).
391 M. Verbergt, and D. Gauthier-Villars, ‘Telia Asked to Pay $1.4 Billion to Settle Bribery Probe’, The Wall Street Journal, 15 
September 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/telia-to-pay-1-4-billion-in- bribery-probe-1473921293 (accessed 13 February 
2017).
392 T. Escritt ‘Dutch Court Orders Seizure of 123 Million Euros in Uzbek Corruption Case’, Reuters, 20 July 2016, http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-netherlands-uzbekistan-corruption-idUSKCN10026V (accessed 20 March 2017).
Karimova’s case, nonetheless, offers an 
unprecedented window into this system owing both 
to her prolific and expedited rise, and the significant 
paper trail it has left behind. In contrast to the 
socialite caricature often presented of Karimova, 
reality appears to be more sinister. If the evidence 
presented in the foregoing sections is accurate 
– the volume and variety of sources suggest 
credibility – it would appear Karimova presided over 
a state organised crime syndicate that operated 
through a diverse range of governmental organs. 
This syndicate administered a range of legitimate 
enterprises, although evidence has been forwarded 
to suggest key assets were acquired through 
misappropriation or expropriation. A significant 
stream of income was also allegedly generated 
through protection and extortion rackets. What 
seemingly made these operations so successful, was 
the access the syndicate had to state machinery, 
which acted as its core lever and teeth. In the 
end, of course, the Karimova syndicate was itself 
expropriated and consumed by rivals, who have now 
secured positions of dominance in the Uzbek state 
after the death of Islam Karimov.
We have also seen that Karimova syndicate’s 
activity was not self-contained within Uzbekistan. 
Many illicit transactions, in fact, were organised 
through entities positioned in offshore jurisdictions. 
The United Kingdom, in particular, was a critical 
spoke in the Karimova case. The rackets and 
bribe payments were apparently organised using 
companies incorporated in British Overseas 
Territories, while British banks were alleged to 
have been key nodal points for the syndicate’s 
expansive money laundering operations. The United 
States, Switzerland and Latvia also ranked highly. 
US citizens and companies for instance, were 
implicated in expropriation and bribery allegations, 
while a US bank was also evidently employed to 
launder money.393 Switzerland and Latvia’s primary 
function were as money laundering centres. It needs 
to be added and underlined, the institutions and 
jurisdictions involved here, have been implicated 
in a range of criminal activities. Their relationship 
with the Karimova syndicate was not anomalous. It 
appears to be part of a systemic pattern of activity. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude, in a region 
like Uzbekistan where state-organised crime is 
fractured between rival syndicates, the dangers 
and risks involved, create a reliance on offshore 
jurisdictions to enhance secrecy, security and  
wealth protection. These jurisdictions readily 
provide such services.
In the final section of this report consideration will 
be given to the principles and mechanisms that can 
be usefully deployed to guide international efforts 
directed towards remedy and non- reoccurrence 
in the Karimova case. This will lead to a series of 
concrete proposals, grounded in the foregoing 
evidence, that aim to enhance the impact of the 
ongoing US led asset-forfeiture initiative, both with 
respect to remediating victim populations, and 
promoting embryonic forms of reform in Uzbekistan 
that can aid non-reoccurrence.
3.9 Conclusion
Following her prolific rise between 2001 and 2010, Karimova’s bleak fate is 
indicative of the complex, turbulent nature of power-cliques in Uzbekistan, 
and the way in which agents who wield power, often become its victims. 
Indeed, many of the state agencies which executed Karimova’s orders are now 
implicated in her prosecution, which is perhaps the clearest signal of the fickle 
nature of state organised crime in Uzbekistan, whilst further demonstrating 
that this system is institutionally inscribed and systemic. It, therefore, endures 
despite the demise of individual operatives and syndicates.
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393 Evidence provided by Karimova’s financial adviser suggests Citibank UK closed down an account held in the name  
of Revi UK Limited, however, Inogambaev argues significant flows of money went through her personal account at 
Citibank, Dubai.
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‘It was a totally crazy situation. 
Bekhzod was the CEO for the 
competitor, MTS. And there sat 
TeliaSonera, in the competitor’s 
office, negotiating about money 
for the Karimov family’
TeliaSonera Executive
4. Victimhood and Grand Corruption: 
Building a Transformative Model
Under the leadership of the US Department of Justice, approximately 
US$850 million worth of assets have been seized, which are alleged to 
belong to Gulnara Karimova, through a series of front companies. The 
Department of Justice argues that these assets should be forfeited as the 
proceeds of crime. Given that the total sum sort amounts to almost one 
billion dollars, this asset-forfeiture action raises important legal and policy 
issues – in particular, how can the funds be deployed in ways that help 
remedy the harm inflicted by grand corruption in Uzbekistan.
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The default position in practice, and law, has been 
to return stolen assets to the state that has suffered 
loss as a result of this conduct, freeing the recipient 
government to apply these funds as national leaders 
see fit. However, when the state, and its organs, have 
been systematically involved in grand corruption, 
sensitive policy challenges emerge. Should the money 
be returned in these situations? If so, under what 
conditions? Furthermore, is there a principled basis 
on which this difficult decision can be made? 
If we turn to the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption (UNCAC), the emphasis here is on the 
return of property to its prior legitimate owners, or in 
the alternative, using returned assets to compensate 
victims.394 Uzbekistan’s telecom scandal reveals 
the practical difficulties associated with returning 
assets to its prior legitimate owner. Who, in fact, 
is the legitimate owner of these illicit proceeds in 
the Uzbek case? The shareholders of the different 
telecommunications firms? Or were these access 
payments made to Takilant and Swisdorn Limited, 
in fact money that should have been used for 
the benefit of the Uzbek people (i.e. license fees/
taxation), under the guardianship of the state. If the 
answer is yes, then how would we overcome the fact 
that the Uzbek state does not safeguard public funds, 
therefore, return of these funds to the government 
would likely lead to secondary forms of victimisation?
On the other hand, if instead we focus on the 
principle of compensating victims, which may be 
preferable in light of the above difficulties, we 
nonetheless still face numerous challenges. With 
respect to corruption, victimhood is not clearly 
defined in UNCAC. There is a risk, therefore, that by 
default victimhood will be defined through a white-
collar crime lens, which frames criminal events as 
a relationship between an individual perpetrator, 
and individual victims, who suffer immediate loss 
or harm as a result of the actions being censured. 
This lens is incongruent with the empirical realities 
exhibited in cases of grand corruption, where the 
illicit activity is institutionalised, while the harm 
generated by this activity has a number of vectors.
With these challenges in mind, the concluding 
section of this report will focus first on 
disaggregating the distinctive harms generated by 
state-organised rackets in Uzbekistan. The aim here 
is to build a holistic approach to victimhood, which 
more accurately reflect the harmful trajectories of 
state-organised criminality. Attention will then be 
turned to the field of transitional justice, where 
principles and mechanisms have emerged for 
addressing systematic harms perpetrated by state 
agencies. Finally, consideration will be given to how 
these principles and mechanisms might be adapted 
in order to help create a coherent approach for 
managing the return of seized assets emerging from 
the telecoms scandal.
394 Chapter V, United Nations Convention Against Corruption, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2005.
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First, there are what we might call ‘transactional 
victims’. This category pinpoints a specific set of 
individuals and entities, who suffered harm or loss as 
a result of transactions essential to the racketeering 
activity, Karimova and her associates, were alleged 
to be involved in. For instance, there are the 
companies and business owners, who experienced 
full or partial expropriation, under the weight of 
threats and/or political prosecutions. Then there are 
those individuals who faced violence at the hands of 
state security forces, as part of a broader endeavour 
by the Karimova syndicate to coerce an individual or 
entity into acting a certain way. Evidence suggests 
this coercive activity has taken a number of forms:
• torture, and detention
• imprisonment through a corrupted judicial process
• kidnap and ransom
• forced exile
Finally, there are the state assets, and revenues, 
which should have been employed for the benefit 
of the public, but were instead rendered into the 
custody of private entities linked to Karimova.  
In this case the public, as a collective, was the  
victim of these transactions.
In order for these victimising transactions to take 
place, the Karimova syndicate, it appears, were 
reliant on a series of institutional supports, that 
were essential to the administration of rackets. On 
the basis of the evidence discussed in the previous 
sections, the institutional structure essential to the 
racketeering activity had three core components:
1 Financial and corporate apparatus: The 
racketeering activity was not nationally self-
contained, it relied to a significant extent 
on international financial and corporate 
infrastructure, that ultimately proved hospitable 
to a range of illicit activities.
2 The administrative apparatus: The rackets were 
heavily dependent on the syndicate’s capacity to 
have a series of decisions enacted by government 
agencies, including Cabinet, Ministries, State 
Committees, the General Prosecutor, and the 
Courts. For instance, this enabled the syndicate to 
control market access and commercial operations 
in the telecommunications sector, and also, was 
an important mechanism for turning different 
forms of coercion into financial gain.
3 The security apparatus: Evidence suggests that 
the Karimova syndicate, for a period, was able to 
steer the activities of the SNB and the Presidential 
Security Service. This was essential to creating the 
general climate of fear upon which rackets rested; 
it also facilitated violent interventions, designed to 
expropriate or strong-arm businesses.
In the previous sections, it has already been noted 
that the Karimova syndicate was not responsible for 
setting up, or subverting, these different institutional 
levers that appear to have been essential to their 
illicit activity. To the contrary, the integration of 
state organs into organised-crime activity is a 
systemic reality in Uzbekistan that transcends 
particular groups. Indeed, it is apparent that state 
organs serve other syndicates, and senior power-
brokers in government, in a similar fashion to the 
Karimova case. Nevertheless, it does not negate the 
fact that throughout the period examined here, the 
government agencies noted above formed part of 
the Karimova syndicate’s activity structure.
4.1 Empirically identifying victims –  
A three layered approach
Once modelled, and analysed, the available evidence on the Karimova 
syndicate, indicate that there are, at least, three distinct categories of victim 
emerging from the racketeering activities.
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This dovetails with an essential insight, critical to 
comprehending grand corruption and kleptocracies. 
The rule of law’s erosion, the instrumentalisation 
of the bureaucracy, and the subversion of the 
security apparatus, are not the product of state-
failure, or insufficient capacity, although the latter 
might be a compounding factor. To the contrary, 
these deleterious aspects of the state edifice are 
created and sustained because they are part of an 
established repertoire that helps ruling cliques to 
accrue political power and economic advantage, 
which are generally entwined. Therefore, the violent 
organisation of state power in Uzbekistan, which in 
large part may be described as totalitarian, is not so 
much the case of a Soviet past haunting the political 
present, as it is a certain present commandeering 
the state instruments passed down from a Soviet 
past. This present is marked by a situation where 
governmental power helps to sustain the political 
ascendency of ruling clans and cliques, which in 
turn allows them to profit through state-organised 
rackets. This political-economic dynamic, in turn, is 
the driving force that upholds a civil administration 
and security apparatus that is autocratic, arbitrary 
and unaccountable.
Because the arbitrary and violent dimensions of 
Uzbekistan’s state-system is preserved in significant 
ways, by its deployment in corrupt political 
and economic processes – which the Karimova 
syndicate appears to be a prime example of – it is 
reasonable to categorise those persecuted by this 
administrative and security apparatus as victims of 
grand corruption. That is, were grand corruption 
no longer the principal vehicle of power and wealth 
accumulation in Uzbekistan, these deleterious 
aspects of the Uzbek state would lack contemporary 
purpose, and be reformed.
Framed this way, a significant constituency of 
Uzbek citizens and residents, who have experienced 
abuse, extortion, torture, and false-imprisonment 
at the hands of the state, can be deemed victims 
of a system of grand corruption, the Karimova 
syndicate appears to have been both a product of, 
and contributor to. We might call this constituency, 
‘system victims’, as their victimhood is not 
necessarily tied to transactions engineered by a 
particular syndicate, such as the Karimova group; 
but nonetheless emerges out of the system which 
must be maintained to support the activities of 
these syndicates. It is clear from the available 
evidence that this general system in Uzbekistan 
was central to securing the assets that have been 
frozen by the US Department of Justice. If they 
are successfully seized, it would appear reasonable 
to claim that those who have fallen victim to 
this predatory system deserve to be considered 
stakeholders in any compensation effort.
There is also an argument to be made for widening 
the lens of victimhood further, so it captures those 
affected by the damaging structural inequities 
which kleptocratic relations create in Uzbekistan. 
The environment of fear, terror and repression 
corruption has fostered, for example, means that 
no one within Uzbekistan is able to enjoy basic 
human rights, other than a select few in entrenched 
seats of power. Compounding matters, the illicit 
economies supported by this predatory system, 
have discouraged investment, stifled innovation, 
constricted productivity, diluted public management, 
and given rise to price gouging and exploitative 
black economies. As a result, the vast majority of 
Uzbekistan’s population – outside of elite circles – 
are unable to fully realise their human capabilities 
through meaningful participation in economic, 
cultural and social life, supported through accessible 
health, education and professional resources. Uzbek 
citizens, in other words, are denied substantive 
enjoyment of civil and political rights, which has 
tangible consequences that are commensurate 
with the harm suffered by system and transactional 
victims (see 3.2). We might call this cross-section, 
societal victims.
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In summary, we face a complex empirical reality 
when it comes to the question of grand corruption 
and victimhood in the Uzbek case. Because the 
criminal activity is state organised, and systemic 
in nature, it cannot be adequately addressed 
through a white-collar lens that is focused on 
offenses involving an individual perpetrator, and 
set of immediate victims, which are confronted 
employing the principles of retribution, deterrence, 
rehabilitation and restitution.
On that note, attention will now be turned to 
paradigms of justice that appear more sympathetic 
to the policy objectives underpinning international 
asset return. To that end, we will selectively examine 
the transitional justice literature, an applied area 
of knowledge and professional practice, that 
looks to address mass social-harms generated by 
systemic forms of political violence, ranging from 
war, through to authoritarian regimes. Critiques 
and innovations developed within this field can 
potentially provide a key foundation for constructing 
a principled approach for the return of seized assets, 
particularly in contexts marked by kleptocracies. 
Once these principles have been outlined, attention 
will then turn back to the question of seized assets 
in the Karimova case, in order to consider how they 
might be applied to inform the return process.
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32 The three layers of victimisation generated 
by grand corruption in Uzbekistan
395 The definition adopted by the UN Secretary-General is: ‘The full range of processes and mechanisms associated with 
a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve 
justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of 
international involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, 
vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof’. (UN Secretary General, ‘Rule of law and transitional justice in conflict 
and post-conflict societies’, UN Security Council: Secretary-General’s Reports, 2004, p.4, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2004/616).
396 P. Arthur, ‘How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice’. Human Rights 
Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 2, 2009, pp. 325; A.C. Patel, ‘Transitional Justice, DDR, and Security Sector Reform’ pp262-283 in A.C. 
Patel, P. De Greiff, P. and L. Waldorf (eds.), Disarming the Past: Transitional Justice and Ex-combatants. New York, Social 
Science Research Council, 2010, pp. 268-71; C, Sandoval, ‘Transitional Justice: Key Concepts, Processes and Challenges’, 
Institute for Democracy & Conflict Resolution – Briefing Paper, IDCR-BP-07/11, pp. 3- 10.
Nevertheless, TJ contains flaws which undermine 
its ability, as a framework, to fully deal with post-
authoritarian and post-conflict legacies. These flaws 
include its state-centric character; the marginalisation 
of victims; TJ’s overly legalistic content; its 
criminological focus on individual perpetrators of 
specific violations; and the neglect of substantive 
structural changes that could better ensure 
reparation and non-recurrence in the long-term.
With respect to the first critique, TJ is fundamentally 
pitched at the level of state, particularly with 
international law holding states responsible for 
failures to investigate and remedy rights violations. 
This focus is welcome, in the sense that it places 
pressure on countries to confront systemic 
criminality, but in itself suffers from two weaknesses: 
the assumption that the state has both the capacity 
and willingness to engage in serious efforts to 
deal with the past; and the tendency of state-level 
processes to disenfranchise local action. In the former 
respect, there are appeals within TJ processes to 
“draw a line under the past”, “move on” and “start 
afresh” – yet remnants of previous regimes (personnel 
and institutional) do not simply disappear. This point 
will be further dealt with below.
On the latter front – disenfranchising local action 
– the exclusion of victims is another serious 
consequence of TJ processes being conducted 
primarily at a governmental level, often with a 
significant role being played by international actors 
including foreign states, civil society organisations 
and governance institutions. This can generate 
transitional mechanisms that are unsuited to 
the host societies, and approaches that satisfy 
the international community rather than the 
requirement of national legitimacy.
Truth Commissions are one of TJs major non-judicial 
contributions, which arise from a desire to shed 
light on secretive regimes and involve victims. 
However, even here it is argued that victims tend to 
participate on other’s terms or not at all, with most 
efforts being centralised, often privileging urban 
dwellers, and led by national or global elites. In 
particular, victims are not involved in designing Truth 
4.2 From transitional to transformative justice
Transitional justice (TJ) emerged during the 1980s in an effort to deal with 
the authoritarian legacies of European and Latin American pasts, using 
processes that aim to prosecute wrongdoers, reveal truth, redress harm, 
facilitate reconciliation and prevent the recurrence of violence and rights 
violations.395 TJ has subsequently been extended to conflict, post-colonial and 
institutional abuse contexts, while also solidifying its focus around four core 
processes: (criminal) justice, truth-telling, reparation, and institutional reform.396 
Importantly, TJ is now a framework/concept/approach/field of endeavour 
recognised by the UN and other international actors, and a dominant one in 
many post-authoritarian and post-conflict states.
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Commissions, and participate instead by testifying 
rather than contributing to the collation, analysis 
or publication of the work being done. This means 
that there is little substantive contact beyond the 
days spent telling their story, and no opportunity 
for capacity building or deeper empowerment. 
In addition, victims do not have the ability to 
enforce Truth Commission recommendations 
which are easily ignored or subverted by more 
powerful actors,397 as was the case in Guatemala 
and Nepal when the state did little to implement 
the recommendations. This means that more 
transformative actions such as far-reaching 
reparations programmes or reform of abusive state 
institutions are unlikely to be carried out.
Beyond Truth Commissions, TJ has conventionally 
relied on legal forums to address the question of 
justice, where victims are commonly brought in 
as witnesses – here their experience of brutality 
is instrumentalised to secure convictions against 
principal actors. This legalistic orientation is closely 
linked to an individualised focus in TJ, a process 
modelled on corrective criminal justice systems 
that concentrate on prosecuting criminals as a 
means to both punish them and deter others.398 
The dominance of legalistic approaches in TJ 
can be seen in a recent empirical study which 
concluded that 82% of mechanisms are related 
to the justice process, comprising of prosecutions 
and amnesties.399 The bulk of human and financial 
resources, as well as time and political capital, are 
therefore expended pursuing legal avenues of 
redress. For example, Sierra Leone’s Special Court 
had an operating budget of $250 million, whereas 
only US$4.4 million was available for reparations.400 
In fact Lansana Gberie claims the final cost was 
US$300 million, of which 70% went on paying 
salaries and bonuses, often to non-Sierra Leoneans. 
In a context of constrained resources, the choice of 
certain mechanisms clearly impedes the operation 
of others.401
Restorative or reparative justice strands of TJ 
reject a strictly criminal justice oriented approach, 
conceptualising violations firstly as a harm to the 
community and a crime second. The objective 
then is to rebuild relations within the community 
and between victim and perpetrator. However, 
even then it has been argued that restorative 
justice schemes continue to focus on the past, 
seeking accountability for individual violations.402 
Accordingly, this narrow focus on specific incidents, 
transactions and individuals fails to elucidate the 
structures underpinning violations, nor does it 
uncover the important roles played by facilitators, 
beneficiaries and bystanders.403 
Critique of TJ’s individualised focus applies also to 
its truth and reparative components. The remit of 
Truth Commissions is to extract individuals’ stories; 
while this is a vital building block for elucidating 
general patterns of structural or collective harms, 
many reports remain a compendium of individual 
cases rather than a deeper analysis of the social 
foundations underpinning violence. Furthermore, 
reparation payments are often made in a short-term 
and individually focused way, based on incidents 
of direct violence or violations of civil and political 
rights. So while reparations are, in theory, designed 
397 M, Evans., ‘Structural Violence, Socioeconomic Rights, and Transformative Justice’, Journal of Human Rights, vol. 15, 
no. 1, 2016, p.5.
398 L, Arbour, ‘Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition’. New York University Journal of International Law 
and Politics, vol. 40, no. 1, 2007, p. 2; L. Waldorf, ‘Anticipating the past: Transitional justice and socio-economic wrongs’. 
Social & Legal Studies, vol. 21, no. 2, 2012, pp. 171-186; E.A. Posner and A. Vermeule, ‘Transitional Justice as Ordinary 
Justice’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 117, no. 3, pp. 761-825; D, Dyzenhaus, ‘Leviathan as a Theory of Transitional Justice’ in 
M.S. Williams, R. Nagy and J. Elster, (eds) Transitional Justice. New York, New York University Press, 2012, pp.180-217.
399 T.D. Olsen et al., Transitional Justice in Balance: Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy. Washington, DC, United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 2010, p.39.
400 ‘Evaluating Transitional Justice’, Oxford Transitional Justice Research Seminar Series, [podcast], Oxford University, 
2015, https://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/evaluating-transitional-justice (accessed 13 February 2017).
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402 Z. Miller, ‘Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the “Economic” in Transitional Justice’, International Journal of Transitional 
Justice, vol. 2, no. 3, 2008, p. 275; K. Clamp, Restorative Justice in Transition, London, Routledge, 2014, p.34-35. 
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to provide corrective and distributive justice, 
define guilt and victimhood, identify power shifts 
and redefine citizenship,404 they ultimately fail to 
redistribute wealth or power on a scale that could 
truly reduce systemic inequalities or challenge 
dominant power relations.405
This failure is also linked to the other factors 
enumerated above, together demonstrating the 
major historical weakness of TJ, is its unwillingness 
or inability to properly diagnose and confront 
underpinning structures that sustain different forms 
of marginalisation, exploitation and predation, at 
the heart of contention, conflict and insecurity. 
Indeed, TJ has traditionally focussed on redressing 
direct violence and violations of civil and political 
rights (CPR): massacres, disappearances, tortures. 
However, these CPR violations are indivisible from 
violations of economic, social and cultural rights 
(ESCR) legally, conceptually and practically, a point 
that has been noted by critical TJ scholarship,406 
and in non-TJ work.407
Therefore, it is important to build transitional 
frameworks which are capable of identifying the 
deeply embedded social processes within a regional 
context that: rigidly allocate privilege on the one 
hand, and disadvantage on the other; distribute 
opportunities for self and community advancement, 
along opaque, non-democratic lines; permit certain 
forms of exploitation, which significantly diminish 
the dignity of its participants; all of which as a 
totality, are among the key forces underpinning 
conflict, insecurity and repressive state violence.
Structural violence is a category that has emerged 
within the peace-making literature to frame these 
systemic processes, that underpin more immediate 
forms of violence, corruption and insecurity. To that 
end, structural forms of violence differs from direct 
violence in that it occurs without a clear subject-
action-object relation.408 Instead, it draws attention 
to the ways in which social systems shape the ability 
of individuals or groups to access rights, services 
and opportunities, or even to meet basic needs.409 
It also points to the way in which headline- grabbing 
incidents of gross human rights violations and 
direct violence are normally sustained by deeper 
hierarchies of power that maintain highly inequitable 
societal relations.410
In short, structural violence rests on three major 
pillars: social marginalisation, political exclusion 
and economic exploitation.411 It captures, in 
other words, (1) the different ways in which 
sections of the population face social exclusion 
based on gender, race, belief and/or class; (2) how 
political power is distributed and pooled through 
institutional arrangements, creating significant 
differentials in capacity and accountability; and, (3) 
the methods by which capital, resources and labour 
come together in a structured fashion, creating 
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substantive inequities and inequalities in wealth. 
None of which is a natural phenomenon – they are 
engineered socially, and hinge as much on agency, 
albeit on a different socio- temporal scale, as the 
direct forms of violence that sustain conflict and 
authoritarian regimes.
Furthermore, the harm produced by structural 
violence is no less serious, or depersonalised, 
than direct violence. For instance, Evans argues ‘a 
person’s life expectancy may be reduced by an act  
of direct, intended personal violence or by the 
failure of a system to provide adequate care for 
those with treatable illnesses’.412 For the victim, 
the end result – loss of life – is the same. Therefore, 
prioritising one modality of engineered violence  
over the other, at least from a social harm 
perspective has no compelling basis – especially 
given their entwined characteristics. 
This critique of TJ, made from the vantage point 
of structural violence, has particular relevance 
to corruption. For example, we have observed in 
Uzbekistan how state-organised rackets use both 
physical violence, and property expropriation, which 
has significant impacts on the health, wellbeing and 
opportunities available to the victims of these illicit 
transactions. However, at the same time, these 
rackets are symptomatic of an institutionalised 
culture which sees wealth and resources 
systematically syphoned away from important 
forms of social consumption, such as public 
health and education, while maintaining a widely 
feared surveillance and repressive apparatus. This 
overarching system that sustains rackets, in turn, has 
deleterious impacts on the Uzbek population, that 
are commensurate with the violence experienced by 
those persecuted directly through rackets.
In recognition of the nexus between structural 
and direct violence, a growing strand of thought 
centring on the concept of transformative justice 
has emerged. This framework aims to bring about 
transitional methods capable of tackling the nexus 
holistically, thus overcoming observed flaws in TJ 
models. It is to this framework we will now turn.
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Critically, transformative justice rejects the 
imposition of a global template, which can be 
applied in diverse societies. In fact, its proponents 
argue that a single national model of justice can 
even be problematic given the economic, political, 
social and cultural dynamics that shape experiences 
of violence or authoritarian regimes, often assume 
specifically localised form. It is also essential, from 
a transformative justice perspective, for initiatives 
that address systemic forms of exclusion and 
marginalisation to have deep public participation. 
Importantly, this entails that victims of direct and 
structural violence participate as key stakeholders 
at all stages of the transformative process. This 
will include diagnosing the problem, along with, 
designing, implementing and monitoring reparations 
and reformative measures.
Such deep engagement fulfils an empowerment 
function by building the capacity and confidence of 
marginalised individuals, groups and communities 
to participate more fully in emerging social and 
political spaces. An empowered civil society, in 
turn, is central to initiating new democratising 
processes, and advocating for resources from the 
central state.414 Indeed, bottom-up initiatives 
can subsequently be scaled-up and transferred to 
other sectors and localities by building constructive 
alliances with interested stakeholders.415 For 
instance, rural communities in parts of Colombia 
are reversing the existing transitional dynamic 
by convening assemblies and inviting state 
representatives to dialogue, rather than travelling to 
appear in state-organised forums.416
Drawing on this victim-centred approach, 
transformative justice focuses primarily on 
the fourth pillar of TJ,417 institutional reform. 
Changes here are more likely to have deep and 
lasting consequences, as opposed to legalistic 
and routinised processes of prosecutions, truth- 
telling and individualised reparations. That said, 
transformative justice does not take institutional 
reform as a goal in itself, but rather as a key starting 
point for addressing social, political and economic 
exclusion, and improving overall living conditions. 
It creates a context for rethinking the exclusionary 
practices and systems that have made transitional 
societies inequitable places prone to structural and 
direct violence.
4.3 A transformative model of justice
Transformative justice places structural violence at the centre of its 
analysis, and aims to seriously counter the forms of social marginalisation, 
political exclusion and economic exploitation existing in many transitional 
states, as a key step to reducing both structural and direct violence. To 
that end, transformative justice is best defined as ‘transformative change 
that emphasises local agency and resources, the prioritisation of process 
rather than preconceived outcomes and the challenging of unequal and 
intersecting power relationships and structures of exclusion at both the 
local and the global level’.413
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To effect this rethinking and reform process, the 
effectiveness of transitional initiatives are assessed 
on the basis of their performance in three distinct 
areas: diagnosis, process and outcome.418 The 
diagnostic dimension requires that transitional 
initiatives engage in comprehensive analysis that 
considers the historical roots and political economy 
of the existing situation, and any lessons learnt from 
past initiatives in the region, or those undertaken 
in a different, comparable place. The process 
dimension calls for meaningful involvement of 
victim communities as active agents in designing 
transitional policies and practices, in a manner 
that values local knowledge, understandings 
and manners of working. Processes that fulfil 
this participatory function can be considered 
transformative, as they contain the potential to 
alter the basis of existing social relationships 
and challenge the decision-making monopoly 
of dominant groups, and empower wider civic 
competence.419 Operationally, this may entail 
removing cultural, financial or social barriers that 
prevent meaningful inclusion, in addition to building 
the capacity and confidence of marginalised 
communities and individuals to participate 
more fully in society. The outcome dimension 
recognises that transformative initiatives should 
have tangible positive and context-specific effects 
on everyday life, such as creating more equitable 
societal structures or widening access to social and 
economic opportunities.
A transformative justice matrix has been developed 
by McGill, as a tool to for enhancing initiative design 
in the above respects.420 It invites practitioners 
to critically reflect on initiative design and focus, 
through a series of questions, framed from a 
diagnostic, process and outcome vantage point.421 
In so doing it provides an evaluative tool for critically 
reflecting on each stage of the transformative 
initiative, and its success in building mechanisms 
that address the nexus between structural and 
direct violence, through victim oriented transitional 
processes. The matrix provided below has been 
modified for an asset recovery initiative in 
Uzbekistan. In the next section we will consider its 
applied relevance for the Karimova case.
418  D. McGill, ‘Different Violence, Different Justice? Taking Structural Violence Seriously in Post- Conflict and Transitional 
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420 D. McGill, ‘Different Violence, Different Justice? Taking Structural Violence Seriously in Post- Conflict and Transitional 
Justice Processes’. State Crime Journal: Special Issue on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, the Crimes of the Powerful and 
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1 DIAGNOSIS & AIMS
• Who created the (asset return) initiative?
• What problem does the initiative target?
• What causes does it identify?
• Are asymmetrical power relations acknowledged?
• Are the existence of exclusions and inequities acknowledged?
• What are the proclaimed aims?
• Who are the initiative’s intended beneficiaries?
• How are beneficiaries defined and identified?
 
2  DESIGN & PROCESS
• Is there local community involvement in designing the initiative?
• Are local needs/concerns addressed?
• How is participation in the initiative ensured?
• What form does participation take?
• At what point in the process is participation taking place?
• Is there capacity building to enable participation?
• Are practical or financial obstacles to participation removed?
• Is participation open only to direct beneficiaries?
• How are participants selected?
• Are they representative of the local community in terms of race/gender/class?
 
33 Transformative Justice Matrix (modified for Uzbekistan)
3 OUTCOMES (potential indicators – related to groups suffering direct and structural violence)
1. Direct Violence
• Have extortionate practices generally reduced?
• Have killings/kidnappings/threats against businesses reduced?
• Has the use of forced labour been reduced? 
2. Socio-political
• Are civil society organisations more active in commenting on and participating in
initiatives designed to enhance public integrity?
• Have media organisations been allowed more space to hold accountable both government
and the private sector?
• Do local communities have greater input in defining local priorities, overseeing spending
and participating in good governance forums?
• Do local communities have greater input in decision making bodies?
• Has participation in the initiative increased wider socio-political mobilisation?
• Do local communities and the broader diaspora have greater input into the transnational
governance of financial flows and corporate infrastructure underpinning corruption in Uzbekistan?
3. Economic
• Is there evidence of decreasing incidents of bribery?
• Are markets, and state industries, practically governed in a more transparent, accountable fashion?
• Have industries marked by forced labour practices been reduced?
• Is there a more equitable distribution of wealth?
• Have employment opportunities and incomes increased?
• Has access to and ownership of resources broadened?
• Are necessary economic inputs available?
• Has necessary infrastructure improved?
• Have inequalities reduced? 
4. Socioeconomic
• Has access to education improved?
• Have literacy levels improved?
• Have average years in education increased?
• Have education inequities reduced?
• Has access to health services improved?
• Have health inequities reduced?
• Have health outcomes improved state-wide?
 
   Confronting Grand Corruption in Uzbekistan  87
If we now return to the question of asset recovery, 
set against the backdrop of the US Department 
of Justice action against assets linked to Gulnara 
Karimova, a number of points can be made, taking 
into account both the lessons of TJ, and the principles 
advanced by transformative justice proponents.
First, it would be beneficial – from a participatory 
perspective – if the seized assets were transferred 
into an institutional context, where civil society 
engagement could take place, so victims have 
a real role in (a) diagnosing the problem; (b) 
designing how returned assets are deployed; and (c) 
formulating a set of desirable initiative outcomes. 
The category, victim, here captures transactional, 
system and societal victims, who as a whole, must 
be empowered to share experiences and develop 
solutions, that can remedy the direct violence 
they faced, while also devising mechanisms that 
can incrementally impact upon structural forms of 
violence in the long term.
This objective would appear to disqualify – at least 
in the short term – returning the assets to the Uzbek 
state, which in its present iteration would be unable 
to oversee this democratic conversation, leaving 
aside the fact its institutions remain unreformed 
perpetrators of the illicit activities documented in the 
previous sections. An alternative approach would be 
to create a new space where an inclusive, democratic 
conversation could occur, through the vehicle of an 
independent trust. Providing it was underpinned 
by robust oversight mechanisms, a representative 
board from civil society, and transparent reporting 
requirements, a trust could create the institutional 
context where complex policy questions are handled, 
free from state-centric pressures.
Accordingly, the trust should not be conceived of as 
an implementing vehicle for a prescribed process of 
asset return. This would court the same problems 
besetting TJ processes that are designed by global 
stakeholders, without the requisite forms of bottom-
up participation from victims/survivors – namely, 
the asset-return process would lack legitimacy, nor 
would it offer avenues for empowering victims, 
in ways that are capable of addressing long-term 
transformative aims. Accordingly, the trust should 
be framed as a democratic space for engaging 
victims in a constructive conversation on desirable 
implementing processes, and initiative outcomes.
This raises the question of how victims can be 
engaged, when governed by an authoritarian state. 
First, it ought to be noted that a significant number 
of transactional, system and societal victims, have 
been exiled or ejected from Uzbekistan – this 
stakeholder group is a readily accessible resource for 
a victim oriented, asset return initiative if properly 
resourced and supported. Second, consideration 
can also be given to methods for engaging citizens 
in Uzbekistan, drawing on secure communications 
technology, and discussion forums in neutral 
locations, where stakeholders could speak with a 
substantively lowered risk of repercussion. Third, 
creating a democratic space for victims, need not 
mean the exclusion of Uzbek state officials. It is 
important, where possible, that the conversations 
and actions facilitated through the trust, take into 
account state initiated reform efforts, through 
constructive dialogue.
4.4 Applying the transformative model to Uzbekistan
Put succinctly, the experience of TJ warns against justice oriented initiatives 
that abstract illicit events from the broader structural realities they are reliant 
on, and sustain. It also warns against combatting human rights violations 
and social harms using burdensome legal procedures, that marginalise the 
populations who are expected to benefit from transitional measures, thus 
reproducing the cycle of exclusion.
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Ultimately, if asset return is to be leveraged for 
maximum impact, the trust must be instrumentalised 
as a mechanism for generating a safe space 
where victims can be engaged, in diagnosing 
the problem, setting desirable outcomes, and 
designing implementing measures. Furthermore, 
a transformative justice matrix, such as the one 
set out in the previous section, can be employed 
as a tool for holding the trust to account, ensuring 
the constituting processes governing asset return 
remain focused on addressing the mutually 
reinforcing goals of empowering victims, repairing 
harm, and addressing the structural forces that 
sustain systems of grand corruption.
This proposal represents a change in tact for asset 
return procedure. In effect, it involves shifting 
asset recovery to a different modality of justice, 
moving it away from a white-collar crime paradigm, 
to one grounded in transitional, transformative 
and restorative principles of justice. This is a move 
that appears sympathetic to the broader policy 
objectives underpinning asset return. Indeed, it 
will potentially allow asset recovery to become 
a substantive practice that seriously confronts 
the systems and processes that underpin grand 
corruption in regions burdened by kleptocracies,  
by making victims and civil society the driving force 
guiding the remediation and reform process.
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‘“Victims” means persons who, individually 
or collectively, have suffered harm, including 
physical or mental injury, emotional 
suffering, economic loss or substantial 
impairment of their fundamental rights, 
through acts or omissions that are in 
violation of criminal laws operative within 
Member States, including those laws 
proscribing criminal abuse of power’.
UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for  
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (1985)
5. Conclusions and Recommendations
On the basis of the evidence outlined in this report – if its accuracy can 
be accepted – a number of key conclusions may be drawn that illuminate 
fundamental features of corruption in Uzbekistan, which have critical 
implications for how these practices are confronted.
In particular: 
1 The activity of the Karimova syndicate is most 
accurately framed as state-organised crime. 
Karimova’s orders were willingly implemented 
by state agencies, and were part of a state 
sanctioned culture of racketeering, corruption, 
violence and impunity.
2 State-organised crime as it is practised in 
Uzbekistan, is a form of grand corruption. The 
constitutive activities of which are dependent on 
the systematic persecution of particular civilian 
populations. Most directly, those who have 
successfully established profitable businesses are 
targeted, along with their family and employees. 
However, it is also apparent that the Uzbek 
national population as a whole are persecuted 
by a regime that employs state terrorism, to 
buttress political power, and the illicit economies 
this power is instrumental to. Without a general 
climate of fear, and paranoia, the illicit economies 
essential to state-organised crime in Uzbekistan, 
would be difficult to administer.
3 Given that grand corruption in Uzbekistan is 
enacted through the persecution of particular 
groups, and the population as a whole, employing 
a range of inhumane tactics, collectively these 
acts constitute gross human rights violations.
4 These gross human rights violations so integral 
to state-organised crime in Uzbekistan, rest on a 
transnational infrastructure of shell companies, 
financial institutions, multinational companies and 
professional service providers.  
5 Notably the UK and its overseas territories 
appear to be arguably one of the most critical 
transnational spokes facilitating these gross 
human rights abuses.
On the basis of the above empirical conclusions,  
this report makes a number of core 
recommendations for enhancing the administration 
of justice in the Karimova case. These core 
recommendations include:
1 Caution should be exercised when attempting 
to deliver justice through a white-collar crime 
lens that is focused upon punishing individual 
deviance, through state-centric processes. 
Such a frame will not fully address the causes 
underpinning the offending; it risks entrenching 
the marginalised position of victims; and, it will 
generate secondary forms of victimisation if 
seized assets are returned to the Uzbek state.
2 An effective and urgent response to the types 
of illicit activity documented in the Karimova 
case, must begin with special measures directed 
towards ensuring that no jurisdiction beyond 
Uzbekistan can be used to organise such conduct, 
or launder its proceeds. This requires international 
cooperation, compliance from the private sector, 
and robust action against those actors who fail to 
prevent their institution or jurisdiction from being 
used as a conduit for state-organised crime.
3 Civil asset forfeiture is arguably one of the more 
powerful tools available for delivering justice 
in the Karimova case. First, seized proceeds of 
crime can buttress transformative measures 
designed to repair the harm suffered by victims. 
Second, a portion of these funds can be directed 
towards funding initiatives designed to prevent 
reoccurrence. Given that a vibrant, active civil 
society is argued to be an essential bulwark 
against grand corruption, their involvement should 
be central to any such initiative.
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4 The conduct being confronted through asset 
forfeiture should be framed as state organised 
and systemic, rather than individually organised 
and episodic. Furthermore, this systematic, state 
organised activity involves the persecution of 
distinct groups, in addition to a broader cross-
section of society victimised through a regime 
of state surveillance and repression essential to 
illicit economies in Uzbekistan. Both groups are, 
accordingly, important stakeholders in the justice 
making process.
5 The political-economic arrangements essential to 
state-organised crime in Uzbekistan, are wedded 
to different forms of structural violence, including, 
for instance, democratic restrictions that preclude 
the public from meaningfully participating in 
spaces of political power; labour regimes that 
violate fundamental worker rights; rackets which 
prevent private sector actors from enjoying 
market freedoms essential to growing businesses; 
and, models of state asset allocation that reduce 
productivity and deny the public essential 
services. As a result, reform and justice need to be 
pursued in a strategic manner, that acknowledges 
their mutual dependency.
6 The principles of transformative justice could 
usefully inform how stolen assets are returned 
to victim populations. In short, a transformative 
approach to asset-forfeiture would require 
processes oriented towards (a) redress of the 
diverse social harms suffered by victimised 
populations, (b) securing non-reoccurrence, 
and (c) assisting movements and initiatives that 
can instigate reforms which confront structural 
violence. To achieve these ends, a transformative 
approach encourages the engagement of victim 
groups in the design of enacting mechanisms for 
asset return, and defining desirable outcomes. 
This promotes a return process that is bottom-up, 
victim oriented, context driven and calibrated to 
important systemic changes.
7 It would be beneficial – from a participatory 
perspective – if the seized assets were 
transferred into an institutional context, where 
civil society engagement could take place. This 
would appear to disqualify – at least in the short 
term – returning the assets to the Uzbek state, 
which in its present iteration would be unable to 
oversee such a democratic conversation, leaving 
aside the fact its institutions remain unreformed 
perpetrators of the illegitimate activities 
documented in this report.
8 An alternative approach would be to create a new 
space where an inclusive, democratic conversation 
could take place, through the vehicle of an 
independent trust. Providing it was underpinned 
by robust oversight mechanisms, a representative 
board from civil society, and transparent reporting 
requirements, a trust could create the institutional 
context where complex policy questions are 
handled, free from state- centric pressures. It 
would also generate a safe space where victims 
can be engaged, in diagnosing the problem,  
setting desirable outcomes, and designing 
implementing measures.
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